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ABSTRACT 
Worms and their variants are widely believed to be one of the most serious 
challenges in network security research. In recent years, propagation mechanisms used 
by worms have evolved with the proliferation of data transmission, instant messages 
and other communication technologies. However, automatically scanning 
vulnerabilities and sending malicious email attachments (human involvement) are still 
the two main means for spreading worms. 
 In order to prevent worms from propagating, as well as to mitigate the impact of an 
outbreak, we need to have a detailed and quantitative understanding of how a worm 
spreads. However, previous models mainly focus on analyzing the trends of worm 
propagation and fail to describe the spreading of worms between different individual 
nodes. This leads to difficulties in providing a set of optimized and economical patch 
strategies that deal with the problems of when, where and how many nodes we need to 
patch. In this thesis, we present a microcosmic analysis of the propagation procedure 
for scanning worms. It is different from traditional models and can accurately reflect 
the distribution of nodes in the network in terms of the propagation probabilities. 
Moreover, from the microcosmic model, we can provide defenders with useful 
information to answer above three questions and generate a set of optimized patch 
strategies that minimize the number of infected nodes. The results we obtained can 
benefit the security industry by allowing them to save significant money in the 
deployment of their security patching schemes. 
The propagation of topology-based worms is a complex procedure as it is closely 
allied to the topology of the network and requires human interference to spread. Few 
previous researches have accurately modeled the propagation dynamics of topological 
worms in an analytical way. Either the spreading speed is overestimated due to the 
implicit homogeneous mixing assumption or the propagation is investigated through 
simulation rather than in terms of an analytical model. In this thesis, we propose two 
methods for modeling the propagation mechanism of typical topology-based worms. 
In the first method, we use a novel probability matrix to examine the propagation deep 
inside the spreading procedure among nodes and work out an effective scheme against 
topology-based worms. In the second method, we derive an accurate propagation 
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model of email worms by investigating the individual steps and state transitions from 
an analytical point of view. This not only provides an accurate representation on the 
propagation of worms with different checking time, but also can reflect the repetitious 
email sending process. Analysis of experiments demonstrates that the two models are 
accurate and can aid a better and more realistic understanding of the propagation of 
topology-based worms. 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 presents an introduction to the 
characteristics of worms and their propagation mechanisms, and also describes 
research objectives and the major contributions of this thesis. Chapter 2 provides a 
detailed survey of related work carried out in the target discovery techniques of 
worms and the modeling of worm propagation is also presented. Chapters 3 to 6 
present our major contributions for modeling the spreading procedure of scanning 
worms and topology-based worms. Chapter 3 proposes a microcosmic model of worm 
propagation by concentrating on the propagation probability and time delay described 
by a complex matrix. In Chapter 4, we evaluate the microcosmic model for scanning 
worms and provide a set of optimized and economic patch strategies. In Chapter 5, we 
propose a novel probability matrix to model the propagation mechanism of a typical 
topology-based worm, and derive a series of effective defense schemes against it. 
Chapter 6 presents an analytical model of the propagation dynamics of email worms. 
Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the contributions of this thesis and discusses future 
work. 
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1 
Chapter 1  
Introduction 
In this chapter, we begin by introducing the background and basic concepts relevant to this 
thesis. We then describe the research objectives and highlight the major contributions of the 
research in our study. Finally, we outline the organization of this thesis. 
1.1 Background  
Worms and their variants have been a persistent security threat in the Internet from the late 
1980s, especially during the past decade. For example, the Code Red worm [15] in 2001 
infected at least 359,000 hosts in 24 hours and had already cost an estimated $2.6 billion in 
damage to networks previous to the 2001 attack [86]. The Blaster worm [66] of 2003 infected 
at least 100,000 Microsoft Windows systems and cost each of the 19 research universities an 
average of US$299,579 to recover from the worm attacks [87]. Conficker worm [88, 92] was 
the fifth-ranking global malicious threat observed by Symantec in 2009 and infected nearly 
6.5 million computers by attacking Microsoft vulnerabilities. These worms not only lead to 
large parts of the Internet becoming temporarily inaccessible, but also caused a huge amount 
of financial loss and social disruption around the world. According to the official Internet 
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threat report of the Symantec Corporation [59], worms made up the second highest 
percentage of the top 50 potential malicious code infections for 2009, which rose from 29 
percent in 2008 to 43 percent in 2009.  
1.1.1 Definition of a Worm 
A computer worm is a program that self-propagates across a network exploiting security or 
policy flaws in widely-used services [14]. Worms and viruses are often placed together in the 
same category, however there is a technical distinction. A virus is a piece of computer code 
that attaches itself to a computer program, such as an executable file. The spreading of 
viruses is triggered when the infected program is launched by human action. A worm is 
similar to a virus by design and is considered to be a sub-class of viruses. It differs from a 
virus in that it exists as a separate entity that contains all the code needed to carry out its 
purposes and does not attach itself to other files or programs. Therefore, we distinguish 
between worms and viruses in that the former searches for new targets to transmit themselves, 
whereas the latter searches for files in a computer system to attach themselves to and which 
requires some sort of user action to abet their propagation [89].  
1.1.2 Worm Categorization 
A worm compromises a victim by searching through an existing vulnerable host. There are 
a number of techniques by which a worm can discover new hosts to exploit. According to the 
target-search process, we can divide worms into two categories: scan-based worms and 
topology-based worms.   
A. Scan-based Worms 
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A scan-based worm (scanning worm) propagates by probing the entire IPv4 space or a set 
of IP addresses and directly compromises vulnerable target hosts without human interference, 
such as Code Red I v2 (2001), Code Red II (2001), Slammer/Sapphire (2003), Blaster (2003), 
Witty (2004) [41], Sasser (2004) [42] and Conficker (2009) [88, 92]. A key characteristic of a 
scan-based worm is that it can propagate without dependence on the topology. This means 
that an infectious host is able to infect an arbitrary vulnerable computer.  
Scan-based worms employ various scanning strategies, such as random scanning and 
localized scanning, to find victims when they have no knowledge of where vulnerable hosts 
reside in the Internet. Random scanning selects target IP addresses randomly, whereas worms 
using the localized scanning strategy scan IP addresses close to their addresses with a higher 
probability compared to addresses that are further away.  
B. Topology-based Worms 
A topology-based worm, such as an email worm and a social network worm, relies on the 
information contained in the victim machine to locate new targets. This intelligent 
mechanism allows for a far more efficient propagation than scan-based worms that make a 
large number of wild guesses for every successful infection. Instead, they can infect on 
almost every attempt and thus, achieve a rapid spreading speed. Secondly, by using social 
engineering techniques on modern topological worms, most internet users can possibly fail to 
recognize malicious codes and become infected, therefore resulting in a wide range of 
propagation. 
A key characteristic of a topology-based worm is that it spreads through topological 
neighbors. For example, email worms, such as Melissa (1999) [70], Love Letter (2000) [71, 
90], Sircam (2001)[91], MyDoom (2004) and Here you have (2010), infect the system 
immediately when a user opens a malicious email attachment and sends out worm email 
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copies to all email addresses in the email book of the compromised receiver. For social 
network worms such as Koobface, the infected account will automatically send the malicious 
file or link to the people in the contact list of this user.  
1.1.3 The Propagation of Worms 
Worms have attracted widespread attention because they have the ability to travel from 
host to host and from network to network. Before a worm can be widely spread, it must first 
explore the vulnerabilities in the network by employing various target discovery techniques. 
Subsequently, it infects computer systems and uses infected computers to spread itself 
automatically (as with scan-based worms) or through human activation (as with topology-
based worms).   
During the propagation of worms, hosts in the network have three different states: 
susceptible, infectious and removed. A susceptible host is a host that is vulnerable to 
infection; an infectious host means one which has been infected and can infect others; a 
removed host is immune or dead so cannot be infected by worms again. According to 
whether infected hosts can become susceptible again after recovery, researchers model the 
propagation of worms based on three major models: SI models (if no infected hosts can 
recover), SIS models (if infected hosts can become susceptible again) and SIR models (if 
infected hosts can recover). Researchers have also and then presented various defense 
mechanisms against the propagation of worms. 
Although a great deal of research has been done to prevent worms from spreading, worm 
attacks still pose a serious security threat to networks for the following reasons. Firstly, 
worms can propagate through the network very quickly by various means, such as file 
downloading, email, exploiting security holes in software, etc. Some worms can potentially 
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establish themselves on all vulnerable machines in only a few seconds [7]. Secondly, the 
rapid advances of computer and network technologies allow modern computer worms to 
propagate at a speed much faster than human-mediated responses. Thirdly, in order to 
propagate successfully, worms are becoming more complicated and increasingly efficient. It 
is therefore of great importance to characterize worm attack behaviors, analyze propagation 
procedures and efficiently provide patch strategies for protecting networks from worm 
attacks.  
1.2 Research Objectives 
The objective of this thesis is to model and defend against worm attacks that employ 
different target discovery techniques. Specifically, we investigate the propagation procedure 
of worms and aim to provide a set of optimized and economical patch strategies that deal 
with the following important problems: 1) Where do we patch? 2) How many nodes do we 
need to patch? 3) When do we patch? In order to address these three questions, we need to 
model the characteristics of worm propagation that can examine the spreading deep inside the 
propagation procedure among hosts in the network, ensuring we can accurately understand 
the spreading and work out effective schemes that minimize the number of infected nodes 
against the propagation of worms. The results of this research can benefit the security 
industry by allowing them to save significant money in the deployment of their security 
patching schemes. 
Our research also includes modeling of the propagation dynamics of email worms as they 
constitute one of the major Internet security problems. We aim to present an analytical model 
to investigate the details of the propagation mechanisms and characterize the spreading of 
real-world email worms based on their infection strategies. This model should reflect a 
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realistic understanding of email worm spreading and provide an accurate representation of the 
propagation procedure. This analytical model can benefit the creation of new tactics against 
email worms. 
1.3 Contributions of the Thesis 
In this thesis, we firstly present a microcosmic worm propagation model to accurately 
access the spreading process and investigate errors which are usually concealed in the 
traditional macroscopic analytical models. We then apply the proposed microcosmic model to 
observe the propagation of scan-based worms and provide a series of recommendations and 
advice for patch strategies to counter worm propagation. We also present a novel process 
modeling the propagation of topology-based worms to examine the spreading deep inside the 
propagation procedure and address effective schemes to deal with the problems of where and 
how many nodes we need to patch. We further model the propagation dynamics of email 
worms analytically, thus helping us to understand real-world worms based on their different 
infection methods, which, in turn can benefit the deployment of new defense strategies. The 
main contributions of our research in this thesis are listed as follows. 
1.3.1 A Microcosmic Model of Worm Propagation 
Existing macroscopic models focus on analyzing the trends of worm propagation and 
identify very little information within the propagation procedure. These lead to difficulties in 
dealing with the problems of when, where and how many nodes we need to patch. Therefore, 
we present a propagation model from a microcosmic view, which is used to examine the 
spreading deep inside the propagation process of worms between each pair of nodes and can 
answer the proposed three problems by estimating an optimized patch strategy. We introduce 
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a complex matrix to represent the propagation probabilities and time delay between each pair 
of nodes. These two factors result in accurate exploration of the propagation procedure and 
estimation of both infection scale and the effectiveness of defense. The extension from the 
real field of the matrix to the complex field of the matrix reflects the mutual effect between 
these two factors and matches the real case well. This microcosmic model can help evaluate 
the mutual effect of initial infectious states and patch strategies, and analyze the impact that 
different distributions of vulnerable hosts have on worm propagation. We create a 
microcosmic landscape on worm propagation which can provide useful information for a 
defense against worms. 
1.3.2 Defense Study against Scanning Worms 
We apply the proposed microcosmic model to investigate the propagation procedures of 
scanning worms. We carry out extensive simulation studies of worm propagation and 
successfully provide useful information for the proposed problems of where, when and how 
many nodes we need to patch. According to the results, for high risk vulnerabilities, it is 
critical that networks reduce the number of vulnerable nodes to below a certain threshold, e.g., 
80% in this analysis. We believe the results can benefit the security industry by allowing 
them to save significant money in the deployment of their security patching schemes. 
Moreover, through the deployment of different scenarios, we can find how propagation 
source states, vulnerabilities distributions and patch strategies impact the spreading of worms. 
In addition, we derive a better understanding of dynamic infection procedures in each step of 
matrix iteration. These procedures include: 1) What is the propagation probability and time 
delay between each pair of nodes? 2) How does one node infect another node directly? 3) 
How does one node infect another node through a group of intermediate nodes? We also 
discuss the overestimation caused by errors in macroscopic models. Through the analysis of 
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the propagation procedure, we observe that the error is mainly caused by propagation cycles 
in the propagation path, which are usually ignored by traditional macroscopic models. 
1.3.3 Defense Study against Topology-based Worms 
An accurate and realistic model of topology-based worms can help us devise effective 
strategies of defense and reduce expenses for controlling the impact of their outbreak each 
year. We develop a modeling framework that can characterize the spread of topology-based 
worms. We first construct the propagation mechanism of topology-based worms by 
concentrating on the propagation probability and model the propagation procedure through k-
hops. With the help of the model, we then evaluate the mutual effect of initially infectious 
states and address effective schemes to deal with the problems of where and how many nodes 
we need to patch. We take advantage of the propagation probability between each pair of 
nodes to explore the propagation procedure of worms and estimate both infection scale and 
defense effectiveness. Through model analysis, we derive a better understanding of dynamic 
infection procedures in each step rather than recapitulative analysis on propagation tendency. 
Specifically, we aim to understand: 1) the propagation probability between each pair of nodes; 
and 2) how one node infects another node through a group of intermediate nodes. From the 
results, the network administrators can make decisions on how to immunize the highly-
connected node to prevent topology-based worm propagation.   
1.3.4 Modeling the Propagation Dynamics of Email Worms 
Modeling the propagation dynamics of email worms not only benefits the development of 
defense strategies to prevent them from spreading but can also help us investigate the 
propagation of those isomorphic worms such as Koobface. However, it is hard to provide 
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mathematical analysis instead of simulation modeling for analyzing the spreading of email 
worms. The difficulty lies in two aspects: how to characterize the propagation dynamics with 
different mailbox checking time between email users in a large scale network and how to 
model the repetitious email sending process for reinfection and self-start reinfection worms. 
Therefore, an analytical model for observing the spreading procedure of email worms is 
proposed. We examine the individual spreading steps and every state transition on each node 
in the network so that our analytical model can reflect the propagation dynamics with the 
different mailbox checking habits of users. We also propose the concept of virtual users to 
represent the process of sending repetitive emails so that our analytical model can accurately 
reflect the propagation of reinfection worms. In addition, our model analyzes the spreading of 
self-start reinfection worms that most modern email worms belong to and models the 
repetitious email sending process in self-start reinfection worms. Our evaluation results 
indicate that our modeling is accurate and can aid a better and more realistic understanding of 
the propagation of worms. This has potential benefits for devising new tactics against email 
worms. 
1.4 Organization of the Thesis  
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 surveys related work. Chapter 3 
presents a new microcosmic worm propagation model that examines deep inside the 
propagation procedure among individual nodes and is able to provide a series of effective 
patch strategies against worm propagation. We then apply the proposed microcosmic model 
to observe the propagation of scan-based worms through the design of different experiments 
in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents a novel process modeling the propagation of topology-based 
worms by concentrating on the propagation probability. We also analyze the formation of 
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propagation errors and examine the impact of eliminating errors on the propagation procedure 
of topology-based worms. In Chapter 6, we focus on modeling the propagation dynamics of 
email worms analytically. This model studies the propagation procedure of three classes of 
real-world email worms: non-reinfection, reinfection and self-start reinfection worms. 
Chapter 7 summarizes the main research contributions and innovations and identifies several 
possible avenues for future work. 
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Chapter 2 
Related Works 
This chapter provides an overview of the background and related research on worm 
propagation. Firstly, we investigate different target discovery mechanisms for two types of 
worms: scan-based worms and topology-based worms. Then, we study four common 
topologies of networks for worm spreading. Finally, based on the different spreading 
strategies and topology information, we provide an analysis and comparison of the current 
mathematical models typically used to describe worms. 
2.1 Target Discovery Techniques of Worms 
Worms employ distinct propagation strategies such as random, localized, selective and 
topological scanning to spread. In this subsection, we discuss these target discovery 
techniques and some of their different sub-classes.   
2.1.1 Scan-based Techniques 
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Scanning is a very common propagation strategy due to its simplicity and is the most 
widely employed technique by some well-known scan-based worms such as Code Red, Code 
Red II, Slammer, Blaster, Sapphire, and Witty worm. Scan-based techniques probe a set of 
addresses to randomly identify vulnerable hosts or work through an address block using an 
ordered set of addresses [14].  
2.1.1.1 Random Scanning 
Random scanning selects target IP addresses randomly, which leads to a fully-connected 
topology with identical infection probability β for every edge (shown in Fig. 2.1). Several 
types of scanning strategies, such as uniform, hit-list, and routable scanning, are implemented 
on the basis of random scanning.  
A. Uniform Scanning 
Uniform scanning is the simplest strategy to compromise targets when a worm has no 
knowledge of where vulnerable hosts reside. It picks IP addresses to scan from the whole 
IPv4 address space with equal probability. This means a worm selects a victim from its 
scanning space without any preference. Thus, it needs a perfect random number generator to 
generate target IP addresses at random. Some famous worms, such as Code Red I v1 and v2 
β
β
β
β
β
β
β
β
Random Scanning
β
β
β
β
β
β
β
β β
β
β
β
β β
β
β β
1 2
3
4
56
7
8
 
Figure 2.1: Graphical representation of random scanning 
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[15], and Slammer [12] employed this scanning approach to spread themselves. However, 
Code-Red I v1 used a static seed in its random number generator and thus generated identical 
lists of IP addresses on each infected machine. This meant the targets probed by each infected 
machine were either already infected or impregnable. Consequently, Code-Red I v1 spread 
slowly and was never able to compromise a high number of hosts. Code-Red I v2 used a 
random seed in its pseudo-random number generator and thus, each infected computer tried 
to infect a different list of randomly generated IP addresses. This minor change resulted in 
more than 359,000 machines being infected with Code-Red I v2 in just fourteen hours [16]. 
B. Hit-list Scanning 
Hit-list scanning was introduced by Staniford et al. [7], which can effectively reduce the 
infection time at the early stage of worm propagation. A hit-list scanning worm first scans 
and infects all vulnerable hosts on the hit-list, then continues to spread through random 
scanning. The vulnerable hosts in the hit-list can be infected in a very short period because no 
scans are wasted on other potential victims. Hit-list scanning hence effectively accelerates the 
propagation of worms at the early stage. If the hit-list contains IP address of all vulnerable 
hosts, (called a complete hit-list), it can be used to speed the propagation of worms from 
beginning to end with the probability of hitting vulnerable or infected hosts equal to 100%. 
Flash worm [7] is one such worm. It knows the IP addresses of all vulnerable hosts in the 
Internet and scans from this list. When the worm infects a target, it passes half of its scanning 
space to the target, and then continues to scan the remaining half of its original scanning 
space. If no IP address is scanned more than once, then a flash worm is the fastest spreading 
worm in terms of its worm scanning strategy [5]. Due to bandwidth limitation, however, flash 
worms cannot reach their full propagation speed. Furthermore, in the real world it is very 
hard to know all vulnerable hosts‟ IP addresses. Therefore, complete hit-list scanning is 
difficult for attackers to implement considering the global scale of the Internet. 
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C. Routable Scanning 
The routable scanning approach probes each IP address from within the routable address 
space in place of the whole IPv4 address space. Therefore, it needs to determine which IP 
addresses are routable. Zou et al. [4] presented a BGP routable worm as BGP routing tables 
contain all routable IP addresses. Through scanning the BGP routing table, the scanning 
address space Ω of BGP routable worms can be effectively reduced without missing any 
targets. Currently about 28.6% of the IPv4 address has been allocated and is routable. 
However, worms based on BGP prefixes have a large payload, which leads to a decrease in 
the propagation speed. Consequently, a Class A routing worm was presented by Zou et al. [4], 
which uses IPv4 Class A address allocation data. The worm only needs to scan 116 out of 
256 Class A address space, which contributes 45.3% of the entire IPv4 space. Routable 
scanning therefore, improves the spreading speed of worms by reducing the overall scanning 
space.  
2.1.1.2 Localized Scanning 
Instead of selecting targets at random, worms prefer to infect IP addresses that are closer 
by. Localized scanning strategies choose hosts in the local address space for probing. This 
leads to a fully-connected topology as shown in Fig. 2.2, where nodes within the same group 
(group 1 or group 2) infect each other with the same infection probability β1, while nodes 
from different groups infect each other with infection probability β2. 
A. Local Preference Scanning 
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Since vulnerable nodes are not uniformly distributed in the real world, a worm can spread 
itself quickly when it scans vulnerability dense IP areas more intensively. For this reason, the 
local preference scanning approach is implemented by attackers, which selects target IP 
addresses close to a propagation source with a higher probability than addresses farther away. 
Some localized scanning worms (Code Red II [2,8,9,36] and Blaster worm [10]) propagate 
themselves with a high probability in certain IP addresses for the purpose of increasing their 
spreading speed. Taking Code Red II as an example, the probability of the virus propagating 
to the same Class A IP address is 3/8; to the same Class A and B IP address is 1/2; and to a 
random IP address is 1/8.  
B. Local Preference Sequential Scanning 
Different from random scanning, the sequential scanning approach scans IP addresses in 
order from a starting IP address selected by a worm [5]. Blaster [17] is a typical sequential 
scan worm because it chooses its starting point locally as the first address of its Class C /24 
network with a probability of 0.4 and a random IP address with a probability of 0.6. In 
selecting the starting point of a sequence, if a close IP address is chosen with higher 
probability than an address far away, we use the term „local preference sequential scanning‟.  
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Figure 2.2: Graphical representation of localized scanning 
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According to an analysis in [5], a worm employing a local preference sequential scanning 
strategy is more likely to repeat the same propagation sequence, which results in wasting 
most of the infection power of infected hosts. Consequently, the local preference sequential 
scanning approach slows down the spreading speed in the propagation of worms. 
C. Selective Scanning 
Selective scanning is implemented by attackers when they plan to intentionally destroy a 
certain IP address area rather than the entire Internet, that is, the scanning space is reduced to 
those selected IP addresses. The selective scanning strategy can lead to an arbitrary topology 
as shown in Fig. 2.3, where node 4 scans nodes 1, 2 and 3 with infection probability β1 and 
node 5 scans nodes 4, 6, 7 and 8 with infection probability β2. If a worm only scans and 
infects vulnerable hosts in the target domain, it is referred to as Target-only scanning. In 
selective scanning, attackers care more about the spreading speed of a worm in the target 
domain than the scale of the infected network. According to the analysis in [5], target-only 
scanning can accelerate the propagation speed if vulnerable hosts are more densely 
distributed in the target domain.   
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Figure 2.3: Graphical representation of selective scanning 
Chapter 2 Related Works 
 
17 
2.1.2 Topology-based Techniques 
Topology-based (or topological scanning) techniques are mainly used by worms spreading 
through topological neighbors. This strategy can lead to an arbitrary topology, as shown in 
Fig. 2.4, where node Ni (i=1,2,…,8) scans its neighbors with a different infection probability 
βi (i=1,2,…,10). A typical example of worms that employ topology-based techniques to 
launch attacks are email worms. When an email user receives an email message and opens 
the malicious attachment, the worm program will infect the user‟s computer and send copies 
of itself to all email addresses that can be found in the recipient‟s machine. The addresses in 
the recipient‟s machine disclose the neighborhood relationship. Melissa [28] is a typical 
email worm which appeared in 1999. It looks through all Outlook address books and sends a 
copy of itself to the first 50 individuals when an infected file is opened for the first time. 
After Melissa, email worms have become annoyingly common, completed with toolkits and 
improved by social engineering, such as Love letter in 2000, Mydoom in 2004 and 
W32.Imsolk in 2010. Recently, topology-based techniques have been used by some 
isomorphic worms such as Bluetooth worms [21], p2p worms [18-19], and social networks 
worms [20]. For example, Koobface [27] spreads primarily through social networking sites. It 
searches the friend list of a user and posts itself as links to videos on their friend‟s website. 
When a user is tricked into visiting the website that hosts the video, they are prompted to 
download a video codec or other necessary update, which is actually a copy of the worm. 
Users may have difficulty determining if a link was posted by a friend or the worm.   
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Topology-based techniques utilize the information contained in the victim‟s machine to 
locate new targets. This intelligent mechanism allows for a far more efficient propagation 
than scan-based techniques that make a large number of wild guesses for every successful 
infection. Instead, they can infect on almost every attempt and thus, achieve a rapid spreading 
speed. A common feature of topology-based techniques is to involve human interference in 
the propagation of worms. Taking email worms as an example, the worm program can infect 
the user‟s machine and become widespread only when an email user opens the worm email 
attachment. Thus, whether or not a computer can be infected by malicious emails is 
determined by human factors including the user's personal habits of checking emails and the 
user's security consciousness.  
2.2 Topologies for Modeling the Propagation of Worms  
The topology of a network plays a critical role in determining the propagation dynamics of 
a worm. In the research of epidemic modeling, many types of networks (for example, [6, 10, 
33-35, 47, 57]) are adopted to study the effect of epidemic propagation. In this subsection, we 
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Figure 2.4: Graphical representation of topological scanning 
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will introduce four typical topologies of networks that are widely used in modeling the 
propagation of worms.  
2.2.1 Homogenous Networks  
In a homogenous network, each node has roughly the same degree. A fully-connected 
topology, a standard hypercubic lattice, and an Erdös-Renyi (ER) random network are three 
typical examples of homogeneous networks [35]. The propagation of worms on homogenous 
networks satisfies the homogenous assumption that any infected host has an equal 
opportunity to infect any vulnerable host in the network. In real scenarios, most scan-based 
worms, such as Code Red I, Code Red II, and Slammer, can propagate without any 
dependence on the properties of the underlying topology. Thus, homogeneous networks are 
more suitable for modeling the spreading of scan-based worms.  
Recently, many researches [2, 5, 7, 10] studied random scanning worms on homogenous 
networks using differential equation models. These models assume all hosts in the network 
can contact each other directly and thus, their topologies are treated as fully-connected graphs. 
Chen et al. [10] proposed an analytical active worm propagation (AAWP) model for 
randomly scanning worms on the basis of homogenous networks. Yan and Eidenbenz [21] 
present a detailed analytical model that characterizes the propagation dynamics of Bluetooth 
worms. It assumes all individual devices are homogenously mixed. Zou et al. [2] proposed a 
two-factor worm model to characterize the propagation of the Code Red worm. This model 
adopts the homogeneous network, that is, they consider worms that propagate without the 
topology constraint. 
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2.2.2 Random Networks 
A random network is a theoretical construct which contains links that are chosen 
completely at random with equal probability. Using a random number generator, one assigns 
links from one node to a second node. Random links typically result in shortcuts to remote 
nodes, thus shortening the path length to otherwise distant nodes [37]. Recent work [38, 39] 
provided mechanisms to specify the degree distribution when constructing random graphs 
and further characterize the size of the large connected component. Fan and Xiang [19] 
investigated the impact of worm propagation over a simple random graph topology. It 
assumes each host has the same out-degree. Hosts to which each host has an outbound link 
are randomly selected from all hosts except the host itself. Of course, the degrees of nodes in 
a random graph may not be all equal. Zou et al. [6] studied the email worm propagation on a 
random graph. The random graph network was constructed with n vertices and an average 
degree E[k] ≥ 2. From the analysis of Zou‟s model, a random graph cannot reflect a heavy-
tailed degree distribution and thus, it is not suitable for modeling topology-based worms.  
2.2.3 Small-World Networks  
A small-world network is a type of mathematical graph where most nodes are not 
neighbors of one another, but can be reached from every other node by a small number of 
hops or steps. Small-world networks are highly clustered and have a small characteristic path 
[51]. Some researchers have observed the dynamic propagation of worms on small-world 
networks. G. Yan et al. [22] considered the BrightKite graph to investigate the impact of 
malware propagation over online social networks. Compared with the random graph, the 
BrightKite graph [48] has a similar average shortest path length and a smaller clustering 
coefficient, and thus, it closely reflects a small-world network structure. Zou et al. [6] 
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modeled email worm propagation on a small-world network that has an average degree 
E[k]>4. It firstly constructs a regular two-dimensional grid network and then connects two 
randomly-chosen vertices repeatedly until the total number of edges reaches E[k] • n/4. From 
the analysis of Zou‟s model, a small-world network still cannot provide a heavy-tailed degree 
distribution and thus, is not suitable for modeling topology-based worms. 
2.2.4 Power-Law Networks  
Power-law networks are networks where the frequency fd of the out-degree d is 
proportional to the out-degree to the power of a constant α: fd∝d
α
 [40]. The constant α is 
called the power-law exponent. In a power-law network, nodes with the maximum topology 
degree are rare and most nodes have the minimum topology degree. Recent works have 
shown that many real-world networks are power-law networks such as social networks [33, 
46, 49-50], neural networks [45], and the Web [43-44].   
Zou et al. [6] and Ebel et al. [47] investigated email groups and found that they exhibited 
characteristics of a power-law distribution. The simulation model proposed by Zou et al. [6] 
studied the dynamic propagation of an email worm over a power-law topology. Although 
email worms spread slower on a power-law topology than small world topology or random 
topology, the immunization density is more effective on a power-law topology. Fan and 
Xiang [19] presented a logic 0-1 matrix model and observed the propagation of worms on a 
pseudo power law topology. Z. Chen and C. Ji [32] constructed a spatial-temporal model and 
analyzed the impact of malware propagation on a BA (Bárabási-Albert) network [44], which 
is a type of power-law network. W. Fan et al. [20] assumed that the node degree of Facebook 
users exhibits the power-law distribution and constructed the network using two models: the 
BA (Bárabási-Albert) model and the GLP (Generalized Linear Preference) model.  
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2.2.5 Examples of Real World Topologies 
Topology properties affect the spread of topology-based worms, which can either impede 
or facilitate their propagation and maintenance. Existing works [6, 32, 34] show that 
structures and characters of the network have strong impact on the spreading speed and scale 
of worms.  
The characters of social networks and the impacting of social structures on the propagation 
of worms have been intensively investigated in many works [22, 33, 102]. Adamic et al. [102] 
found that the network exhibits small-world behavior through studying an early online social 
network. Mislove et al. [33] presented a large-scale measurement study and analysis of the 
structure of four popular online social networks: Flickr, Orkut, YouTube and LiveJournal. 
Their results confirm the power-law, small-world and scale-free properties of online social 
networks. Yan et al. [22] studied the BrightKite network and found that the highly skewed 
degree distributions and highly clustered structures shown in many social networks are 
instrumental in spreading the malware quickly at its early stage.  
The topology of an email network plays a critical role in determining the propagation 
dynamics of an email worm [6, 47]. Zou et al. [6] examined more than 800,000 email groups 
in Yahoo! and found that it is heavy-tailed distributed, which exhibits the character of power-
law networks. Ebel et al. [47] studied the topology of email network that constructed from 
log files of the email server at Kiel University and found that it exhibits a scale-free link 
distribution and pronounced small-world behavior.   
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2.3 Worm Propagation Models 
In the area of network security, worms have been studied for a long time [1, 93-94]. Early 
works mainly refer to the academic thought on epidemic propagation and thus, models are 
constructed according to the state transition of each host including Susceptible-Infectious 
(denoted by „SI‟) models [26], Susceptible-Infectious-Susceptible (denoted by „SIS‟) models 
[53], and Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (denoted by „SIR‟) models [34, 54-55]. In the SI 
framework, all hosts stay in one of only two possible discrete states at any time: susceptible 
or infectious, which ignores the recovery process. The difference between SIS models and 
SIR models depends on whether infected hosts can become susceptible again after recovery. 
If this is the case, we use the term SIS model. Otherwise, if a host cannot become susceptible 
again once it is cured, we use the SIR model, where all hosts stay in one of only three states at 
any time: susceptible (denoted by „S‟), infectious (denoted by „I‟), removed (denoted by „R‟).  
Currently, many mathematical models [6-7, 10, 19, 21, 24, 95-101] have been proposed for 
investigating the propagation of scan-based and topology-based worms on the basis of 
different state transition models. In this subsection, we mainly focus on these mathematical 
models and analyze their respective advantages and disadvantages.  
2.3.1 Homogenous Scan-based Model 
The homogenous worm propagation model relies on the homogeneous assumption that 
each infectious host has an equal probability of spreading the worm to any vulnerable peer in 
a network. Hence, the homogenous model is based on the concept of a fully connected graph 
and is an unstructured worm model that ignores the network topology. It can accurately 
characterize the propagation of worms using scan-based techniques to discover vulnerable 
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targets, such as Code Red [29-30], Code Red II [2], and Slammer [12]. Scan-based worms 
scan the entire network and infect targets without regard to topological constraints which 
means that an infectious host is able to infect an arbitrary vulnerable peer. Up to now, many 
researchers have modeled the propagation procedure of different types of scan-based worms 
on the basis of the homogenous assumption. The homogenous model can be further divided 
into two categories: continuous time and discrete time. A continuous time model is expressed 
by a set of differential equations, while a discrete time model is expressed by a set of 
difference equations. 
2.3.1.1 Continuous-time Model 
A. Classical Simple Epidemic Model  
The Classical Simple Epidemic Model [13, 23-26] is a SI model. In this model, the state 
transition of any host can only be S→I, and it is assumed a host will remain in the „infectious‟ 
state forever once it has been infected by a worm. Denote by I(t) the number of infectious 
hosts at time t; N the total number of susceptible hosts in the network before a worm spreads 
out. Thus, the number of susceptible hosts at time t is equal to [N-I(t)]. The classical simple 
epidemic model for a finite population can be represented by the differential equation below:  
 )()()( tINtI
dt
tdI
                 (2.1) 
where, β stands for the pair-wise rate of infection in epidemiology studies [13]. It 
represents a ratio of infection from infectious hosts to susceptible hosts. At the beginning, t=0, 
I(0) hosts are infectious, and in the other [N-I(0)] all hosts are susceptible.  
The Classical Simple Epidemic Model is the most simple and popular differential equation 
model. It has been used in many papers (for example, [2, 5, 7, 10]) to model random scanning 
worms, such as Code Red [2] and Slammer [12]. 
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B. Uniform Scan Worm Model 
If a worm (i.e. Code Red, Slammer) has no knowledge of the distribution of vulnerable 
hosts in the network, uniformly scanning all IP addresses is the simplest method to spread 
itself. Once a host is infected by a worm, it is assumed to remain in the infectious state 
forever. The uniform scan worm model specifies the abstract parameter β in the classical 
simple epidemic model based on information pertaining to the scanning rate and IP space of 
the network. Denote by I(t) the number of infectious hosts at time t; N the total number of 
susceptible hosts in the network before a worm spreads out. Thus [N-I(t)] is the number of 
susceptible hosts at time t. Suppose an average scan rate η of a uniform scan worm is the 
average number of scans an infected host sends out per unit of time. Denote by δ the length of 
a small time interval. Thus, an infected host sends out an average of ηδ scans during a time 
interval δ. Suppose the worm uniformly scans the IP space that has Ω addresses, every scan 
then has a probability of 1/Ω (1/Ω <<1) to hit any one IP address in this scanning space. 
Therefore, on average, an infected host has probability q to hit a specific IP address in the 
scanning space during a small time interval δ.  
  11/Ω,//111  q              (2.2) 
Here, during the time interval δ, the probability that two scans sent out by an infected host 
will hit the same vulnerable host is negligible when δ is sufficiently small. Consequently, the 
number of infected hosts at time t+δ will be: 
   /)()()()(  tINtItItI                      (2.3) 
Taking δ→0, according to the epidemic model (2.1), the uniform scan worm model can be 
represented by (2.4): 
 )()()( tINtI
dt
tdI




                       (2.4) 
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At time t=0, I(0) represents the number of initially infected hosts and [N-I(0)] is the number 
of all susceptible hosts. 
Some variants of random scanning worms (hit-list worms [7], flash worms [5, 7], and 
routable worms [11]) cannot be directly modeled by (2.4). However, through the extension of 
the uniform scan worm model, the propagation of these variants of worms can be accurately 
modeled. 
Staniford et al. [7] introduced a variant of random scanning worms, called the hit-list worm. 
It first scans and infects all vulnerable hosts on the hit-list, then randomly scans the entire 
Internet to infect others just like an ordinary uniform scan worm. We can assume the 
vulnerable hosts on the hit-list to be the initially infected hosts I(0) and ignore the 
compromising time since they can be infected in a very short time [7]. As a result, a hit-list 
worm can be modeled by (2.4) along with a large number of initially infected hosts 
determined by the size of the worm‟s hit-list.  
A flash worm is a variant of the hit-list strategy, introduced by Staniford et al. [7]. When a 
flash worm infects a target, it simply scans half of its scanning space as the other half has 
been passed to the target including the target host. Since it knows the IP addresses of all 
vulnerable hosts, that is, the size of scanning space Ω = N, which is much smaller than the 
entire IPv4 address space (Ω =232), and because no IP address is scanned more than once, the 
flash worm could possibly infect most vulnerable hosts in the Internet in tens of seconds. For 
this reason, the time delay caused by the infection process of a vulnerable host cannot be 
ignored in modeling the spreading of flash worms. Denote by ε the time delay, which is the 
time interval from the time when a worm scan is sent out to the time when the vulnerable host 
infected by the scan begins to send out worm scans. We assume a flash worm uniformly 
scans the address list of all vulnerable hosts. Then, based on the uniform scan model (2.4), 
the flash worm (uniform scanning) can be modeled by (2.5):  
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    ttItINtI
Ndt
tdI
,0)(,)()(
)(
           (2.5) 
Another variant of random scanning worms is a routable worm. Zou et al. [4] found that 
currently around 28.6% of IPv4 addresses are routable and thus, they presented a BGP 
routing worm. It uses BGP routing prefixes to reduce the worm‟s scanning space Ω. When a 
BGP routing worm uniformly scans the BGP routable space, it can be modeled by (2.4), 
where Ω equals 28.6% of all IP addresses.  
Zou et al. [5] investigated and compared the propagation performance of random scanning 
worms and their variants (for example, Code Red, a hit-list worm, a flash worm and a BGP 
routable worm). Assume the number of vulnerable hosts (N) is 360 000, and worms have the 
same scan rate, i.e., η = 358/min. Suppose the size of a worm‟s hit-list is 10 000, that is, 
I(0)=10 000, while Code Red, the flash worm and the BGP routable worm have 10 initially 
infected hosts, that is, I(0)=10. The scanning space for the BGP routable worm is 28.6% of 
the entire IP address space, while the Code Red worm and the hit-list worm scan all IP 
addresses Ω =232. For the flash worm, the scanning space Ω = N. From the results of the 
experiment shown in Fig. 2.5, the flash worm is the fastest spreading worm, which finishes 
infection within 20 seconds, while Code Red finishes infection after around 500 minutes. At 
the early stage of propagation, because of a large number size of the hit-list, the hit-list worm 
can infect more vulnerable hosts than Code Red and the BGP routable worm. Compared with 
Code Red and the hit-list worm, the BGP routable worm has a smaller scanning space and 
thus, the infection speed of the routable worm is faster. 
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C. RCS Model  
Staniford et al. [7] presented a RCS (Random Constant Spread) model to simulate the 
propagation of the Code Red I v2 worm, which is almost identical to the classical simple 
epidemic model. Let a(t) = I(t)/N be the fraction of the population that is infectious at time t. 
Substituting I(t) in equation (2.1) with a(t), and then deriving the differential equation (2.6) 
below, yields the equation used in [7]: 
 )(1)()( tatka
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tda
                (2.6) 
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where, k = β N, and T is a constant of integration that fixes the time position of the incident. 
Differential equation (2.6) is a logistic equation. For early t, a(t) grows exponentially, that is, 
the number of infectious hosts is nearly exponentially increased at the early stage of worm 
propagation. For large t, a(t)  goes to 1 (all susceptible hosts are infected).    
D. Classical General Epidemic Model: Kermack-McKendrick Model 
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Figure 2.5: Worm propagation of Code Red, BGP routable, hit-list, and flash worm. 
Chapter 2 Related Works 
 
29 
Different from the classical simple epidemic model, the Kermack-McKendrick model 
considered the removal process of infectious hosts [26]. In the Kermack-McKendrick model, 
all hosts stay in one of only three states at any time: susceptible (denoted by „S‟), infectious 
(denoted by „I‟), removed (denoted by „R‟). Once a host recovers from the disease, it will be 
immune to the disease and stay in the „removed‟ state forever. The removed hosts can no 
longer be infected and they do not try to infect others. Therefore, the Kermack-McKendrick 
model is in the framework of a SIR model.   
Let I(t) denote the number of infectious hosts at time t and use R(t) to denote the number of 
removed hosts from previously infectious hosts at time t. Denote β as the pair-wise rate of 
infection and γ as the rate of removal of infectious hosts. Then, based on the classical simple 
epidemic model (2.1), the Kermack-McKendrick model can be represented by (2.8): 
 
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where, N is the size of the finite population. The Kermack-McKendrick model improves the 
classical simple model by introducing a „removed‟ state for each host which means some 
infectious hosts either recover or die after some time.   
E. Two-factor Model  
The Kermack-McKendrick model includes the removal of infectious hosts in the 
propagation of worms, but it ignores the fact that susceptible hosts can also be removed due 
to patching or filtering countermeasures. Furthermore, in the real world, the pair-wise rate of 
infection β decreases with the time elapsed in the spreading procedure due to the limitation of 
network bandwidth and Internet infrastructure, while the Kermack-McKendrick model 
assumes β is constant. Therefore, Zou et al. [2] introduced a two-factor model, which extends 
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the Kermack-McKendrick model by considering human countermeasures and network 
congestion.   
In the two-factor model, the removal process consists of two parts: removal of infectious 
hosts and removal of susceptible hosts. Denote R(t) as the number of removed hosts from the 
infectious population and Q(t) as the number of removed hosts from the susceptible 
population. R(t) and Q(t) involve people‟s security awareness against the propagation of 
worms. Moreover, in consideration of the slowed down worm scan rate, the pair-wise 
infection rate β is modeled as a function of time t, β(t), which is determined by the impact of 
worm traffic on Internet infrastructure and the spreading efficiency of the worm code. Then, 
the two-factor model can be represented by (2.9):  
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where, N is the finite population size; I(t) denotes the number of infectious hosts at time t; β(t) 
is the pair-wise rate of infection at time t; and γ stands for the rate of removal of infectious 
hosts. The two-factor model improves the Kermack-McKendrick model through 
consideration of two major factors that affect worm propagation: human countermeasures 
like cleaning, patching or filtering and the slowing down of the worm infection rate.    
2.3.1.2 Discrete-time Model 
A. AAWP Model  
Chen, Gao and Kwiat [10] presented an AAWP (Analytical Active Worm Propagation) 
model to take into account the characteristics of random scanning worms spreading according 
to the homogenous assumption. It assumes that worms can simultaneously scan many 
machines in a fully-connected network and no hosts can be repeatedly infected. In this model, 
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active worms scan the whole IPv4 address (Ω = 232) with equal likelihood, therefore, the 
probability any computer is hit by one scan is 1/2
32
.  Denote mt as the total number of 
vulnerable hosts (including the infected hosts); denote nt as the number of infected hosts at 
time tick t (t ≥ 0). At time tick t = 0, the number of initially vulnerable hosts m0 is equal to N 
and the number of initially infected hosts n0 is equal to h. We suppose s is the scanning rate, 
and the number of newly infected hosts in each time tick t is equal 
to ])2/11(1)[( 32 t
sn
tt nm  . Assume that d represents the death rate and p denotes the 
patching rate. Then, in each time tick the number of vulnerable hosts without being infected 
and the number of healthy hosts will be (d + p)nt. Therefore, on average in the next time tick 
t+1, the number of total infected hosts can be represented by (2.10):  
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In each time tick, the total number of vulnerable hosts including infected hosts is (1-p)mt, and 
thus, at time tick t, mt=(1-p)
t
m0=(1-p)
t
N. Therefore, we can derive (2.11) as follows: 
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where t ≥ 0 and n0=h. Formula (2.11) models the propagation of random scanning worms 
analytically, and the iteration procedure will stop when all vulnerable hosts are infected or the 
number of infected hosts remains the same when worms spread.        
B. Bluetooth Worm Model 
G. Yan and S. Eidenbenz [21] presented a detailed analytical model that characterizes the 
propagation dynamics of Bluetooth worms. It captures not only the behavior of the Bluetooth 
protocol but also the impact of mobility patterns on the propagation of Bluetooth worms. This 
model assumes all individual Bluetooth devices are homogeneously mixed and advances time 
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in a discrete fashion. Through analyzing a single infection cycle, it derives the duration of an 
infection cycle Tcycle(t) and the number of new infections out of the infection cycle α(t). 
According to the pair-wise infection rate β(t) derived from α(t) and new average density of 
infected devices at time t, this model can estimate the Bluetooth worm propagation curve. 
From this model, the average density of infected devices in the network at time tk+1 is defined 
by (2.12):  
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where i′ (tk) is the maximum value between i(t) and 1/Sinq(t) to ensure at least one infected 
device in the radio signal covers. ρ(tk) is the average device density at time tk. Since the worm 
growth rate can change, and in order to avoid overestimating the number of new infections 
out of the infection cycle, it uses α′ to achieve a better estimation of worm propagation, 
which is defined by (2.13):  
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At the early phase, α′ is close to α(tk) and at the late state of the worm propagation, α′ is close 
to α(tx). Here, tx is the latest time when an infected device starts their infection cycle after 
time t but before time tk+1. This model predicts that the Bluetooth worm spreads quickly once 
the density of the infected devices reach 10 percent, although it propagates very slowly at the 
early stage.     
2.3.2 Localized Scan-based Model  
Since vulnerable nodes are not uniformly distributed, some localized scanning worms 
(Code Red II [2, 8-9] and Blaster worm [10]) propagate the virus with a high probability in 
certain IP addresses for the purpose of increasing their spreading speed. Taking Code Red II 
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as an example, the probability of the virus propagating to the same Class A IP address is 3/8; 
to the same Class A and B IP address is 1/2; and to a random IP address is 1/8. Therefore, the 
localized scanning worm employs a non-homogenous pattern to spread itself in the network. 
The localized scan-based model can be further divided into two categories: continuous time 
and discrete time. A continuous time model is expressed by a set of differential equations, 
while a discrete time model is expressed by a set of difference equations. 
2.3.2.1 Continuous-time Model 
A. Local Preference Model  
Zou et al. [5] took advantage of a continuous time model to describe the spread of 
localized scanning worms. In this local preference model, it is assumed that a worm has 
probability p of uniformly scanning IP addresses that have the same first n bits and 
probability (1-p) of uniformly scanning other addresses. Suppose that the worm scanning 
space contains K networks where all IP addresses have the same first n bits and each network 
has Nk (k=1, 2… K) initially vulnerable hosts. Denote by Ik(t) the number of infected hosts in 
the k-th network at time t; and denote by β' and β" the pair-wise rates of infection in local 
scan and remote scan, respectively. Then we have:  
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where η represents the average number of scans an infected host sends out per unit of time. 
Since hosts are not uniformly distributed over the whole Internet, this model supposes only 
the first m networks (m<K) have uniformly distributed vulnerable hosts, i.e., N1=…= Nm=N/m, 
Nm+1=…=Nk=0. Thus, the worm propagation on each network follows (2.15):  
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Suppose Ik (0) = I1(0)>0, k=2,3,…,m. We then have:  
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(2.14) describes the number of newly infected hosts at time tick t with respect to the entire 
Internet. This local preference model uses differential equations to reflect the propagation of 
localized worms that probe different IP addresses with their own preference probabilities.   
2.3.2.2 Discrete-time Model 
A. LAAWP Model  
LAAWP (Local Analytical Active Worm Propagation) model is a discrete time model 
extended from the AAWP model [10]. It characterizes the propagation of worms employing 
the localized scanning strategy to probe subnets. The worm scans a random address with a 
probability of p0. For an address with the same first octet, the probability is given by p1, while 
an address with the same first two octets is scanned with probability p2. In order to simplify 
the model, both the death rate and patching rate are ignored in the AAWP model. This model 
assumes localized worms scan a subnet containing 2
16
 IP addresses instead of the whole 
Internet. This subnet is divided into three parts according to the first two octets. Subnet 1 is a 
special subnet, which has a larger hit-list size. The average number of infected hosts in subnet 
1 is denoted b1 and the average number of scans hitting subnet 1 is represented by k1. Subnet 
2 contains 2
8
-1 subnets which have the same first octet as subnet 1. The average number of 
infected hosts in subnet 2 is denoted by b2 and the average number of scans hitting subnet 2 is 
represented by k2. The other 2
16
-2
8
 subnets belong to subnet 3, which has b3 infected hosts 
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and k3 scans on average. Therefore, the number of infected hosts in the next time tick is 
represented by (2.17):  
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where i =1, 2, or 3. ki (i=1, 2 or 3) indicates the total number of scans in different subnets 
coming from the local subnet, the same first octet subnets and the global subnets. The 
calculation of ki (i=1, 2 or 3) is as follows:  
       
       
     163816281031323
16
3
816
2
8
10
8
2
8
11222
16
3
816
2
8
10
8
2
8
11121
2/2212
2/22122/12
2/22122/12
bbbspsbpsbpk
bbbspbbspsbpk
bbbspbbspsbpk



       
The LAAWP model adopts deterministic approximation to reflect the spreading of worms 
that preferentially scans targets close to their addresses with a higher probability. 
2.3.3 Topology-based Model  
Both homogenous scan-based models and localized scan-based models reflect unstructured 
worms‟ propagation without regard to topological constraints. However, a topology-based 
model describes a structure dependent propagation of worms, which relies on the topology 
for the spreading of viruses such as email worms [6], p2p worms [18-19], and social network 
worms [20, 22, 33]. In this subsection, we introduce some typical topology-based discrete-
time models.  
A. Email Worms Simulation Model  
Zou et al. [6] presented a simulation model on the propagation of email worms. It 
considered the probability of opening an email attachment and email checking frequency, and 
then compared internet email worm propagation on power law topologies, small world 
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topologies and random graph topologies. In the proposed model, the probability of each user 
opening a worm attachment can be treated as an infected probability and the distribution of 
email checking times can represent the propagation probability.  
Due to the high likelihood that email users will also receive email from those they send 
email to, the Internet‟s email network is modeled as an undirected graph. According to the 
distribution of Yahoo! Email groups, authors believe the Internet email network conforms to 
a heavy-tailed distribution and model the email network topology as a power law network, 
which follows F(α)∝K-α.  The constant α is the power law exponent that determines the 
degrees of nodes in the network. A larger maximum topology degree requires a larger power 
law exponent, and a larger expected value of topology degree demands a smaller power law 
exponent. This model uses α =1.7 to generate the power law network with the total number of 
hosts |V|=100 000 and an average degree of 8. The highest degree for this power law network 
is 1 833 and the lowest degree is 3.   
Email worms depend on email users‟ interaction to spread. When a user checks an email 
with a malicious attachment, this user may discard it or open the worm attachment without 
any security awareness. This user‟s behavior is represented by an opening probability C~N 
(0.5, 0.3
2
) in this model. Then, when a malicious email attachment is opened, the email worm 
immediately infects the user and sends out a worm email to all email addresses found on this 
user‟s computer. Thus, the email checking time is an important parameter that contributes to 
the propagation speed of the email worm. In this simulation model, the email checking time T 
follows a Gaussian distribution: T~N (40,20
2
). This model discusses two cases under different 
infection assumptions: non-reinfection and reinfection. The main difference is whether a user 
in the infectious state can be infected again. If the victims can be infected each time they are 
visited by worms, it is assumed to be a reinfection scenario. Otherwise, infected users send 
out worm copies only once even if they open a worm attachment again. We refer to this as a 
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non-reinfection scenario. This email simulation model only considers the propagation of 
reinfection email worms, which is described as follows.  
Simulation Model: The discrete-time email worm simulator 
/* step 1: Initialize parameters */ 
1. initialize the number of infected nodes infectednum 
2. initialize the email checking time CheckingTime and opening probability OpeningProb 
(both follow Gaussian distribution) 
3. initialize the number of worm emails: VirusNum, NextVirusNum 
4. timetick =1; 
 
/* step 2: Sending worm emails*/ 
timetick=timetick+1; 
for i=1 to the number of total email users do 
    if (user i is not HEALTHY or timetick==2) 
        if (user i is checking emails) 
             if (user i is DANGER) 
                user i is INFECTED; 
                infectednum=infectednum+1; 
             end 
            for sendnum=1 to the number of worm emails do 
                    for link=1 to all the links of user i do 
                        if (user i opens a worm attachment) 
                            sending worm emails 
                        end 
                    end 
            end 
            the number of user i's worm email is reset as 0 
        end 
    end 
end 
 
/* step 3: Update Current Node Status */ 
for i=1 to the number of total email users do 
        if (the number of worm emails is not 0) 
            if(user i doesn't check the email) 
                if(user i is not INFECTED)  
                    user i is DANGER;  
                end          
                record the number of worm attachements user i received newly 
                reset user i's CheckingTime(i); 
            end 
        else  
     record the total number of worm attachements user i received 
        end 
        user i's CheckingTime-1; 
    end 
    Re_InfectedNum(timetick)=infectednum; 
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end  
 
 
According to the discrete-time email worm simulator, the propagation of email worms on a 
power-law network under the non-reinfection and reinfection scenarios, as shown in Fig. 2.6, 
illustrate that the spreading speed in the reinfection case is faster and the number of infected 
hosts at the end of propagation is higher than the non-reinfection case. Based on this 
simulation model, Zou et al. studied the selective immunization defense against email worms. 
According to their analysis, in a power law topology, if the top 29% of the most-connected 
nodes are removed from the network, the email network will be broken into separated 
fragments and no worm outbreak will occur.  
B. Logic 0-1 Matrix Model  
Fan and Xiang [19] used a logic matrix approach to model the spreading of P2P worms. 
They presented two different topologies: a simple random graph topology and a pseudo 
power law topology. The research studied their impacts on a P2P worm‟s attack performance 
and analyzed related quarantine strategies for these two topologies.  
This model uses a logic matrix (denoted by matrix T) to represent the topology of a P2P 
overlay network. It adopts two constants of logic type (True or 1, False or 0) as the value of 
matrix variables. The logic constant „T‟ indicates the existence of a directed link between two 
nodes in the network, and the logic constant „F‟ is used to indicate there is no directed link. 
The i-th row of a topology logic matrix represents all outbound links of node i; and the j-th 
column of the topology logic matrix represents all inbound links of node j. This 0-1 matrix 
stands for the propagation ability of nodes, i.e. whether they can allow the virus to spread or 
not.  
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This logic 0-1 matrix model is a discrete-time deterministic propagation model of P2P 
worms under three different distributions: infectious state (denoted by logic vector S), 
vulnerability status (denoted by logic vector V) and quarantine status (denoted by logic vector 
Q). Where the logic vector Sg represents the current state g of the logical P2P overlay 
network and the logic vector Sg+1 represents the next state of the logical P2P overlay network, 
we have:  
new
ggg SSS 1                                                    (2.18)   
Here, 1-entries in the vector Sg
new
 represent the transition to infectious at state g+1. Sg
new 
varies in consideration of different distributions of S, V, and Q. If all nodes are vulnerable to 
the worm and no nodes are quarantined, then we have (2.19):  
TSSS ggg 1                                                  (2.19)   
If all nodes are not vulnerable to the worm and no nodes are quarantined, then we have (2.20): 
TVSSS ggg 1                                         (2.20)   
If all nodes are vulnerable and some nodes are quarantined, then we have (2.21):  
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Figure 2.6: Propagation on a power-law network: reinfection vs. non-reinfection. 
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QTSSS ggg 1                                         (2.21) 
where Q bar stands for the distribution of those unquarantined nodes.   
This logic 0-1 matrix model translates the propagation processes of P2P worms into a 
sequence of logic matrix operations. According to the analysis of this model, authors 
discovered the relation between out-degree, vulnerability and coverage rate in power law 
topologies and simple random graph topologies respectively, and then proposed quarantine 
strategies against P2P worms.            
C. OSN (Online Social Networks) Worms Model 
Fan and Yeung [20] proposed two virus propagation models based on the application 
network of Facebook, which is the most popular among social network service providers. The 
difference between email worms and Facebook worms, as the authors highlight, is that people 
only check if there are any new emails and then log out, while people spend more time on 
Facebook. In Facebook, two users‟ accounts appear in each other‟s friends list if they have 
confirmed their status to be friends. Thus, the topology of this network is treated as an 
undirected graph and is constructed by a power-law distribution in the models. 
Facebook application platform based model: since Facebook provides an application 
platform that can be utilized by attackers to publish malicious applications, one of the worm 
propagation models is based on the Facebook application platform. Users of Facebook can 
install applications to their accounts through this platform. If a user added a malicious 
application, their account is infected and an invited message is sent to all their friends to 
persuade them to install the same application, which leads to the spreading of the worm 
application. The probability of installing one application for user i is:  
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where Appsi(t) is the number of applications that user i has installed at time step t. The 
parameter ρ reflects the effect of preferential installation. inituser is used to show the initial 
probability Puser(i,t) of a user who does not install any application. Since there are many new 
installations every day, the probability of one application selected by user i from the 
application list is:  
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where initapp defines the initial probability Papp(k,t) of an application without any installation. 
When a malicious application is installed, invitation messages are sent to all the friends of 
this infected user. Assuming each user has received c invitations at time step t. Then the 
probability the user is infected is:  
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where ζ is the percentage of users who accepted the invitations. The infected number I(t) is 
changed when a malicious application is installed.  
Sending messages based model: this model investigates the propagation of worms through 
the sending of messages to friends, which is similar to email worm propagation. When users 
of Facebook receive malicious emails and click them, these users are infected and worm 
email copies are sent to their friends. At each time tick, a user can log-in to Facebook with a 
log-in time Tlogin(i), which follows an exponential distribution. The mean value of Tlogin(i) 
follows a Gaussian distribution N(μTl(t),ζTl
2
). The online time that users spend on Facebook is 
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Tonline(i), which follows a Gaussian distribution N(μTo(t),ζTo
2
). All of the online users may 
open the malicious email with a probability of Pclick, which follows a Gaussian distribution 
N(μp(t),ζp
2
). The worm propagates until no more new users are infected in the online social 
network.   
D. Spatial-temporal Model  
In the work of Chen and Ji [32], a spatial-temporal random process was used to describe 
the statistical dependence of malware propagation in arbitrary topologies. This spatial-
temporal model is a stochastic discrete time model that reflects the temporal dependence and 
the spatial dependence in the propagation of malware. The temporal dependence means that 
the status of node i (infected or susceptible) at time t+1 depends on the status of node i at 
time t and the status of its neighbors at time t. The temporal dependence of node i can be 
shown as (2.25) and (2.26):  
  iii tXtXP  0)(|0)1(                                      (2.25)    
  )()(x)(,0)(|1)1( ttttXtXP iNii
iNi
                                (2.26)   
where Xi(t) denotes the status of a network node i at time t (t represents discrete time): if node 
i is infected at time, Xi(t)=1; if node i is susceptible at time t, Xi(t)=0. XNi(t) is used to denote 
the status of all neighbors of node i at time t and the vector xNi(t) is the realization of XNi(t). If 
node i is susceptible at time t, it can be compromised by any of its infected neighbors and 
become infected at the next time step t+1 with a birth rate βi(t). Otherwise, node i is infected 
and has a death rate δi to recover at the next time step t+1. The transition probabilities 
characterize the temporal evolution due to infection and recovery.  
Denoting by Ri(t), the probability that node i recovers from infected to susceptible status at 
time t+1, is:  
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   1)(1)(,0)1()(  tXPtXtXPtR iiiii                              (2.27) 
If node i is susceptible at time t, the probability that node i remains susceptible at the next 
time step can be defined as:  
 
    

)(x
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t
iiN
iii
ttXttP
tXtXPtS
i
                    (2.28)   
where a joint probability P(XNi(t)=xNi(t)|Xi(t)=0) representing the status of all neighbors of 
node i at time t  characterizes the spatial dependence according to the network topology and 
the interaction between nodes. Based on (2.27) and (2.28), the probability that node i is 
infected at time t+1 can be represented by (2.29).  
   0)()()(11)1(  tXPtStRtXP iiii                             (2.29)   
Formula (2.24) reflects an iteration process of malware propagation according to the status of 
a node at time t and the status of all neighbors of this node i at time t, which characterizes the 
spatial and temporal statistical dependencies. Consequently, the expected number of infected 
nodes at time t, n(t), can be computed:  
       
M
i i
M
i i
tXPtXEtn
11
1)()(                                        (2.30)     
Though (2.24) can be used to study the behavior of malware propagation, the cost of 
computing Si(t) is large especially when a node has a great number of neighbors.  Therefore, 
authors presented two models to simplify the challenge posed by the spatial dependence: the 
Independent Model and the Markov Model.  
The Independent Model assumes that the status of all nodes at time t is spatially 
independent. This means no propagation cycles are formed when worms propagate via some 
intermediate nodes because the infected probability of a node is not influenced by its 
neighbors. Thus, the independent model neglects the spatial dependence. However, the status 
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of a node at a given time is related to its status at the last time tick and thus, it still remains 
temporally dependent. The state evolution of node i in the independent model can be 
represented by (2.31): 
   0)()()(11)1(  tXPtStRtXP i
ind
iii
                            (2.31)  
where 
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The Markov Model assumes that the status of a node is related to its neighbors, but its 
neighbors cannot be influenced by each other at the same time. This assumption can result in 
propagation cycles via a single intermediate node, however this can be solved with 
conditional independence in the network space. If the status of node i‟s neighbors at the same 
time step is spatially independent give the status of node i, then the state evolution of a node 
in the Markov model can be represented by (2.32):  
   0)()()(11)1(  tXPtStRtXP i
mar
iii
                            (2.32)  
where 
  


iNj
ijji
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i tXtXPtS 0)(|1)(1)(        
2.3.4 Comparison of Worm Propagation Models 
A comparison of the various mathematical models of worms discussed above is 
summarized in Table 2.1. The classical simple epidemic model is the most widely used model 
for investigating the propagation of scan-based worms using a continuous-time differential 
equation. Some previous works, such as the uniform scan worm model and the RCS model, 
are derived from the classical simple epidemic model, which assumes two states for all hosts: 
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susceptible and infectious, and will stay in the infectious state forever when a host is infected. 
However, these models are not suitable for cases where the infected and infectious nodes are 
patched or removed. Consequently, the classical general epidemic model (Kermack-
McKendrick model) has been proposed to extend simple epidemic models by introducing a 
removal process of infectious peers. Continued improvements [2, 56] on modeling worm 
propagation have considered immunization defense. Zou et al. [2] proposed a two-factor 
worm model, which developed the general epidemic model by taking into account both the 
effect of human countermeasures and decreases in the infection rate.  
The above models adopt a continuous-time differential equation to observe and predict 
worm spreading in the network. As scanning IP addresses or logical neighbors is usually 
performed in discrete time [52], a host cannot infect other hosts before it is infected 
completely. Thus, strictly speaking, the propagation of worms is a discrete event process. A 
continuous-time model can possibly result in a different spreading speed and infected scale 
because a host begins devoting itself to infecting other hosts even though only a “small part” 
of it is infected. Consequently, modeling worm propagation at each discrete time tick is more 
accurate than using continuous time. The AAWP model, the LAAWP model and the 
Bluetooth worm model are constructed according to a discrete event process. The AAWP 
model characterizes the spread of active worms that employ random scanning. LAAWP is 
extended from the AAWP model and takes into account the characteristics of local subnet 
scanning worms spreading. The Bluetooth worm model analyzes the propagation dynamics of 
Bluetooth worms. It captures not only the behavior of the Bluetooth protocol but also the 
impact of mobility patterns on the propagation of Bluetooth worms.  
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All of the above models including continuous-time and discrete-time rely on the 
homogenous mixing assumption that any infected host has equal opportunity to infect any 
vulnerable host in the network. However, worms that use a localized scanning strategy, such 
as Code Red II, require non-homogenous consideration of population locality [7]. 
Consequently, the local preference model assumes a local preference scanning worm has 
probability p to uniformly scan addresses which share its first n bits in the network and 
probability (1-p) to uniformly scan other addresses. Besides, Zou et al. [6] analyzed the 
propagation of email worms and pointed out that models based on the homogenous mixing 
assumption overestimate the propagation speed of an epidemic in a topological network, 
especially in the early stages when a small number of nodes are infected and clustered with 
Table 2.1 A Comparison of Worm Propagation Models 
Worm 
Propagation 
Models 
Network 
Topology 
Graphical 
Representation of 
Topology 
Modeling 
Method 
Propagation 
Process 
Model 
Type 
Infection 
Type 
Classical Simple 
Epidemic Model 
H UG A C SI 
Not 
considered 
Uniform Scan 
Worm Model 
H UG A C SI 
Not 
considered 
RCS Model H UG A C SI 
Not 
considered 
Classical General 
Epidemic Model 
H UG A C SIR 
Not 
considered 
Two-factor 
Model 
H UG A C SIR 
Not 
considered 
AAWP Model H UG A D SIR 
Non-
reinfection 
Bluetooth Worm 
Model 
H UG A D SI 
Not 
considered 
Local Preference 
Model 
Non-H UG A C SI 
Not 
considered 
LAAWP Model Non-H UG A D SIR 
Non-
reinfection 
Email Worms 
Simulation Model 
R/SW/PL UG S D SI Reinfection 
Logic 0-1 Matrix 
Model 
R/PL DG A D SIR 
Non-
reinfection 
OSN Worms 
Model 
PL UG S D SI 
Non-
reinfection 
Spatial-temporal 
Model 
H/PL DG A D SIS 
Non-
reinfection 
  H: homogenous mixing; R: random network; SW: small-world network; PL: power-law network;  
  UG: undirected graph; DG: directed graph;  
  C: continuous-time event; D: discrete-time event 
  A: analytical; S: simulation; 
  SI: susceptible-infected model; SIR: susceptible-infected-recovered model; SIS: susceptible-infected-susceptible model; 
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each other. In order to avoid overestimation, the researchers provide a discrete-time 
simulation model and mainly study the email worm propagation over a power-law topology. 
This simulation model can more accurately simulate the propagation of email worms than 
previous homogenous mixing differential equation models. However, this model describes 
the email worm propagation tendency instead of modeling the dynamic spreading procedure 
between each pair of nodes. Secondly, they discussed the lower bound for the non-reinfection 
case, but their model is not capable of accurately eliminating the errors caused by reinfection. 
Moreover, some assumptions are not realistic. For example, the authors believe that just one 
malicious email copy will be sent to recipients even if an infected user checks multiple emails 
containing worms. In reality, a malicious copy is sent whenever the infected user opens a re-
infection worm email.  
This logic 0-1 matrix model employs a logic matrix to represent links between each pair of 
hosts and models the spreading of peer-to-peer worms over a pseudo power-law topology. 
This model can examine the spreading of worms deep inside the propagation procedure 
among nodes in the network. The model cannot avoid propagation cycles formed among 
intermediate nodes although it does not allow peers to have outbound links to themselves. 
These propagation cycles lead to the overestimation in the scale of the infected network. 
Besides this, their logic matrix is weak regarding an email resembling network because the 
weight of each link is a probability value ranging from zero to one instead of constant zero or 
one. The model does not consider the propagation probability and infected probability of each 
node, which has significant impacts on the infection procedure.  
Social networks have become attractive targets for worms. Fan and Yeung [20] proposed 
the OSN worm model to characterize the behavior of a worm spreading on the application 
network of Facebook. However, these two models assume a user starts infecting others at 
every moment once the user is infected. In practice however, infected users spread worms 
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only as they periodically accept invitations and install malicious applications or check newly 
received messages and open malicious links. As a result, they have neglected a realistic 
temporal delay process. Furthermore, the second model simulates the scenario of non-
reinfection worm propagation, however non-reinfection worms mainly appear in the early 
worm cases and are not appropriate for modeling modern email worms that spread over social 
networks.  
The above models assume computer users behave independently, that is, the status of all 
hosts at the same time step is spatially independent. In real scenarios, however, the 
propagation of topology-based worms needs human activation and thus the spreading 
procedure is spatial and temporally dependent. Chen et al. [32] used a spatial-temporal 
random process to describe the statistical dependence of worm propagation in arbitrary 
topologies. Although this model can outperform the previous models through capturing 
temporal dependence and detailed topology information, there are also some weak 
assumptions made. Firstly, this model adopts a SIS model, even though infected users are not 
likely to be infected again after they clean their computers by patching vulnerabilities or 
updating anti-virus software. Secondly, their model assumes that an infected computer cannot 
be reinfected. However, recent email worms often reinfect users, and are far more aggressive 
in spreading throughout the network. Thirdly, the authors ignore an important consideration 
regarding human behavior; the email checking time, which has been shown to greatly affect 
the propagation of email worms. 
2.4 Summary 
Worms and their variants are widely believed to be one of the most serious challenges in 
network security research. Although in recent years propagation mechanisms used by worms 
Chapter 2 Related Works 
 
49 
have evolved with the proliferation of data transmission, instant messages and other 
communication technologies, scan-based techniques and topology-based techniques are still 
the two main means for the spreading of worms. Modeling the propagation of worms can 
help us understand how worms spread and enable us to devise effective defense strategies. 
Therefore, a variety of models have been proposed for modeling the propagation mechanism. 
This chapter firstly introduced the target discovery techniques for scan-based worms and 
topology-based worms respectively, illustrating their scanning methods with graphical 
representations. Secondly, it analyzed the characteristics of four common topologies for 
modeling worm propagation. Finally, this chapter has described some typical mathematical 
models of worms that are the analytical tools for investigating dynamics and measuring the 
propagation of worms. We compared these modes and discussed the pros and cons of each 
model.   
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Chapter 3  
A Microcosmic Worm Propagation Model  
Worms and their variants are critical threats to the Internet. Each year, large amounts of 
money and labor are spent on patching the vulnerabilities in operating systems and various 
popular software to prevent exploitation by worms. Modeling the propagation process can 
help us to devise effective strategies against the spread of worms. Most traditional models 
simulate the overall scale of an infected network for each time tick, making them invalid for 
examining deep inside the propagation procedure among individual nodes. For this reason, 
this chapter presents a microcosmic model to analyze worm propagation procedures. Our 
proposed model can go deep inside the propagation process between each pair of nodes in the 
network by concentrating on the propagation probability and time delay described by a 
complex matrix. Moreover, since the analysis gives a microcosmic insight into a worm‟s 
propagation, the proposed model can investigate errors which are usually concealed in the 
traditional macroscopic analytical models. The objectives of this model are to accurately 
access the spreading and work out an effective scheme against the propagation of worms so 
the problems of when, where and how many nodes we need to patch can be dealt with. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Worms and their variants are widely believed to be one of the most serious challenges in 
network security research. According to the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report 
[64], the second highest percentage of the top 50 potential malicious code infections for 2009 
belonged to worms, which increased from 29 percent in 2008 to 43 percent in 2009. Six of 
the top 10 threats in 2009 had worm components, compared to only four in 2008. In recent 
years, propagation mechanisms used by worms have evolved with the proliferation of data 
transmission, instant messages and other communication technologies.   
In order to prevent worms propagating, as well as to mitigate the impact of an outbreak, we 
need to have a detailed and quantitative understanding of how a worm spreads. Currently, a 
variety of models have been proposed for modeling the propagation mechanism. Previous 
work has adopted the classical simple epidemic model [7, 23-25] which simulates two states 
for all hosts: susceptible and infectious. This is known as the SI model. However, this 
approach is not suitable for cases where the infected and infectious nodes are patched or 
removed. Consequently, the classical general epidemic model [26, 60], also called the 
susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model, has been proposed to extend simple epidemic 
models by introducing a removal process of infectious peers. Continued improvements [2, 6, 
56] on modeling worm propagation have considered the immunization defense. Zou et al. [2] 
proposed a two-factor worm model, which developed the general epidemic model by taking 
into account both the effect of human countermeasures and decreases in the infection rate. 
They also studied the propagation model for internet email worms [6] by comparing three 
different types of topology and summarized the immunization strategies. Although these 
propagation models perform well in predicting the tendency of worms to spread in the 
network, macroscopic models identify very little information within the propagation 
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procedure. This leads to difficulties in dealing with the problems of when, where and how 
many nodes we need to patch. In fact, there are five parameters involved in modeling worm 
propagation: 1) propagation probability; 2) infectious nodes’ distribution; 3) vulnerable 
nodes’ distribution; 4) patch strategy; 5) time delay. Previous models of worm propagation 
have failed to address the following issues: 
 Propagation probability between each pair of nodes so they cannot locate which set 
of nodes are more easily infected (Section 3.3.1 and 3.3.2); 
 Propagation time delay between each pair of nodes so they cannot estimate the time 
for each node to be infected from the propagation source (Section 3.3.1 and 3.3.2); 
 Worms‟ propagation procedure from node to node so they have weak information to 
decide an appropriate position and time for the patching of each node (Section 3.3.3); 
 Errors caused by reinfection in traditional models so they cannot avoid overestimation 
of patching budget (Section 3.3.4); 
 The mutual impact between propagation probability and time delay (Section 3.3.1) 
A recent improvement was proposed in [19] which used a logic matrix approach to model 
the spreading of peer-to-peer worms between each pair of all peers. It adopted two constants 
of logic type (True or 1, False or 0) as the value of matrix variables. This 0-1 matrix 
represents the propagation ability of nodes, that is, whether they allow the worms to spread or 
not. Nevertheless, a significant limitation of this model is that it cannot describe the 
propagation process of some worms, such as local preference worms, as these worms have 
different spreading probabilities for specific IP address spaces. More importantly, the model 
does not include temporal factors, which means it cannot model dynamic worm propagation 
procedures.  
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Compared with a macrocosmic propagation model, a microcosmic model can accurately 
reflect the distribution of nodes in the network, which is beneficial for describing the 
propagation procedure. We can examine the propagation of worms deep inside the spreading 
procedure and are able to understand how the current infected states impact on the worm‟s 
propagation in the next step. Modeling a microcosmic propagation procedure can provide 
defenders with useful information to answer the questions of where to patch, how many 
nodes to patch, and when to patch. Moreover, there is little research in microcosmic 
propagation models from the view of probability. Therefore, we are motivated to present a 
microcosmic propagation model for simulating the spreading of worms. Our model has 
several important components: 
 Probability matrixes (PM) are proposed to construct propagation models for worms; 
 A Propagation Source vector (S) is introduced for describing the distribution of initial 
infectious nodes; 
 A vulnerable distribution vector (V); 
 A patching strategy vector (Q) accounts for a special deployment of patching nodes; 
 Propagation abilities (PA). 
To the best of our knowledge, there is little research that refers to the microcosmic 
procedure of worm propagation between nodes in a network. Although research such as [19] 
analyzed worm propagation from the view of the microcosm, it adopted a simplified logic 
matrix to indicate the infected states of the network. This simple logic does not effectively 
describe the propagation procedure between each pair of nodes, nor does it reflect the 
spreading effect in each step of a worm‟s propagation.  
In order to find an effective and efficient countermeasure against the propagation of worms, 
we must fully understand their propagation mechanisms. This chapter presents a microcosmic 
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study on modeling the propagation of worms. The major contributions of this chapter are as 
follows: firstly, we introduce a complex matrix to represent the propagation probabilities and 
time delay between each pair of nodes. These two factors lead to accurate exploration of the 
propagation procedure and estimation of both infection scale and the effectiveness of defense. 
The extension from the real field of the matrix to the complex field of the matrix reflects the 
mutual effect between these two factors, which matches the real case well. Secondly, 
associated with S, V, Q, our model can also help to evaluate: 1) the mutual effect of initial 
infectious states and patch strategies; 2) the impact different distributions of vulnerable hosts 
have on worm propagation. Thirdly, we create a microcosmic landscape on worm 
propagation which can provide useful information for a defense against worms. 
We apply our proposed microcosmic model to study the propagation of scanning worms in 
Chapter 4. Through simulation results, we can derive a set of optimized patch strategies to 
minimize the number of infected peers and provide economic benefits to industry by 
selectively deploying security patches.   
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we provide a comparison 
between macroscopic worm propagation models and microcosmic worm propagation models. 
In Section 3.3, we model the microcosmic propagation procedure of worms and introduce 
each component of the proposed model. Finally, we conclude this chapter in Section 3.4 with 
a brief summary. 
3.2 Macroscopic and Microcosmic Worm Propagation Models  
In the area of network security, both macroscopic [2-10, 15, 29-30, 65-66] and 
microcosmic [19] models exist for simulating different worm propagation. Most worm 
propagation models are based on a macroscopic view, such as the homogenous worms‟ 
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model, the local preference worms‟ model and the topological worms‟ model, which mainly 
describe the overall spreading tendency of worms. In contrast, microcosm models prefer to 
study the propagation procedure between nodes according to different scenarios of infectious 
states, vulnerable states and quarantine states.  
3.2.1 Macroscopic Worm Propagation Models  
3.2.1.1 Homogenous Worms’ Model 
The homogenous worm propagation model is a simple epidemic model which is used in a 
lot of research [2, 5, 7-10] to model worm propagation for random scanning worms (Code 
Red [2], Slammer [12]). Variants of random scanning worms (hit-list worms [7], routable 
worms [11]) are modeled using extensions of this simple epidemic model. The homogenous 
model is based on the concept of a fully connected graph and is an unstructured worm model 
that ignores the network topology. The model assumes each infectious host has an equal 
probability in spreading the worm to any vulnerable peer in a network. Staniford et al. [7] 
presented an RCS (Random Constant Spread) model to simulate the propagation of the Code-
Red I v2 worm, which is almost identical to the homogenous model. Zou et al. [2] introduced 
a two-factor model, which extended the homogenous model by considering human 
countermeasures and network congestion. These models focus on analyzing the trends of 
worm propagation. However, they do not describe the worm propagation from node to node 
or the infection process when disrupted by patching or immunizing nodes. Thus, they are not 
suitable for modeling the dynamic process of infection and patching between each pair of 
nodes. Furthermore, the models are significantly limited for modeling worms that scan IP 
addresses with differing probabilities and are unable to simulate topology-based worm 
propagation. Additionally, they do not discuss the different impact of reinfection and non-
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reinfection on worm propagation. Rohloff and Basar [8] presented a stochastic density-
dependent Markov jump process propagation model. Sellke et al. [9] provided a stochastic 
Galton-Watson Markov branching process model. These two models are also limited in 
simulating the propagation tendency, which is unable to describe the spreading procedure.  
3.2.1.2 Local Preference Worms’ Model 
Since vulnerable nodes are not uniformly distributed, some localized scanning worms 
(Code Red II [15, 29-30], Blaster worm [66]) propagate the virus with a high probability in 
certain IP addresses for the purpose of increasing their spreading speed. Taking Code Red II 
as an example, the probability of the virus propagating to the same class A IP address is 3/8; 
to the same class A and B IP address is 1/2; and to the random IP address is 1/8. Thus, the 
local preference model employs a non-homogenous pattern to simulate worm propagation. 
Chen et al. [10] presented a LAAWP (Local Analytical Active Worm Propagation) model to 
take into account the characteristics of the spread of local subnet scanning worms. However, 
this model assumes the distribution of vulnerable hosts is uniform in every subnet. They did 
not consider the impact of vulnerable distribution on worm propagation, which is one of the 
important parameters on modeling worms spreading. Zou et al. [5] considered the distribution 
of vulnerable hosts in the IPv4 address space and provided a more accurate method to model 
the propagation of local preference scanning worms. In this model, they suppose only the first 
m networks have vulnerable hosts. However, they still assume vulnerability distribution is 
uniform in each subnet. Moreover, although their model introduced the pair-wise rates of 
infection in local scanning and remote scanning, it is still derived from the homogenous 
model. Therefore, these models cannot reflect non-uniform vulnerability distribution on 
worm propagation and the dynamic process of infection and immunization between each pair 
of nodes.  
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3.2.1.3 Topological Worms’ Model 
Both the homogenous model and the local preference model reflect the propagation of 
unstructured worms without regard to topological constraints. However, a topological model 
describes a structure-dependent propagation of worms, which relies on the topology for the 
spreading of viruses. Zou et al. [6] considered these two probabilities and compared internet 
email worm propagation on power law topologies, small world topologies and random graph 
topologies. In the proposed model, the probability of each user opening a worm attachment 
can be treated as an infected probability and the distribution of email checking times can 
represent the propagation probability. However, this model still describes the email worm 
propagation tendency instead of modeling the dynamic spreading procedure between each 
pair of nodes. In addition, they discussed the lower bound for a non-reinfection case, but their 
model is not capable of accurately eliminating the errors caused by reinfection. 
3.2.2 Microcosmic Worm Propagation Models  
Microcosmic worm propagation models focus on the infection procedure between each 
pair of nodes. Fan and Xiang [19] employed a logic matrix approach to model the spreading 
of peer-to-peer worms between each pair of peers. They discovered the relation between out-
degree, vulnerability and coverage rate in power law topologies and simple random graph 
topologies respectively. However, they did not consider the propagation probability and 
infected probability of each node, which has significant impacts on the infection procedure. 
Additionally, although they do not allow peers‟ outbound links to themselves, they cannot 
avoid propagation cycles formed among intermediate nodes.   
We propose a novel complex matrix that models worm propagation, and simulates the 
microcosmic spreading procedure of worms. Using this complex matrix in the propagation 
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simulation of worms forms the major difference between this work and existing work. In our 
model, we focus on investigating the procedure of worms spreading and providing effective 
patching strategies, which will benefit IT industries and security best practice.  
3.3 Propagation Model  
In this section we present the propagation model from a microcosmic view, which is used 
to simulate the propagation process of worms between each pair of nodes and to estimate an 
optimized patch strategy. We assume that all nodes are vulnerable at the beginning and thus 
there is no need to scan the whole network.   
3.3.1 Propagation Matrix (PM) 
We propose employing an n by n square complex matrix PM with elements cxy to describe 
a network consisting of n peers. We consider that two peers in the network are connected 
even if the probability of the connection‟s existence is very small, thereby making node x and 
y immediate neighbors. In this matrix, the real component of each element cxy represents the 
propagation probability of the worm spreading from node x to node y under the condition that 
node x is infected. The imaginary component represents the propagation delay from node x to 
node y. Worms propagating to a target need a certain time delay. If the time delay tends 
Node x
a+bi
Node y
(ac-βbd)+(ad+bc)i
Node k
c+di
 
 
Figure 3.1: Worm propagation computation 
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towards infinity, the target cannot be infected by infectious nodes. Hence, the effect of time 
delay on a worm‟s spreading cannot be ignored. The calculation rules of complex can be of 
benefit to reflect the mutual impact between the propagation probability and time delay (see 
Section 3.2.2 and Fig. 3.1). However, adopting other means such as two tuples to represent 
the propagation matrix cannot describe the relation between the above two parameters as 
each element in the two tuples is separate. We call this complex matrix the propagation 
matrix (PM) of the network, as shown in (3.1).  
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Each row of the PM represents the propagation probability (pxy) and propagation delay 
(dxy) from one infectious peer to all other peers. Each column represents pxy and dxy from 
infectious peers to a target peer. We assume a peer cannot propagate the worm to itself, so the 
self-propagation pxx and dxx are zero. 
Generally, worms scan an IP address space or a hit-list for propagation. Thus, propagation 
time delay includes time costs of scanning targets and network latency. Compared with time 
costs of scanning targets, network latency can be ignored. We assume the imaginary number i 
as the maximum time cost of scanning the entire IP address space or the hit-list.  
Node x Node y
K=1 K=2 K=k
 
 
Figure 3.2: Worm propagation between two peers 
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3.3.2 Propagation Function (γ) 
In real-world conditions, worms could be spread between peers from node x to node y via 
one or more intermediate nodes, as shown in Fig. 3.2. In existing worms it is observed that an 
infectious peer can propagate worms and a vulnerable peer can also be infected and become a 
new infectious node for future propagation. In this scenario, we assume that initially every 
peer in the PM is vulnerable to the worm. 
We assume that worm propagation from node x (Nx) to node y (Ny) is via and only via k 
intermediate nodes in a network consisting of n peers. According to the rule of complex 
multiplication, as shown in Fig. 3.1, the first component (ac-βbd) of the result indicates 
propagation probability from Nx to Ny. Here we manually insert an impact factor (β) to 
describe the decrease in the propagation probability caused by time delay. It combines the 
characteristic of the worm itself and the network it operates on. The second component 
((ad+bc)i) of the result indicates possible time delay for worm propagation from Nx to Ny. It 
is denoted by cxy 
(k)
 and defined in (3.2):  
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Since Nx self-propagation via k nodes is meaningless in the real world, we define the value 
of this propagation probability as zero; namely cxy
(k)
 =0 when x=y. We introduce a function γ 
to conduct the iterated procedure as in (3.3):  
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Operation × is the traditional matrix multiplication. Subsequently, the PM can be 
represented by the following equation when the worm propagation is via and only via k 
intermediate nodes, as shown in (3.4): 
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3.3.3 Three Key Factors 
In a network, there are three significant factors for worm propagation: infectious state, 
vulnerability distribution, and patch strategy. The infected state represents the state of 
whether the peer has been infected or not. Vulnerability distribution identifies vulnerable 
peers in the network. A patch strategy provides an approach to cure infected peers. Infected 
peers cannot be infected after being patched.  
3.3.3.1 Propagation Source Vector (S) 
An initial propagation source vector (S) is defined as shown in (3.5). An infectious peer 
that can propagate worms is represented with a probability of one. The probability of zero 
means that a peer is healthy and does not have the ability to propagate the worm. 
  nxorsssssS x
T
nx ....1,10,...... ,,,,2,1                          (3.5) 
The iterated procedure can be represented as function γs in (3.6):  
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We define &L to indicate a new logic AND operation of a column vector A and a matrix B, 
called Left Logic AND. The result of A &L B is a new logic matrix of the same dimension as B. 
This operation is used to eliminate non-infectious nodes. Each element in the new matrix is 
the result of the product of the corresponding elements ax and bxy from each column of matrix 
B. It is defined in (3.7):  
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The PM can be represented by the following equation when a worm‟s propagation is via 
and only via k intermediate nodes, as in (3.8).  
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During the propagation process, each intermediate node can be infected and become 
infectious. We introduce an infected state vector I, as shown in (3.9):  
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where Г function computes each item in infected state vector I using the formula as shown in 
(3.10):  
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Is
 (k)
 reflects the infected possibility and time delay of each node after worm propagation 
via k intermediate nodes under a certain deployment of S.  
3.3.3.2 Vulnerable Distribution Vector (V)  
Under real-world conditions, the vulnerability of a peer is an objective fact. Therefore, a 
healthy peer without any vulnerability cannot become infectious in the worm‟s propagation 
process. On the basis of this fact, we need to consider the vulnerability distribution in the PM. 
The vulnerable distribution vector (V) is defined in (3.11). For an element in V, the value of 
one represents that a peer is vulnerable. Zero means that the peer is healthy and is not 
vulnerable.  
  nxorvvvvvV x
T
nx ....1,10,...... ,,,,2,1                              (3.11) 
Once nodes are vulnerable, they can become infected and have the ability to infect others. 
Therefore, the iterated procedure can be represented as function γsv in (3.12):  
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We define &R to indicate a new logic AND operation of a column vector A and a matrix B, 
called Right Logic AND, which is different from Left Logic AND. The result of A &R B is a 
new logic matrix of the same dimension as B. Each element in the new matrix is the result of 
the product of the corresponding elements ay and bxy from each row of matrix B. It is defined 
in (3.13):  
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Considering the vulnerability distribution vector, the PM and infected probability vector I 
can be represented by the following equations respectively when the worm propagates via 
and only via k intermediate nodes, as in (3.14).  
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3.3.3.3 Patch Strategy Vector (Q)  
An infected peer can be cured and become a healthy node, unable to spread worms to other 
peers. Therefore, we need to remove these nodes from the propagation process at that time. 
We define a patch vector Q in (3.15). For each element in Q, the value of one represents that 
a peer has been patched and is now a healthy node. A value of zero indicates that a peer is 
still vulnerable. 
  nxorqqqqqQ x
T
nx ....1,10,...... ,,,,2,1                      (3.15) 
Once the nodes have been patched, they will become immune to the worms and lose their 
infectious ability. Thus, we should exclude these patched nodes in the matrix for the 
successive iteration. The iterated procedure can be represented as function γsvq shown in 
(3.16):  
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We define & to indicate a new logic AND operation between two elements. The definition 
for & operation is shown in Table 3.1.    
After considering the patch strategy vector, the PM and infected probability vector I can be 
represented by the following equations respectively when the worm propagates via and only 
via k intermediate nodes, as shown in (3.17):  
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3.3.4 Error Calibration Vector (E) 
We consider two scenarios of infection: reinfection and non-reinfection. Generally, 
reinfection means a node can be infected repeatedly and non-reinfection indicates a node can 
only be infected once [15]. 
Table 3.1. Truth Table for New Logic And Operation 
V
T
 Q
T
 V
T
& Q
T
 
1 1 0 
0 1 0 
1 0 1 
0 0 0 
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If a worm belongs to the reinfection type, the earlier-mentioned propagation mechanism is 
reasonable. However, if a worm belongs to the non-reinfection type, propagation cycles will 
be formed during the spreading procedure, which results in errors in the infected probabilities, 
as shown in Fig. 3.3. There are three types of cycles formed in the propagation procedure. As 
shown in Fig. 3.3(a), an infectious node s could spread the worm to itself (S-S). This is called 
self-propagation, which results in an increase of infected probability infinitely. In the real 
case, however, this infectious node can be infected only once. Thus, in our propagation model, 
we do not allow a self-propagation cycle, that is, each node can be infected by N (N ≥1) 
nodes and no peer has an outbound link to itself. The work completed by [19] also noticed 
this self-propagation characteristic and also avoided it. 
The second type of cycle is shown in Fig. 3.3(b). The initial infectious node s can be 
infected again after worms have spread via some intermediate nodes: S-N1-N2-S, S-N3-N1-N2-
S. These two cycles (①③④ and ②③④) start from the initial infectious nodes and end up at 
④
③
②
①
S N1
N2 N3
N4
Infectious Node
Vulnerable Node S
②
①
S
N1
N3
N2
①
③
④
(a)
(c)
(b)
 
Figure 3.3: Propagation cycles 
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themselves. This self-propagation leads to an infinite increase in the infected probabilities of 
these initial infectious nodes. In order to eliminate the errors caused by this type of cycle, we 
define the infected probability of each node to itself as zero in the procedure of the worm‟s 
propagation. 
Fig. 3.3(c) shows the third type of cycle. N1 can be infected by infectious node s directly or 
via one or more intermediate nodes: S-N4-N1-N2-N1, S-N1-N2-N3-N1. Two cycles (③and④) 
begin from the intermediate nodes (N1) and ends up at itself when the worm propagates via 
some other intermediate nodes (N2, N3). Since two cycles form in the procedure of the 
worm‟s spreading but not from the initial infectious nodes, we cannot eliminate the infinite 
probability cycles by setting the diagonal items in PM to zero. The macroscopic propagation 
models cannot exclude the errors caused by propagation cycles among the intermediate nodes. 
Thus, it is desirable to have a mathematical model quantifying the errors and discussing the 
impact on the worm‟s propagation.  
In order to avoid the errors in non-reinfection worms, we introduce an error calibration 
vector E, as shown in (3.18): 
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where k is the current iteration times. Psi
 (k-x)
 is the propagation probability from node s to 
node i by (k-x) times‟ iteration. Pi
(x)
 is the propagation probability from node i to node i by x 
times‟ iteration. Consequently, in the case of non-reinfection worms, we calibrate Isvq
(k)
 to be 
(3.19):   
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3.3.5 Propagation Ability (PA) 
In real-world scenarios, attackers expect to control a significant proportion of a network to 
enable worm propagation. The worm propagation ability (PA) is related to the number of 
peers that the worm can propagate to with high probability and related time delay. In 
consideration of more than one path for the propagating worm, we adopt an accumulative I 
(AI) to represent the sum of probabilities for the worm propagation between two peers with at 
most k intermediate nodes. It is defined in (3.20):   
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where in function Re(I
(k)
) is used to obtain the real component of I
(k)
, n indicates the number 
of nodes in the network and (n-1) means the maximum number of intermediate nodes. In the 
propagation procedure, it is observed that the infected probability gradually decreases when 
the number of intermediate nodes increases.    
Moreover, we define the accumulative time delay AT to represent the estimated time delay 
for the worm propagation between two peers with at most k intermediate nodes, as shown in 
(3.21).  
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The condition to terminate propagation is when the matrix iteration count reaches N-2 (N 
nodes in a network). Since PA is two-tuples (AI, AT), in order to evaluate the PA, we simply 
inspect the AI and AT for each node in the network after an iteration of propagation.    
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3.4 Summary 
Most macroscopic models simulate the overall scale of an infected network for each time 
tick, making them invalid for examining deep inside the propagation procedure among 
individual nodes. For this reason, this chapter compared the differences between the existing 
macroscopic and microcosmic worm propagation models and proposed a new microcosmic 
exploration for modeling worm propagation processes. Firstly, we presented a complex 
matrix model to construct the propagation of worms from one node to another node. Our 
model involves three indispensible aspects for propagation: infected state, vulnerability 
distribution and patch strategy. Through analyzing different scenarios of these three aspects, 
we can generate a set of optimized patch strategies so that defenders can prevent the worms 
from spreading using a reasonable and economic approach. In the proposed model, we use 
three different vectors to represent these key factors: propagation source vector, vulnerable 
distribution vector and patch strategy vector. We also discussed propagation cycles in the 
propagation path that result in propagation errors. In order to quantify the errors, the proposed 
model introduces an error calibration vector and thus, investigates the impact on the worm‟s 
propagation. This model adopts propagation ability to evaluate the propagation procedure of 
worms. 
The proposed microcosmic worm propagation model is able to provide a series of 
recommendations and advice for patch strategies to counter worm propagation. We apply the 
proposed microcosmic model to observe the propagation of scanning worms through the 
design of different experiments in Chapter 4. According to the results, our microcosmic 
model can successfully provide useful information for the proposed problems of where, when 
and how many nodes we need to patch. 
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Chapter 4  
Microcosmic Modeling of the Propagation and 
Defense Study of Scanning Worms  
Scanning worms scan IP addresses to infect vulnerable computers in the network. This 
chapter applies the proposed microcosmic worm propagation model in Chapter 3 to analyze 
the propagation procedures of scanning worms, such as Code Red II. The objectives of this 
chapter are to address three practical aspects of preventing worm propagation: 1) Where do 
we patch? 2) How many nodes do we need to patch? 3) When do we patch? We implement a 
series of experiments to evaluate the effects of each major component in the microcosmic 
model proposed in Chapter 3 and provide a set of optimized and economical patch strategies 
to prevent scanning worms from spreading. Based on the results drawn from the experiments, 
for high risk vulnerabilities, it is critical that networks reduce the number of vulnerable nodes 
to below a certain threshold, e.g., 80% in this analysis. We believe the results can benefit the 
security industry by allowing them to save significant money in the deployment of their 
security patching schemes. Moreover, we investigate the mutual impact between the 
propagation probability and time delay and discuss the overestimation caused by errors in 
macroscopic models. Through the analysis of the propagation procedure, we observe that the 
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error is mainly caused by propagation cycles in the propagation path, which are usually 
ignored by traditional macroscopic models. 
4.1 Introduction 
Each year, in order to prevent worms from spreading effectively, large amounts of money 
and labor are spent by industry on patching vulnerabilities in operating systems and popular 
software. Wipro Technologies stated in their 2004 patch management costs report [67], 
“Annual per-system patching costs on windows: $297.1(clients), $416.2 (Non-Database 
Servers), $682.1 (Database Servers) and on open source software systems: $343.7 (clients), 
$479.3 (Non-Database Servers), $1020.4 (Database Servers).” We expect the cost to have 
been greater in 2010 because of the enormous increase in sophistication and potential for 
damage caused by worms. Consequently, it is important to provide a set of optimized and 
economic patch strategies to deal with the problems of where and how many nodes we need 
to patch. 
Security experts routinely uncover software vulnerabilities and then issue software patches 
and upgrades. Sometimes, however, it may cause inadvertent and possibly detrimental effects. 
Security researcher Dan Kaminsky uncovered a flaw in the Domain Name System (DNS) and 
published a series of patches before publicly disclosing the specifics of the vulnerability [68]. 
By looking at the patch, others were able to reverse engineer the patch, and shortly afterwards 
code to exploit the newfound weakness had been posted to a website. Some network 
administrators may have initially been reluctant to patch their systems, fearing that the 
upgrade itself might cause problems. However, the result is the potential break out of worms 
before a sufficient number of nodes can be patched. Therefore, we need to quantify an 
appropriate time for patching vulnerabilities. 
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In order to understand and possibly address: 1) where to patch; 2) how many nodes we 
need to patch; 3) when to patch, we characterize the worm propagation through the 
microcosmic model proposed in Chapter 3. We mainly focus on scanning worms in this 
chapter, which scan the entire network and explore the vulnerabilities without regard to 
topological constraints. It is closely related to the logical features of the network rather than 
the physical structure. Therefore, our proposed approach is suitable for modeling networks 
that are susceptible to scanning worms. 
The objective of the research is to generate a set of optimized patch strategies to minimize 
the number of infected peers and provide economic benefits to industry by selectively 
deploying security patches. The major contributions of the chapter are as follows. Firstly, 
according to the microcosmic model proposed in Chapter 3, we carry out extensive 
simulation studies of worm propagation and successfully provide useful information for the 
proposed problems of where, when and how many nodes we need to patch. Secondly, 
through deploying different scenarios, we can find how propagation source states, 
vulnerabilities distributions and patch strategies impact on the spreading of worms. Thirdly, 
we derive a better understanding of dynamic infection procedures in each step of matrix 
iteration. These procedures include: 1) what is the propagation probability and time delay 
between each pair of nodes; 2) how does one node infect another node directly; 3) how does 
one node infect another node through a group of intermediate nodes. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we introduce the design of 
our experiments, including the experiment environment and scanning strategy. In Section 4.3, 
we evaluate three key factors of the proposed model. Then we analyze the effect of the 
impact factor and the overestimation in macroscopic models in Section 4.4 and Section 4.5 
respectively. In Section 4.6, we discuss open issues. Finally, we conclude this chapter in 
Section 4.7 with a brief summary. 
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4.2 Design of Experiments   
Our implementation is in Visual C++ 2008 SP1 and Matlab 7. The random numbers in our 
experiments are produced by the C++ TR1 library extensions. Experiments are carried out by 
a series of simulations: 1) we analyze the effect of the main components in our model 
including S, V, Q; 2) we analyze the mutual effect from the impact factor β between 
propagation probability and time delay; 3) in this chapter we focus on scanning worms that 
primarily belong to the non-reinfection class of worms. Thus, we evaluate the errors caused 
by loops in worm propagation, which are normally ignored by macroscopic propagation 
models.  
Some worms, such as Code Red [2], Code Red II [15, 29-30], and Slammer [12] can 
propagate without a dependency on the topology. This means that an infectious node is able 
to infect an arbitrary vulnerable peer. Up to now, many researchers have modeled this type of 
worm propagation. In our experiments, we choose a typical local preference worm on the 
basis of Code Red II, as shown in Fig.4.1. The time delay between each pair of nodes follows 
the Gaussian Distribution N (0.5, 0.2
2
). 
In practice, there are problems to overcome in the propagation simulation. It often takes a 
significant amount of time to perform the experiments--72 h in our case on an Intel (R) Core 
(TM) i7 CPU 2.67-GHz (4 cores) processor to model 10000 nodes--to simulate a single run 
of matrix iteration for one set of components S, V, Q. To identify trends, many such runs need 
to be performed and the whole simulation process has to be rerun for any parameter changes. 
The simulation overhead can be prohibitively high in some cases when the simulated network 
has a larger scale. This leads to the conclusion that all such experiments are intractable in 
practice. However, according to our practice and observation, we have found two properties 
of our model that can be used in addressing the difficulties stated above: 1) our model is 
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based on matrix computation (See Formula (3.3) in Chapter 3). Matrix multiplication has a 
computational cost, however, the matrix operations all run with a polynomial time 
complexity and can be highly parallelized. Matrix multiplication is the bottleneck in our 
implementation and is an embarrassingly parallel problem which means each resultant matrix 
element can be solved concurrently. Thus, the performance of our system will increase 
significantly with the addition of concurrent computational resources. On a single 
workstation, we performed the evaluation using 2×4 threads (OpenMP threading Library) to 
improve the speed of matrix computation. The theoretical speedup is linear in an 
embarrassingly parallel problem such as matrix multiplication for most realistically sized 
clusters, which means the computational time is reduced linearly as more computational units 
are utilized. Industry and research organizations have access to significant computation 
resources and can mitigate the performance obstacles we have described by employing 
distributed and high performance computing resources such as clusters and clouds; 2) we 
analyze the impact of changing the matrix dimensionality used in the experiments and find 
that a larger dimension will not produce significantly different results. In order to show these 
results clearly, we choose reasonable network sizes (5000 nodes) and examine them under 
different scenarios. 
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Figure 4.1: Code Red II probability propagation matrix  
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4.3 Effect of Three Key Factors   
In this section, we evaluate the effects of three significant factors for scanning worms: 
infected state, vulnerability distribution and patch strategy according to different scenarios. 
Then, based on the results, we derive a series of recommendations and provide advice for 
patch strategies.  
4.3.1 Effect of the Propagation Source Vector  
In this subsection, we assume all nodes in the network are vulnerable and no nodes have 
been patched. According to the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report [59], global 
malicious activities are not evenly distributed in different ranges of IP addresses. 
Consequently, we arrange a group of scenarios with practical meaning in Table 4.1 to 
describe the different origins of worms. The results are represented by the mean value of 
propagation ability (E(AI)), the variation of propagation ability (D(AI)), the mean value of 
propagation time delay (E(AT)) and the variation of propagation time delay (D(AT)). In order 
Table 4.1 Scenarios for Analysing Propagation Source (S) 
Scenario Description (refer to Fig. 4.1) Practical Meaning 
1 
IP address range A1B1 has 
increasing number of initial 
infectious nodes. 
Analyzing the impact of the number of initial 
infectious sources on the propagation probability in 
an IP address range such as a specific region. 
2 
Increasing number of IP address 
ranges A1Bx (x∈ [1, g]) have an 
initial infectious node. 
Analyzing the impact of different geographic 
distribution of initial infectious sources on the 
propagation probability. 
3 
Increasing number of IP address 
ranges AxB1 (x∈ [1, g]) have an 
initial infectious node. 
4 
IP address ranges AxBy (x, y∈ [1, 
g]) have a different number of 
initial infectious nodes. 
Analyzing worm propagation when different 
regions have a different density of initial infectious 
source. 
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to describe the differences of each parameter clearly, we cut the first 81 nodes to make 
figures for some experiments. 
4.3.1.1 Scenario 1 
Preparation: 
We deploy 1% to 3% infectious nodes in A1B1 of PM (See Fig.4.1). Based on different 
propagation probabilities, the entire IP space is divided into three ranges: 
 R1: A1B1 
 R2: A1B2→A1Bg 
 R3: A2→Ag 
Result: 
Table 4.2 Results from Different Scenarios of Propagation Source (S) 
Scenario 
Infectious Node 
Propagation 
Probability 
Time Delay 
Quantity Scenario Setting E(AI) 
D(AI) 
(×10
-4
) 
E(AT) 
(× i ) 
D(AT) 
(×10
-2
) 
1 
1% A1B1 has 1% initial infectious nodes 0.0124 0.0729 0.5201 0.3758 
2% A1B1 has 2% initial infectious nodes 0.0124 0.0729 0.2605 0.0941 
3% A1B1 has 3% initial infectious nodes 0.0124 0.0729 0.1735 0.0416 
2 
2% 
A1B1 and A1B2 have 1% initial 
infectious nodes respectively 
0.0124 0.0723 0.2605 0.0938 
3% 
A1B1, A1B2 and A1B3 have 1% 
initial infectious nodes respectively 
0.0124 0.0704 0.1734 0.0418 
3 
2% 
A1B1 and A2B1 have 1% initial 
infectious nodes respectively 
0.0124 0.0320 0.2576 0.0659 
3% 
A1B1, A2B1 and A3B1 have 1% 
initial infectious nodes respectively 
0.0124 0.0183 0.1706 0.0203 
4% 
AxB1 (x∈ [1, 4]) have 1% initial 
infectious nodes respectively 
0.0124 0.0115 0.1275 0.0079 
4 
3% 
A1B1 has 2% infectious nodes and 
A1B2 has 1% infectious nodes 
0.0124 0.0724 0.1732 0.0414 
  3%* 
A1B1 has 2% infectious nodes and 
A2B1 has 1% infectious nodes 
0.0124 0.0365 0.1722 0.0306 
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The result is listed in Table 4.2 Scenario 1. We find that the number of initial infectious 
nodes have no impact on E(AI) and D(AI). As shown in Fig. 4.2, AI in different IP ranges R1, 
R2 and R3 are overlapped respectively when the number of initial infectious nodes increases. 
In Fig. 4.2(a), AI deviates in different IP ranges during the propagation procedure: 
AI(R1)>AI(R2)>>AI(R3). In Fig. 4.2(b), the difference of AI deviates in different IP ranges. 
Within the first 20 iterations, R1 and R2 decline rapidly, while R3 slightly increases. 
Afterwards, the difference of AI tends to be stable. 
In Table 4.2, the result of time delay reflects temporal properties of the worm propagation 
in this scenario; an increasing number of initial infectious nodes results in a decrease in 
E(AT) and D(AT). Fig.4.3 shows the estimated time delay AT in different IP ranges when the 
number of initial infectious nodes increases. During the first nearly 40 iterations, 
AT(R1)>AT(R2)>AT(R3); afterwards, AT in R3 goes up quickly: AT(R3)>AT(R2)>AT(R1).  
Analysis: 
Although the number of initial infectious nodes is increasing, their effects are limited in the 
same IP ranges, which leads to the overall propagation probabilities are not improved. 
Therefore the value of E(AI) and D(AI) stay the same. 
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Figure 4.2: Propagation probability in scenario 1  (the first 81 nodes in 5000 nodes) 
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When more infectious nodes are involved, the E(AT) obviously decreases as the average 
time for searching the targets is reduced. Meanwhile, a decline of D(AT) indicates that an 
increase in the number of initial infected nodes can accelerate the propagation speed to all 
nodes in the network since the time delay is close to the E(AT). In the early propagation stage, 
the infected nodes are mainly in IP ranges R1 and R2. Thus, AT is dominated by the nodes 
with greater propagation probability in R1 and R2. Afterwards, when the number of infected 
nodes in R3 increases, the nodes in R3 have greater contribution to AT.  
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 Figure 4.4: Propagation probability in scenario 2 (the first 81 nodes in 5000 nodes) 
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 Figure 4.3: Propagation time delay in scenario 1 (the first 81 nodes in 5000 nodes) 
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4.3.1.2 Scenario 2 
Preparation: 
We deploy 2% and 3% infectious nodes in PM (See Fig.4.1). Based on different 
propagation probabilities, the entire IP space is divided into three ranges: 
 R1: A1B1→A1B2 (2% infectious nodes)  
      A1B1→A1B3 (3% infectious nodes) 
 R2: A1B3→A1Bg (2% infectious nodes) 
      A1B4→A1Bg (3% infectious nodes) 
 R3: A2→Ag 
Result: 
The result is listed in Table 4.2 Scenario 2. As shown in Fig. 4.4, the basic tendency of the 
curves is similar to scenario 1. However, more infectious nodes (from 2% to 3%) in the 
network result in a decrease in AI of R1 and R2. Additionally, we find that the number of 
initial infectious nodes has no impact on AI in R3. 
In Table 4.2, temporal properties of time delay in scenario 2 stay the same with scenario 1. 
As shown in Fig.4.5, the value of AT decreases when the number of initial infectious nodes 
increases.  
Analysis: 
We analyze the decrease of AI in R1 and R2 when there are more initial infectious nodes 
distributed in adjacent IP ranges of the network. The reason for this is that when a new 
infectious node in A1B3 is involved, compared with two infectious nodes case, the AI in A1B3 
will increase. However, the sum of all probabilities is equal to one, which means an increase 
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of AI in A1B3 results in a mathematical decrease of AI in other infectious ranges such as 
A1B1-A1B2.   
Similar to scenario 1, E(AI) stays the same (0.0124), and only a small decrease D(AI) 
(from 0.0723×10
-4
 to 0.0704×10
-4
) indicates more nodes in the network have higher 
probabilities of being infected. Additionally, scenario 2 has the same acceleration of 
propagation time as scenario 1. 
4.3.1.3 Scenario 3 
Preparation: 
We deploy 2% to 4% infectious nodes in PM (See Fig. 4.1). Based on different 
propagation probabilities, the entire IP space is divided into three ranges: 
 R1: A1B1+A2B1 (2% infectious nodes)  
      A1B1+A2B1 +A3B1 (3% infectious nodes) 
      A1B1+A2B1 +A3B1 +A4B1 (4% infectious nodes) 
 R2: {AxB2→AxBg}x=1,2 (2% infectious nodes) 
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Figure 4.5: Propagation time delay in scenario 2 (the first 81 nodes in 5000 nodes) 
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      {AxB2→AxBg}x=1,2,3 (3% infectious nodes) 
      {AxB2→AxBg}x=1,2,3,4 (4% infectious nodes) 
 R3: A3→Ag(2% infectious nodes) 
      A4→Ag(3% infectious nodes) 
      A5→Ag(4% infectious nodes) 
Result: 
We use 2% infectious nodes case to compare with scenario 2. In Fig. 4.6, when the 
infectious nodes are scattered in the network, the AI of R1 and R2 decreases. AI of R3 stays 
the same. 
In Table 4.2, temporal properties of time delay in scenario 3 stay the same with scenario 2. 
In Fig. 4.7, AT of scenario 2 is almost the same with AT of scenario 3 in IP ranges R1 and R2.  
Analysis: 
We analyze the decrease of AI in R1 and R2 when the initial infectious nodes are scattered 
in different IP ranges of the network. The reason is that when infectious nodes are deployed 
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 Figure 4.6: Propagation probability in scenario 2 and scenario 3  
        (the first 81 nodes in 5000 nodes)  
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loosely, more nodes have a higher probability of being infected. Similar to the exceptional 
decrease of AI in scenario 2, an increase of AI in A2B1→A2Bg results in a mathematical 
decrease of AI in other infectious ranges.   
Additionally, scenario 3 has the same acceleration of propagation time as scenario 2 and 1. 
4.3.1.4 Scenario 4 
Preparation: 
We deploy 3% infectious nodes in PM (See Fig. 4.1). Based on different propagation 
probabilities, the entire IP space is divided into several ranges: 
 R1: A1B1 
 R2: A1B2 (3% infectious nodes) 
      A2B1 (3%* infectious nodes) 
 R3: A1B3→A1Bg (3% infectious nodes) 
      A1B2→A1Bg (3%* infectious nodes) 
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Figure 4.7: Propagation time delay (scenario 2 vs. scenario 3) 
     (the first 81 nodes in 5000 nodes) 
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 R4: A2B2→A2Bg (3%* infectious nodes) 
 R5: A3→Ag 
Result: 
The result is listed in Table 4.2 Scenario 4. In Fig. 4.8(a), two infectious nodes are in A1B1, 
and another infectious node is in A1B2. The result shows four IP address ranges have different 
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Figure 4.8: Propagation probability in scenario 4  (the first 81 nodes in 5000 nodes) 
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AI. In Fig. 4.8(b), two infectious nodes are in A1B1, and another infectious node is in A2B1. 
The result shows five IP address ranges have different AI. 
In Table 4.2, scenario setting in Fig. 4.8(a) spends slightly more time infecting the nodes in 
the network than Fig. 4.8(b) (0.1732 compared with 0.1722). In Fig. 4.9, the value of AT is 
almost the same when the same proportion of initial infectious nodes are deployed in 
different IP ranges.  
Analysis: 
We analyze the reason of four and five different ranges of AI. An infectious node has 
larger effect on its own and adjacent IP ranges. A high density of initial infectious nodes has 
greater effect on its own and adjacent IP ranges than other IP ranges with low density. 
Therefore, in Fig. 4.8(a), R1(2% initial infectious nodes) has higher AI than R2 (1% initial 
infectious nodes). In Fig. 4.8(b), R3 that is adjacent to R1 (2% initial infectious nodes) has 
higher AI than R4 that is adjacent to R2 (1% initial infectious nodes).  
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Figure 4.9: Propagation time delay in scenario 4 (the first 81 nodes in 5000 nodes) 
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4.3.1.5 Conclusion of Propagation Source Effect  
We draw conclusions on the practical meaning from different scenarios of the propagation 
source. 
 In scenario 1, an increasing number of initial infectious nodes in a specific region has 
no impact on propagation probability (AI) in the entire network. However, it does 
accelerate the speed of worm propagation considerably.  
 Within a certain (20 in scenario 1) number of intermediate nodes, the vulnerable 
nodes in adjacent IP ranges of an infectious source have a greater probability of being 
infected. 
 In scenario 2 and 3, different geographic distribution of initial infectious nodes has no 
impact on the overall AI. However, when initial infectious nodes are more scattered in 
the network, they can infect more vulnerable nodes in the adjacent IP address ranges 
and accelerate the speed of worm propagation considerably in the network. 
 In scenario 4, a high density of initial infectious nodes can infect more vulnerable 
nodes, which are mainly in adjacent IP address ranges of an infectious source. 
4.3.1.6 Inspiration for Developing the Patch Strategy 
The experiments on the propagation source vector (S) are mainly used to estimate where 
we need to patch. 
 Where: According to the conclusion in this subsection, the best position for patching 
are similar or adjacent net blocks to the propagation source. In the real world, 
however, it is impractical to locate this position since the initial infectious nodes may 
be scattered and it is difficult to foresee the original propagation sources. On the basis 
of the conclusion from scenario 4, the IP ranges with a high density of vulnerable 
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nodes are essential areas in lieu of adjacent IP ranges of a propagation source for 
patching, since denser ranges have a greater possibility to be chosen as initial 
infectious sources. This may warrant collaboration across administrative boundaries 
when adjacent net blocks are not controlled by the same authority. It may be 
advantageous for network administrators to have a prior relationship with adjacent 
network owners to work together in threat intelligence and help prevent worm 
outbreaks and establish patch priorities in their own networks  
 How many: The number of nodes that require patching is closely related to the 
different vulnerability distributions in the network. We will discuss this in the 
conclusion of the next subsection. 
 When: Here, we will consider the estimated time of worm propagation in scanning 
worms. This is closely related to the propagation probability in the target IP ranges, 
but is unrelated to the geographic distribution of the propagation sources. In our 
experiments, when the percentage of the initial infectious nodes was from 1% to 4%, 
the range of propagation time delay was from 0.13i to 0.52i. i is the scanning time of 
the entire IP address space. 
4.3.2 Effect of the Vulnerable Distribution Vector  
In this subsection, we assume that not all nodes are vulnerable and that no nodes have been 
patched. Symantec examines the types of worms causing potential infections in each region 
[59]. The increasing regionalization of vulnerabilities is observed from one area to the next 
when vulnerabilities concern certain languages or localized events. Information about the 
geographic distribution of vulnerabilities can help network administrators improve their 
security efforts. Consequently, we arrange a group of scenarios with practical meaning in 
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Table 4.3 to describe the different distributions of vulnerabilities. The results are represented 
by the mean value of propagation ability (E(AI)), the variation of propagation ability (D(AI)), 
the mean value of propagation time delay (E(AT)) and the variation of propagation time 
delay (D(AT)).  
4.3.2.1 Scenario 1 
Preparation: 
In Scenario 1, we assume a vulnerability rate from 5% to 100% and its distribution follows 
uniform distribution. We fix the initial infectious nodes to 1. 
Result: 
The result is described in Fig. 4.10. When the vulnerability rate is less than 80%, E(AI), 
D(AI), E(AT) and D(AT) remain at a low level. The change point is when the vulnerability 
rate is 80%. The steady AI occurs when the vulnerability rate is lower than 70%. 
Table 4.3 Scenarios for Analyzing Vulnerability Distribution (V) 
Scenario Description Practical Meaning 
1 
Increasing percentage of vulnerable 
nodes and the vulnerabilities follow 
uniform distribution. 
Analyzing worm propagation when 
most of the nodes are vulnerable 
without the difference of geographic 
distribution. 
2 
Increasing percentage of vulnerable 
nodes and the vulnerabilities follow a 
Gaussian distribution. Initial 
infectious nodes are deployed in an 
IP address range that is rich in 
vulnerable nodes. 
Analyzing the impact of different 
geographic distribution of 
vulnerabilities on worm propagation. 
 
Analyzing the impact of different 
deployment of a propagation source 
under different distribution of 
vulnerabilities. 
3 
Increasing percentage of vulnerable 
nodes and the vulnerabilities follow a 
Gaussian distribution. Attackers 
deploy initial infectious nodes in 
sparse vulnerabilities ranges 
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Analysis: 
We analyze the reason of the change point at 80%. Drawing from the conclusions of 
Section 4.3.1, the nodes in adjacent IP ranges of the propagation origins have greater 
propagation probability to be infected. When the vulnerability follows a Uniform distribution, 
the coverage rate of vulnerable nodes in adjacent IP ranges of the propagation origins is small 
if the entire vulnerability rate is not large enough. Therefore, when the vulnerability rate is 
less than 80%, seldom nodes in adjacent IP ranges are involved in the propagation and the 
nodes in non-adjacent ranges dominate the value of AI. When the vulnerability rate reaches 
80% or more, more vulnerable nodes in adjacent IP ranges may be involved in the 
propagation, which lead to the E(AI) and D(AI) increase in Fig. 4.10.   
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Figure 4.10: Vulnerability in Uniform distribution (scenario 1) 
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When the vulnerability rate is more than 80%, the vulnerable nodes have a large 
probability of being infected. Thus, an increasing size of infected nodes in the network results 
in increasing time expenditure for overall worm propagation. 
4.3.2.2 Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 
Preparation: 
In Scenario 2 and 3, we investigate the impact of different geographic distributions of 
vulnerabilities on worm propagation. We also observe the impact of different deployments of 
the propagation source under different distributions of vulnerabilities. Therefore, we assume 
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Figure 4.11: Vulnerability in Gaussian distribution (scenario 2 & 3) 
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vulnerabilities follow a Gaussian distribution from N(1024, 102
2
) (10% vulnerability rate) to 
N(1024, 819
2
) (80% vulnerability rate). We deploy one initial infectious node in vulnerability 
dense or sparse IP ranges.  
Result: 
The result is described in Fig. 4.11. When more nodes in the network are vulnerable, E(AI) 
and D(AI) gradually increase in different deployments of the initial infectious node. 
Obviously, if one initial infectious node is in vulnerability dense IP ranges, E(AI) and D(AI) 
are larger. 
From Fig. 4.11, E(AT) and D(AT) have similar results to E(AI) and D(AI).  
Analysis: 
More nodes in the network are infected when the vulnerability rate increases, which leads 
to E(AI) smoothly increasing. Since the vulnerabilities follow a Gaussian distribution, there 
are more vulnerable nodes in some specific IP ranges. If the initial infectious nodes are 
deployed in vulnerability dense IP ranges, the vulnerable nodes in adjacent IP ranges of the 
propagation origins are quickly infected, which contributes to E(AI). This is a reason why 
E(AI) and D(AI) are larger when the initial infectious nodes are deployed in vulnerability 
dense IP ranges.  
Similar to scenario 1, an increasing size of infected nodes in the network results in 
increasing time expenditure for overall worm propagation. 
4.3.2.3 Inspiration of the Vulnerable Distribution Effect  
The experiments on the vulnerable distribution vector (V) are mainly used to estimate how 
many nodes we need to patch. 
Chapter 4 Microcosmic Modeling of the Propagation and Defense of Scanning Worms 
91 
 Where: If the threat is from a localized worm that exploits vulnerabilities in a specific 
region, it is of greater value to patch in the areas with a high density of vulnerabilities 
since the propagation is accelerated when more nodes are vulnerable.  
 How many: If the worm propagation is independent of the geographic region, the 
worm can infect a large number of nodes when the vulnerability rate is more than 
80%. Making sure the vulnerability rate is lower than 80% can prevent the worm from 
propagating effectively. When the vulnerability rate is lower than 70%, the 
propagation probability remains stable and is significantly lower. A recommended 
patch strategy is to ensure the vulnerability rate is lower than 70%. 
4.3.3 Effect of the Patch Strategy Vector 
A large amount of money and labor are spent on patching the vulnerabilities each year. In 
order to reduce the cost, we focus on finding the most economic tactics for corporations to 
patch their software vulnerabilities. In this subsection, we analyze the effect of patch strategy 
vector Q, which is used to eliminate the vulnerabilities in the vector V. Two scenarios are 
listed in Table 4.4. The results are represented by the mean value of propagation ability 
Table 4.4 Scenarios for Analyzing Patching Strategy (Q) 
Scenario Description Practical Meaning 
1 
Increasing percentage of 
patching nodes when 
vulnerabilities follow 
Uniform distribution. 
Analyzing the effect of patch strategy 
when most nodes are vulnerable without 
the difference of geographic distribution.  
2 
Increasing percentage of 
patching nodes when 
vulnerabilities follow 
Gaussian distribution.  
Analyzing the effect of patch strategy 
when distribution of vulnerabilities 
depends on geographic region. 
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(E(AI)), the variation of propagation ability (D(AI)), the mean value of propagation time 
delay (E(AT)) and the variation of propagation time delay (D(AT)). 
4.3.3.1 Scenario 1 
Preparation: 
The intention of patching is to decrease the number of potentially vulnerable nodes. When 
the patching rate increases, the vulnerability rate decreases. Initially, we assume all nodes are 
vulnerable and fix one initial infectious node in the network. 
Result: 
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Figure 4.12: Patch strategy (scenario 1) 
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From Fig. 4.12, when the patching rate is higher than 20%, there is no obvious change in 
E(AI). When the patching rate is higher than 30%, D(AI) becomes steady. The change points 
of E(AT) and D(AT) are at a 10% patching rate. 
Analysis: 
Once the patching rate reaches 20%, there are no obvious outcomes for more patching. 
Moreover, the outcomes of the patching strategy become steady when the patching rate is 
more than 30%. 
4.3.3.2 Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 
Preparation: 
When vulnerabilities depend on geographic region, some specific IP ranges have more 
vulnerable nodes. Therefore, we arrange vulnerability to follow a Gaussian distribution. We 
assume the vulnerability rate is 50% or 80% and fix one initial infectious node in the network. 
The patching rate varies between 5% to 40%.  
Result: 
From Fig. 4.13, when the patching rate increases from 5% to 40%, E(AI) and D(AI) in 
vulnerable dense IP ranges decrease. The increasing patching rate has a greater effect on 
E(AI) and D(AT) with 80% vulnerability rate. Additionally, E(AT) and D(AT) have a similar 
tendency. 
Analysis: 
The objective of this scenario is to investigate the impact of the patching rate on the 
specific vulnerable dense region. When the specific region has more vulnerable nodes, the 
patch strategy has more effect. 
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4.3.3.3 Conclusion of the Patch Strategy Effect  
The experiments on the patch strategy vector (Q) are mainly used to estimate when we 
need to patch. In accordance with the conclusions regarding S and V, we can summarize the 
patch strategies. 
 Where: If the propagation sources can be predicted, the best strategy is to patch nodes 
that have the same class IP address as the infectious sources. However, in real-world 
scenarios, the propagation sources are hard to locate. In these situations, the IP ranges 
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Figure 4.13: Patch strategy (scenario 2) 
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with a high density of vulnerable nodes are essential areas for patching because more 
nodes are infected in these specific regions.  
 How many: The most economic patching rate is 20%, however we recommend a 30% 
patching rate because the outcome of this patch strategy is more stable. 
 When: “When do we patch?” is a complicated problem when considering global 
recommendations because it involves many social factors, such as how widely used is 
the target software or the size of company? However, companies employing 
vulnerability management services can be given actionable recommendations for 
when it is critical to patch. For high risk vulnerabilities, it is critical that networks 
reduce the number of vulnerable nodes to below 80%. Another actionable result is 
when to disclose information on the vulnerabilities. Most corporations such as 
Microsoft issue vulnerability patches for software products with some specific 
information on the nature of vulnerabilities. This ensures that users are aware of the 
reason and necessity for deploying the patches. However, this information may be 
utilized by hackers to develop exploits for the vulnerabilities. Therefore, increased 
disclosure of specific vulnerabilities could possibly be delayed until the patching rate 
reaches at least 20%. Otherwise, the worms that target these vulnerabilities can 
propagate quickly to infect a large proportion of the network.  
In the proposed model, the propagation source vector (S) and the vulnerable distribution 
vector (V) describe the distribution of initial infectious nodes and the distribution of 
vulnerable nodes in the network respectively. The patching strategy vector (Q) reflects a 
special deployment of patching nodes. The propagation scale and the spreading speed depend 
on different deployment of S, V and Q. Through the analysis of propagation probability (AI) 
according to different scenarios of S, V, Q, we can estimate the best position for patching, the 
most economic patching rate and the appropriate time for patching.  
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4.4 Effect of the Impact Factor β   
The impact factor β reflects the impact of propagation time delay on the propagation 
probability. We introduced this parameter because the propagation time delay is caused by 
two factors: the worm‟s infection strategy and the network infrastructure information such as 
bandwidth. In 2001, Code Red v1 [29] used a static seed for its random number generator and 
thus generated identical lists of IP addresses on each infected machine. The first version of 
the worm spread slowly, because each infected machine began to spread the worm by 
probing machines that were either infected or impregnable. Then, it was improved in Code 
Red v2 [29] through generating a random seed variant. This second version shared almost all 
of its code with the first version, but spread much more rapidly. Each node with an individual 
IP address may be scanned within a much shorter period of time and consequently the 
probability of each node to become infected is credibly increased. Therefore, a worm‟s 
infection strategy has a significant effect on the spreading time. On the other hand, in 2002, 
the Sapphire worm [69] randomly selected IP addresses to spread and reached its peak 
scanning rate of over 55 million scans per second across the Internet in under 3 minutes, but 
in later stages the rate of growth slowed because networks became saturated with its scans 
and there was not enough bandwidth to allow the worm to operate unhindered. It is therefore 
clear that a network environment with more bandwidth will accelerate the infection.  
Since we do not know the exact value of β for propagation in real worms, we assume β is 
equal to zero, which indicates that the propagation probability cannot be affected by temporal 
properties in our previous simulations. However, in order to see how the impact factor β 
affects the propagation probability in the worm spreading procedure, we compare the changes 
of AI with two different β by assuming β1=0.25×10
-6
, β2=0.5×10
-6
.  
Preparation: 
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We deploy 1% infectious nodes in A1B1 of PM (See Fig. 4.1). We also assume all nodes 
are vulnerable and no nodes are patched. Based on the different propagation probabilities, the 
entire IP space is divided into three ranges:  
 R1: A1B1 
 R2: A1B2→A1Bg 
 R3: A2→Ag 
Result: 
As shown in Fig. 4.14, the propagation probabilities are initially almost the same for both 
β1 and β2 via 28 intermediate nodes. Later, however, the propagation probabilities decrease 
gradually. This matches the real spreading tendency in [2] quite well. 
We also observe the effect of different impact factors step by step. In Fig. 4.15, after 60 
hops the propagation probability approaches zero, which indicates the worm theoretically 
propagates in a limited range of vulnerable nodes. This is in accordance with the real case 
analysis by [2] as the propagation time delay largely increases because of network congestion, 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
0.012
0.014
0.016
0.018
Numbers of Intermediate Nodes
P
ro
p
a
g
a
ti
o
n
 P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
(A
I)
β
1
, R
1
β
1
, R
2
β
1
, R
3
β
2
, R
1
β
2
, R
2
β
2
, R
3
β
1
=0.25×10-6
β
2
=0.5×10-6
 
Figure 4.14: Effect of impact factor β on worm propagation  
(the first 81 nodes in 5000 nodes)  
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and thus an infectious node cannot spread worms to the target. Therefore, the propagation 
probability is close to zero 
Discussion: 
The impact factor β is to reflect the mutual impact between the propagation probability and 
the time delay. When β increases, from Fig. 4.14, the time delay has a greater impact on the 
spreading of the worm, which results in a decrease of the propagation probability. If the value 
of β increases continuously, the time delay will increase and the worms will not be able to 
propagate to the target, which reflects real scenarios. Moreover, according to Fig. 4.2(b) and 
Fig. 4.15, we find that an increase of β leads to the propagation probability decreasing 
gradually and tending towards zero. This also indicates that an increase in time delay results 
in a small propagation probability of the worm‟s propagation. However, in the real world, 
each well-known worm has its own feature for propagation. How to formulate the value of β 
to accurately reflect the characteristic of propagation is an issue of modeling a worm‟s 
propagation that we will address in the future.  
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Figure 4.15: Effect of impact factor β on propagation probability in each time unit  
(the first 81 nodes in 5000 nodes) 
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4.5 Discussion of the Overestimation in the Macroscopic Model   
Scanning worms infect targets by scanning the entire network and probing for vulnerable 
machines. Many researchers have studied and modeled the propagation of various worms 
using a variety of approaches and a number of different modeling techniques that address 
particular problems being examined. In this chapter, we generalize previous works, such as [2, 
7, 26, 56, 60] as macroscopic models and propose our microscopic modeling method. 
Macroscopic models rely on differential equations to predict worm behavior and can 
effectively identify the spreading tendency of worms and their infection scale along with the 
elapsed time. Our proposed microscopic model adopts matrix computation and focuses on 
presenting the propagation procedure of worms. In the remainder of this section, we will 
analyze the overestimation in traditional macroscopic modeling methods which can be 
avoided in the microscopic point of view, and thus, is a key reason why we chose the 
microscopic modeling approach. 
Macroscopic methods model the propagation of worms through observing the current 
number of infected hosts and identifying the number of possible hosts for immediate and 
subsequent infection. These methods construct differential equations as a function of time t to 
calculate the number of possible hosts that can be infected in each time tick. The propagation 
analysis of macroscopic models starts from a group of infected nodes and this group is 
updated by conducting the propagation from infected nodes to uninfected vulnerable nodes, 
which are used again as initial infected nodes for propagation. This process continues as time 
elapses, ad infinitum. In our proposed microscopic model, we simulate the propagation of 
worms by constructing the spreading path from the initially infectious nodes to the targets via 
some intermediate nodes. According to the microscopic modeling and analysis of the 
propagation procedure, we have found an important source of inaccuracies in macroscopic 
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modeling caused by propagation cycles (Section 3.3.4 in Chapter 3). These propagation 
cycles lead to overestimation in the macroscopic analysis of worms propagation. This is one 
of the reasons why we believe our microscopic model performs better than previous models. 
In this chapter, we focus on scanning worms that primarily belong to the non-reinfection 
class of worms. These types of worms, which include Code Red, can only be infected once in 
a worm outbreak. According to previous analyzes, this leads to overestimation due to 
propagation cycles among the intermediate nodes. In this section, we use a simple scenario to 
analyze the errors.  
Preparation: 
We deploy 1% of infectious nodes in A1B1 of PM (See Fig. 4.1). We also set all nodes as 
vulnerable and set no patched nodes. Based on the different propagation probabilities, the 
entire IP space is divided into three ranges:  
 R1: A1B1 
 R2: A1B2→A1Bg 
 R3: A2→Ag 
Result: 
As shown in Fig. 4.16(a), errors occur in different IP ranges during the propagation 
procedure: Errors (R1) > Errors (R2) ≫ Errors (R3). Within the first 20 iterations, R1 increases 
rapidly, while R3 remains stable. In our microscopic model we remove the errors. Fig. 4.16(b) 
shows the propagation probability AI in different IP ranges before and after the removal of 
errors when the worm‟s propagation is via some intermediate nodes. From the curves, we 
find the noticeable differences. 
Analysis: 
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Fig. 4.16 demonstrates that non trivial differences exist between macroscopic and 
microscopic models. This difference is accounted for by errors introduced by propagation 
cycles in the macroscopic model. According to (Formula (3.18) in Chapter 3), errors are 
mainly composed of two parts: the propagation probability from node s to node i when 
iterated (k - x) times and the propagation probability from node i to node i when iterated x 
times. In Fig. 4.16(a), the errors have curves analogous to AI, but which are two magnitudes 
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smaller (10
-3
 compared with 10
-1
). In the experiments, similar results also exist in other 
scenarios. In Fig. 4.16(b), we show that when a worm starts to propagate, more intermediate 
nodes are involved in the worm's propagation. This results in the continuous and increasing 
formation of propagation. Thus, the errors increase rapidly especially when the worm spreads 
via the first 20 intermediate nodes. Then, when more vulnerable nodes in the network are 
infected, the growth of propagation cycles tends to stabilize. Consequently, the errors 
increase slowly. After eliminating the errors, we find a clear difference in each IP region. 
Through the inspection of these errors, however, we can eliminate this negative effect using 
(Formula (3.19) in Chapter 3). 
Moreover, in Fig. 4.16(b), we can see noticeable differences between the macroscopic 
model and the microscopic model. Although the magnitude of errors is small (10
-3
), we 
cannot regard them trivially when more initial infectious nodes or a larger network is 
involved. Especially for security companies, the errors can possibly mislead analysis on 
predicting the infected scale of the network and even cause a significant economic loss. 
4.6 Discussion and Open Issues 
Several limitations and open issues are worth discussing. First, the microcosmic model is 
not a complete substitute for the traditional macroscopic model of worm propagation. In 
order to provide an insight into the change of propagation probability between nodes, the 
propagation source S in our model has been constructed according to different initial 
scenarios. Thus, S is static. However, in the traditional macroscopic models [2, 6], the 
infectious state is a function of time t allowing that the traditional models dynamically reflect 
the changes during propagation. These two approaches model worm propagation from 
different perspectives and both are useful in worm analysis.   
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Second, our model employs an n by n square complex matrix to describe a network, which 
makes two arbitrary nodes adjacent. Thus, this representation is suitable for worms that scan 
the entire network and spread themselves to the target without regard to topological 
constraints. In the real world, some worms, such as email worms, are dependent on the 
topology of a network in infecting targets. Our model cannot directly simulate these worms, 
however, if we assume the value of propagation probability in our proposed model as being 
either one or zero to indicate the existence or non-existence of a directed link between the 
nodes, then we can extend our model to simulate the topology-dependent worm propagation. 
Third, many corporations prioritize the patching of various vulnerabilities on the basis of 
their own vulnerability ranking system. For example, vulnerabilities in firewalls should be 
patched as soon as possible because firewalls directly face the internet. Our microscopic 
model cannot describe this type of context dependent information. We believe this issue 
requires additional knowledge and is out of scope of this investigation. 
Fourth, in this chapter, we have not thoroughly investigated the impact factor β and the 
effect of errors. In fact, subtle changes in these may result in perceptible variances. This 
particularly happens in large scale worm propagation. However, like the undiscovered 
parameter α in [6], we do not know the exact value of β for real world worm propagation. 
More research and discussion will address these two factors in our future work. 
Finally, in the experiments, we found that the overhead for the simulation is high. Given 
that industry has existing infrastructure in clouds and cluster environments, accuracy in the 
worm propagation model is the key component to be addressed compared to the issue of time 
cost. In future work, we will employ more practical analysis of parallel algorithms to 
implement our model. 
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4.7 Summary 
In this chapter, we used Code Red II as an example to evaluate the vulnerable distribution 
and patch strategy vector in the proposed microcosmic model (in Chapter 3) and presented a 
series of recommendations and advice for immunization defense. Firstly, if the propagation 
sources can be predicted, the best strategy is to patch nodes that have IP addresses in the 
same net block. Otherwise, the IP ranges with a high density of vulnerable nodes are essential 
areas for patching. Secondly, for high risk vulnerabilities, it is critical that networks reduce 
the number of vulnerable nodes to below a certain threshold, e.g., 80% in this analysis. 
Thirdly, increased disclosure of specific vulnerabilities could possibly be delayed until the 
patching rate reaches a certain threshold, e.g., at least 20% in this analysis. Furthermore, we 
discuss the effect of the impact factor that reflects the impact of propagation time delay on 
the propagation probability and the overestimation in macroscopic models caused by 
propagation cycles. 
The proposed theoretical design and experiments are based on typical scanning worms. 
However, there are also topology-based worms that are actively used throughout the internet. 
Thus, our future work will mainly focus on modeling the propagation of topology-based 
worms.  
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Chapter 5  
Modeling of the Propagation and Defense Study 
of Topology-based Worms 
Topology-based worms, such as email worms, pose a critical security threat to the Internet 
and thus, large amounts of money and labor are spent on controlling and reducing the impact 
of their outbreak each year. These worms rely on searching for local information to uncover 
the local communication topology and find new victims. Through an accurate and realistic 
modeling of the propagation process, we may devise effective strategies for defense and 
reduce such expenses. In order to access the propagation accurately and address effective 
schemes to deal with the problems of where and how many nodes we need to patch, we 
particularly focus on the spreading process of topology-based worms between each pair of 
nodes. We implement a series of experiments to evaluate the effects of each major 
component in the proposed model for topology-based worms. From the results, the network 
administrators can make decisions on how to immunize the highly-connected node for 
preventing the propagation of topology-based worms. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Topology-based worms, such as email worms and social network worms, rely on email 
address books or friends lists contained in the victim hosts‟ hard drive to locate new targets 
and further require human interaction to spread. Typical examples are worms such as the 
“Here you are” email worm [58] and Koobface [27], which emerged on Facebook in recent 
years. Spreading can take place rapidly and leads to potential network damages and service 
disruption. According to the official Internet threats report of Symantec Corporation [59], 
topology-based worms and resembling attacks accounted for 1/4 of the total threats in 2009 
and nearly 1/5 of the total threats in 2010.  
Different from the propagation of scanning worms, topology-based worms pose a 
significant threat to the network where topologies play an important role for worms 
propagation. Firstly, worms search for local information to find new targets by trying to 
discover the local communication topology. This allows a topology-based worm to be far 
more efficient than a scanning worm as it does not make a large number of wild guesses for 
every successful infection. Instead, it successfully infects on most attempts. This makes 
topology-based worms less vulnerable to containment defenses based on looking for missed 
connections or too many connections. Secondly, topology-based worms can potentially be 
very fast. They rely on the information contained in the victim machine to locate new targets. 
This self-broadcast mechanism allows for the worm‟s rapid reproduction and spread. Thirdly, 
due to social engineering techniques, most internet users can fail to recognize the malicious 
code, resulting in a wide range of infection. Therefore, in order to take an effective 
countermeasure to prevent the propagation of topology-based worms as much as possible, we 
must understand the propagation mechanism.   
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The goal of this work is to develop a modeling framework that can characterize the spread 
of topology-based worms and provide a series of effective patching strategies which will 
benefit IT industries and security best practice. To this end, we first construct the propagation 
mechanism of topology-based worms by concentrating on the propagation probability and 
model the propagation procedure through k-hops. With the help of the model, we then 
evaluate the mutual effect of initially infectious states and patch strategies. We take 
advantage of the propagation probability between each pair of nodes to explore the 
propagation procedure of worms and estimate both infection scale and defense effectiveness. 
Through model analysis, we derive a better understanding of dynamic infection procedures in 
each step rather than recapitulative analysis on the propagation tendency [6, 23-25, 60].  
Specifically, we aim to understand: 1) the propagation probability between each pair of 
nodes; and 2) how one node infects another node through a group of intermediate nodes.   
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We provide related work in Section 5.2. In 
Section 5.3, we propose the propagation model for topology-based worms and introduce each 
component of the model. Then, we conduct an analysis and deduce the result for obtaining an 
optimized patch strategy in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 discusses the formation of propagation 
errors and examines the impact of eliminating errors on the propagation procedure. Finally, 
we conclude the chapter in Section 5.6. 
5.2 Related Work 
In the area of network security, several approaches have been proposed to model and 
simulate the spreading of worms in the network.  
The classical deterministic epidemic models [13, 24] are Susceptible-Infectious (SI) 
models, in the sense that all hosts can have only one of two states: susceptible or infectious. 
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Staniford et al. [7] presented a random constant spread model (RCS) for the Code-Red I v2 
worm. Essentially, it is the above classical simple epidemic model allowing for the infection 
rate to be constant, and without considering patching cases. The classical general epidemic 
models [26] improve the classical simple epidemic models by considering the removal of 
infectious hosts due to patching. Zou et al. [2] proposed a two-factor model on the basis of 
the classical simple epidemic model. This model introduced human countermeasures in 
patching, the removal of hosts from both the infectious and susceptible population, and 
considered the infectious rate as a variable but not a constant. Additionally, models from Z. 
Chen et al. [10] and Y. Wang et al. [61] took into account the time taken to cause an infection 
from spreading the virus from one infected host to other hosts. However, all of the above 
models rely on the homogeneous mixing assumption that an infected host can infect any other 
susceptible hosts with equal possibility. Thus, they are no longer appropriate to model the 
propagation of topology-based worms since these models overestimate the worm‟s 
propagation speed, especially at the beginning stage when a small number of nodes are 
infected and clustered with each other [6].  
K.R. Rohloff et al. [8] presented a stochastic density-dependent Markov jump process 
propagation model for RCS (Random constant Scanning) worms, drawn from the field of 
epidemiology. Sellke et al. [9] built up a stochastic branching process model to characterize 
the propagation of worms using a random scanning approach. It developed an automatic 
worm containment tactic for preventing the worm propagation beyond its early states. 
Nevertheless, these two models are based on a linear structure or a one-to-many hierarchy 
and thus, they are not applicable to topology-based worms.  
A topology-based model describes the worms that rely on the topology for spreading 
themselves. Fan and Xiang [19] employed a logic matrix approach to model the spreading of 
peer-to-peer worms between each pair of all peers. They discovered the relation between out-
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degree, vulnerability and coverage rate in power law and simple random graph topologies 
respectively. However, they did not consider the propagation probability and infected 
probability of each node, which had a significant impact on the infection procedure. Zou et al. 
[6] considered these two probabilities and compared internet email worm propagation on 
power law, small world and random graph topologies. In the proposed model, the probability 
of each user opening a worm attachment can be treated as an infected probability and the 
distribution of email checking times can represent the propagation probability. However, this 
model still describes the email worm propagation tendency instead of modeling the dynamic 
spreading procedure between each pair of nodes. 
We propose a probability matrix that models topology-based worm propagation and 
analysis the spreading procedure of worms. Using this matrix in the propagation of worms 
forms the major difference between this work and existing work. In our model, we focus on 
investigating the procedure of worms‟ spreading and providing effective patching strategies 
for preventing topology-based worms from propagating in the network. 
5.3 Propagation Model 
In this chapter, in order to describe how topology-worms propagate in the network, we 
choose a typical topology-based worm on the basis of email worms which infect their logical 
neighbors through sending malicious email attachments.   
5.3.1 Propagation Matrix (P) 
Instead of the complex matrix in Chapter 3, we propose employing an n by n square matrix 
P with elements pij to describe a network consisting of n nodes. We consider that two nodes 
in the network are connected, thereby making node i and j immediate neighbors. In this 
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matrix, each element pij represents a propagation probability of the worm spreading from 
node i to node j under the condition that node i is infected. We call this matrix the 
propagation probability matrix (P) of network, as shown in (5.1). 
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where Ni denotes the node i, Nj denotes the node j in the network. Each row of the P 
represents the propagation probability from one infected node to all other nodes. Each 
column of the P represents the propagation probability from infected nodes to a target node. 
We assume one node cannot propagate the worm to itself, so the probability of self-
propagation is zero.  
5.3.2 Propagation Probability  
In real-world conditions, worms can be spread between nodes from node i to node j via one 
or more intermediate nodes. In existing worms it is observed that an infectious node can 
propagate worms and a vulnerable node can also be infected and become a new infectious 
node for future propagation with a certain probability. 
We assume that a worm‟s propagation from node i (Ni) to node j (Nj) is via and only via k 
intermediate nodes in a network consisting of n nodes. It is denoted by pij 
(k)
 and defined in 
(5.2):  
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Since Ni self-propagation via k nodes is meaningless in the real world, we let the value of 
this propagation probability be zero; namely pij
(k)
 =0 when i=j. We introduce a function γ to 
conduct the iterated procedure. It is defined in (5.3):  
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Operation × is the traditional matrix multiplication. Subsequently, the P can be represented 
by the following equation when the worm‟s propagation is via and only via k intermediate 
nodes, as shown in (5.4): 
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5.3.3 Propagation Time  
In real scenarios, topology-based worms attack victims in the network via neighbor lists. 
For example, email worms search all email addresses found on the compromised user‟s 
computer to spread themselves. Social network worms look for the friends‟ list from the 
victim‟s account and use this list as targets. In this study, we mainly focus on the propagation 
procedure of worms and thus, we assume all events (worm infection, user checking email, 
user clicking website, etc.) happen right at each discrete time tick. Once a host is infected, it 
immediately sends out malicious messages to its neighbors at time tick t and the messages 
could be read by its recipients as soon as the next time tick, t+1. Therefore, the propagation 
time of topology-based worms in the proposed model is equivalent to be presented by the 
number of intermediate users in the propagation path from initially infectious users to the 
current infected user.  
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For email worms, if user i checks email at time t, the user checks all new email received 
after his or her last email checking. When a worm email is opened, user i is infected and the 
worm will send a worm email to all neighbors of the user. These worm emails are read at the 
next time tick. Thus, the time of a current infected user j being infected by user i is 
represented by the hops from user i to user j.     
5.3.4 Propagation Source Vector (S) 
In a network, a propagation source is one of the significant factors for worm propagation, 
which represents whether the state of the node has been infected or not. An initial 
propagation source vector (S) is defined as shown in (5.5). An infectious node that can 
propagate worms is represented with a probability of one. Zero means that a node is healthy 
and does not have the ability to propagate the worm. 
  niorsssssS i
T
ni ....1,10,...... ,,,,2,1                          (5.5) 
The iterated procedure can be represented as function γs in (5.6):  
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We define &L the same as in formula (3.7) in Chapter 3.  During the propagation process, 
each intermediate node can be infected and become infectious. We introduce an infected 
probability vector I, as shown in (5.7): 
  )0()()(  kPSI TksTks                             (5.7) 
Is
 (k)
 reflects the infected possibility of each node after a worm‟s propagation via k 
intermediate nodes under a certain deployment of S. The P can be represented by the 
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following equation when a worm‟s propagation is via and only via k intermediate nodes, as in 
(5.8):  
)1()(),(
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k
sss                     (5.8) 
5.3.5 Patch Strategy Vector (Q)  
A patch strategy is another important factor for the propagation of topology-based worms, 
which provides an approach to cure infected nodes. An infected node can be cured so it is 
unable to spread worms to other nodes. Therefore, we need to remove these nodes from the 
propagation process at that time. We define a patch vector Q in (5.9). For each element in Q, 
the value of one represents that a node has been patched and becomes a healthy node. A value 
of zero indicates that a node is still vulnerable. 
  niorqqqqqQ i
T
ni ....1,10,...... ,,,,2,1                      (5.9) 
Once the nodes have been patched, they will be immune to the worms and lose their 
infectious ability. Thus, we should exclude these patched nodes in the matrix for the 
successive iteration. The iterated procedure can be represented as function γsq shown in (5.10):  
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We define &R the same as formula (3.13) in Chapter 3. After considering the Q, the P and 
infected probability vector I can be represented by the following equations respectively when 
the worm propagates via and only via k intermediate nodes, as shown in (5.11):  
  )0()(),( )()(  kPSIPP TksqTksqksqksq                                  (5.11) 
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5.3.6 Accumulative Infected State (AI) 
We introduce an infected probability vector I for evaluating the infected capability of each 
node in the network, as shown in (5.12):   
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where K means the maximum number of intermediate nodes when no nodes can become 
infectious.  
In consideration of more than one path for the propagating worm, we adopt an 
accumulative infected state (AI) to represent the sum of probabilities for the worm 
propagation via at most k intermediate nodes. It is defined in (5.13).  
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 1                                  (5.13)   
5.4 Model Analysis  
5.4.1 The Experimental Environment  
Our implementation is in Visual C++ 2008 SP1 and Matlab 7. The random numbers in our 
experiments are produced by the C++ TR1 library extensions. In order to show these results 
clearly, we choose reasonable network sizes (5000 nodes) and examine these under different 
scenarios.  
In our experiments, we use a typical topology-based worm on the basis of email worms to 
investigate the propagation procedure. The topology of an email network has been studied by 
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many researchers [6, 62] because it plays a critical role in determining the propagation 
dynamics of an email worm. According to the analysis in [6, 33, 62], the topology mainly has 
the characters: 1) the topology can be thought of as a “semi-directed network”, a graph in 
which some edges are directed and others are undirected; 2) users who have large groups of 
friends tend to appear in the contact lists of many others; 3) the weight of each edge denotes 
the probability of a user being infected by one of their friends. This probability is strongly 
affected by human factor. Therefore, we let the topology of the network in the experiments 
follow Power Law Distribution, namely nodes with the higher value of topology out-degree 
are the minority, most nodes having a lower value of topology out-degree. We assume 
checking probability of email follows the Gaussian Distribution T~N (0.5, 0.2
2
).  
5.4.1.1 Power-law Network Generator 
The Power Law Topology can be characterized by the following equations, as shown in 
(5.14). We assume P(x) follows power law distribution. 
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where x0 and x1 represent the minimum topology out-degree and maximum topology out-
degree respectively, n is the power law exponent, and C is a constant.  In order to make sure 
the topology of networks follows power law distribution, we deduct the out-degree of each 
node by the following equations, as shown in (5.15) and (5.16). Firstly, we assume y is a 
uniformly distributed variant on [0, 1]: 
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Then, according to the (21), we can derive the out-degree x of each node that follows 
power law distribution strictly from the following equation: 
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Finally, once the power law exponent n is determined, given x0 , x1 and a uniformly 
distributed variant y, the out-degree of each node in  the network can be worked out, which 
models the Internet email network followed the power law topology distribution. 
5.4.1.2 Effect of Power Law Exponent n 
The power law exponent n is an important parameter for a power law topology. Combining 
with the minimum and the maximum topology out-degree, it limits the expected value of 
topology out-degree [26], as shown in (5.17).  
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where E(d) stands for expected value of topology out-degree. 
In a real Internet email network, the true value of n is variable. In order to observe how the 
power law exponent n affects the power law topology, we compare the changes of E(d) under  
a different value of n. In a real scenario, a key user has some possibility to connect all other 
users. According to the different topology, the value of out-degree is contingent. In our 
experiment, we assume the minimum topology out-degree x0 is equal to 3, the maximum 
topology out-degree increases from 100 to 550 with step size 50. We believe the range of 100 
to 550 is a reasonable area. The result is shown in Fig. 5.1, which reveals that a larger 
maximum topology out-degree requires a larger power law exponent n, and that a larger 
expected value of topology out-degree demands a smaller power law degree. 
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5.4.2 Effect of the Propagation Source Vector 
In this subsection, we assume all nodes in the network are vulnerable and no nodes have 
been patched. Since an email worm‟s propagation depends on a different topology of the 
network and has a close relation with the out-degree of initially infectious sources, we 
arrange a group of scenarios with practical meaning in Table 5.1 to describe the worm‟s 
spreading under different origins of worms. The results are represented by the maxima and 
the minima of the value of infected probability:  AI(Max), AI(Min). 
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 Figure 5.1: Power law exponent n 
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5.4.2.1 Scenario 1 
We consider two cases: in the first case we select the node with the highest out-degree as 
an initially infectious node, while in the second case the initially infectious node has the 
lowest degree. We fix the number of initially infectious nodes to be one in both cases. Both 
power law networks have the same nodes and a power law exponent of α=2.2, which 
represents a sparse connection. From Table 5.2 and Fig. 5.2, AI declines sharply at the 
beginning stage in both cases, then AI increases continuously when more intermediate nodes 
become involved, and finally achieves the maxima. When the average out-degree increases, 
AI in both cases goes up. The maxima and minima of AI in the first case are larger than in the 
second case.  
Table 5.1 Scenarios for Analyzing Infectious Source (S) in Email Worms 
Scenario Description Practical Meaning 
1 
In a low expected out-degree 
network, the initial infectious node 
has the highest degree or has the 
lowest degree in the topology. 
Analyzing the impact of initially 
infectious sources located in the key 
user or normal user on the Email 
worm‟s propagation in a sparsely 
connected Email Community. 
2 
In a high expected out-degree 
network, the initial infectious node 
has the highest degree or has the 
lowest degree in the topology. 
Analyzing the impact of initially 
infectious sources located in the key 
user or normal user on the Email 
worm‟s propagation in a densely 
connected Email Community. 
 
Table 5.2 Scenario 1: A list of AI (α = 2.2) 
Max 
(OD) 
Average 
(OD) 
Infected Probability 
AI(maxOD) AI(minOD) 
Minima Maxima Minima Maxima 
100 8.04 0.2450 0.9408 0.1138 0.9270 
200 8.93 0.3215 0.9601 0.1201 0.9488 
300 9.41 0.3263 0.9649 0.1287 0.9558 
400 9.73 0.3585 0.9711 0.1575 0.9603 
500 9.96 0.3912 0.9766 0.1585 0.9667 
  OD: the value of out-degree 
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Analysis: 
At the beginning the infected probability declines sharply because the infected probability 
of a node is smaller than when it is directly infected. However, when some intermediate 
nodes with high out-degree are involved, a large number of nodes are infected quickly, which 
results in the AI increasing continuously. The AI will increase if the maximum out-degree 
increases, meanwhile the number of intermediate nodes decreases meaning more nodes can 
possibly be infected via less intermediate nodes when the network has a high average out-
degree. From Table 5.2, we also observe that when the initially infectious node has a higher 
out-degree, the infected probability of nodes will be larger than the node that has a lower out-
degree. This shows that a worm‟s propagation can be effectively prevented if we immunize 
the infected nodes with a higher out-degree.  
5.4.2.2 Scenario 2 
Similar to scenario1, we consider the initially infectious node has the highest out-degree 
(the first case), and it has the lowest degree (the second case). In both cases, the number of 
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 Figure 5.2: Propagation probability in scenario 1 
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initially infectious nodes is one. Both power law networks have the same nodes (5000 nodes) 
and a power law exponent of α=1.6, which represents a dense connection.  From Table 5.3, 
we observe that the change of AI is similar to Scenario 1.  
Analysis: 
Scenario1 and 2 discuss the infected probability of nodes (AI) when worms propagate in 
different connection densities. Compared with scenario1, the AI in scenario 2 is larger. This 
means when worms propagate in a densely connected network, more nodes can be infected 
than worms spread in a sparsely connected network no matter if the initially infectious node 
has the highest or the lowest out-degree. Moreover, regardless of connection densities, more 
nodes can possibly be infected if the initially infectious node has a higher out-degree. 
Therefore, in a densely connected network, if the highly-connected infectious node is 
immunized, the worm spread will slow obviously. 
5.4.2.3 Inspiration for Developing the Patch Strategy 
The two different cases indicate whether the node is a key user or a normal user. The two 
different scenarios show the connection densities of the network. In practice, a key user has a 
larger email list than a normal user. If the key user, especially in a highly-connected network, 
is compromised by malicious email worms, more normal users will be infected when they 
Table 5.3 Scenario 2: A list of the AI (α = 1.6) 
Max 
(OD) 
Average 
(OD) 
Infected Probability 
AI(maxOD) AI(minOD) 
Minima Maxima Minima Maxima 
100 14.33 0.3039 0.9431 0.1218 0.9289 
200 19.42 0.3466 0.9700 0. 1564 0.9616 
300 23.16 0.4139 0.9711 0.1632 0.9617 
400 26.22 0.4720 0.9741 0.2685 0.9660 
500 28.86 0.5366 0.9842 0.3204 0.9700 
 OD: the value of out-degree  
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open email attachments from the key user. Therefore, email worm‟s propagation can be 
effectively prevented or slowed down when key users can be immunized regularly. 
5.4.3 Effect of the Patch Strategy Vector 
In this subsection, we analyze the effect of Q, which is used to immunize the small subset 
nodes for preventing the propagation of worms effectively. The results are represented by the 
accumulative infected probability AI. In order to observe how the patch strategy impacts the 
worm‟s propagation, we consider two different immunization defense methods. In the first 
case, we randomly deploy 5% of nodes to patch, while in the second case we patch the 5% of 
highly-connected nodes in the network.  In both cases, the number of initially infectious 
nodes is one. Both power law networks have the same nodes and a power law exponent of 
α=2.2. The network has an average out-degree of 8. From Fig. 5.3, the curve of the selective 
patch strategy is obviously lower than the random patch strategy. However, the AI after 
random patching nodes is similar to no immunization. 
Analysis: 
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 Figure 5.3: Patching strategy in email worms 
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According to Fig. 5.3, we can observe that patching highly-connected nodes is a quite 
effective strategy to slow down the propagation of email worm. However, if we randomly 
select nodes to immunize, there is a high chance of choosing the nodes with a lower out-
degree in a power law network, which results in a small group of nodes avoiding infection 
during worm‟s propagation. Thus, the effect of random patching is not obvious as email 
worms spread by relying on the underlying connectivity between each pair of nodes. 
5.5 Propagation Errors 
Currently, a variety of models have been proposed for modeling the propagation 
mechanism. A common feature of all current epidemic models [2, 5-10, 15, 23-26, 60, 63] is 
to estimate or predict the number of infected nodes in each time tick, and then the node will 
be counted as long as it is infected. An infectious node can spread worms via some 
intermediate nodes to itself again, which forms a propagation cycle in the spreading 
procedure. However, some worms, such as Melissa and Love Letter, belong to the non-
reinfection class of worms. These types of worms can be infected only once. Consequently, 
propagation errors, and an overestimation of the scale of the infected network, cannot be 
avoided by previous research if a node is infected more than once.   
A possible reason for the above overestimation may be rooted in the failure of considering 
the dynamic spreading procedure between each pair of nodes. Most current models pay 
attention to analyze the overall scale of the infected network, and do not investigate the 
concealed errors between each pair of nodes. Although [57] identified that an email network 
contains cycles, it only considered the topology of the email network as a tree structure. It did 
not discuss the errors caused by a process of self-infection through other nodes, called 
propagation cycles. Based on our knowledge, few models currently aim to eliminate errors. 
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Both macroscopic and microcosmic worm propagation models can encounter the problem of 
propagation cycles. Thus, we introduce an error calibration vector in the proposed 
microcosmic model to eliminate errors caused by propagation cycles. 
In this subsection, we use the revised microcosmic propagation model to efficiently prove 
the existence of propagation cycles and consequentially, the propagation errors caused by 
them. We discuss the negative effects of the errors and propose a method to remove it by 
using our formulized definition. Validation against conducted simulation experiments reveals 
that our analysis of errors helps correctly estimate the worm‟s spreading.  
Preparation: 
To evaluate the propagation errors caused by cycles, we introduce an error calibration 
vector E when there are k intermediate nodes, as shown in (5.18). 
 TkNkxkkk eeeeE )(,,)(,,)(2,)(1)( ......                                        (5.18)   
In the real word, the propagation of email worms is related to the topology of a network 
and the probability of opening an email. We assume the network topology follows a power 
law distribution and the probability of checking an email (C) follows a Gaussian distribution: 
C~N (0.5, 0.2
2
). Therefore, the propagation errors of non-reinfection email worms can be 
defined by (5.19)  
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where k is the number of intermediate nodes. csx
 (k-j-1)
 is the propagation probability from node 
s to node x via (k-j-1) intermediate nodes. cxx
(j)
 is the propagation probability from node x to 
node x via j intermediate nodes. 
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We conducted a simulation with a power law exponent of α=2.2. The highest out-degree of 
this network was 100 and the lowest out-degree was 3. We arranged the initially infectious 
node to have the highest and the lowest out-degree in alternate scenarios. 
Analysis: 
In Fig. 5.4(a), if the initially infectious node has the highest out-degree, errors occur when 
the worm‟s propagation is via two intermediate nodes and reaches 100% when the number of 
intermediate nodes is 11. If the initially infectious node has the lowest out-degree, the errors 
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Figure 5.4: Errors analysis of non-reinfection email worms 
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occur when the worm‟s propagation is via four intermediate nodes and reaches 100% when 
the number of intermediate nodes is 13. The propagation errors continuously increase in 
relation to the increased possibility of cycles forming when more intermediate nodes are 
involved. Since a node can be infected only once, when all nodes in the network have been 
infected, the 100% probability of nodes infecting other nodes is caused by errors only. 
Fig. 5.4(b) shows the infected probability of nodes after the removal of errors when the 
worm‟s propagation is via some intermediate nodes.  Because the infected probability of a 
node is smaller than when it is infected directly, at the beginning the infected probability 
declines sharply. However, when some intermediate nodes with high out-degree are involved, 
a large number of nodes are infected quickly, which results in the infected probability and the 
errors of nodes continuously increasing. When most nodes have been infected, the infected 
probability of nodes tends to be zero after eliminating the errors. 
From Fig. 5.4, when the scale of the infected network increases, the errors will 
significantly mislead the analysis. Through the inspection of these errors, however, we can 
eliminate this negative effect. The errors can be subtracted by formula (5.19) for email worms. 
After the scale of the infected network reaches a peak, the infected probability of nodes 
declines sharply which limits the infected scale extending infinitely. 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter presented a novel process modeling the propagation of topology-based worms 
by concentrating on the propagation probability. In order to understand the propagation 
procedure, we used a typical topology-based worm, an email worm, as an example to 
investigate how a worm spreads from one node to another node through a group of 
intermediate nodes. According to the email user‟s behavior, such as checking email 
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probability, we examined the propagation source and patch strategy vector for investigating a 
more effective patch strategy for preventing worms from spreading. We found that for a 
power law network, a more effective patch strategy against an email worm‟s propagation is to 
immunize the most-connected nodes. 
We also analyzed the formation of propagation errors and examined the impact of 
eliminating errors on the propagation procedure of email worms. Through the use of 
simulations, we have shown that errors increase as more propagation cycles are formed and 
we quantified the errors under different propagation scenarios. This work is helpful in the 
accurate analysis of worm spreading.  
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Chapter 6  
Modeling Propagation Dynamics of Email 
Worms  
As one of the major forms of worms, email worms pose a critical security threat to the 
Internet. This is because an email worm sends itself to the email addresses found on an 
infected computer and email recipients often trust the emails received, especially from their 
friends. Almost everyone uses an email service and thus, the propagation of email worms can 
be incredibly fast and cause significant damage. Modern email worms are more sophisticate 
and intelligent. For example, reinfection email worms will send malicious copies every time 
the user opens the worm email and self-start reinfection email worms can be triggered by 
specific events and the system restart process. The proposed microcosmic worm propagation 
model in Chapter 3 may not simulate the propagation procedure accurately. In this chapter, 
we present an analytical model on the propagation dynamics of email worms. Our model 
distinguishes itself from previous models because: 1) we extensively investigate classes of 
real-world worms based on their infection strategies, including non-reinfection, reinfection, 
and modern self-start reinfection categories; 2) we investigate the details of the propagation 
mechanisms by examining the individual steps and state transitions. Our model can provide 
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an accurate representation of the propagation of worms with different checking time of 
mailboxes from users; 3) our model reflects the repetitious email sending process in 
reinfection and self-start reinfection worms. To highlight the advantage of our analytical 
model, we implement a series of experiments. The results show that our modeling is accurate 
and can aid a better and more realistic understanding of the propagation of worms. This has 
benefits for devising new tactics against email worms. 
6.1 Introduction 
For a number of years, the propagation of email worms has followed the same modus 
operandi; a worm email is sent to victims which looks legitimate. The email appears as 
though it was sent by somebody the recipient trusts and the subject matter will often be 
related to the recipient's area of business. Once the victim is fooled into either clicking a 
malicious link or opening a malicious attachment, the victim's PC will be infected and start to 
search for local information, such as an email address book, in order to discover the 
communication topology of the network and infect new targets. From Melissa in 1999, Love 
Letter in 2000, Mydoom in 2004 and W32.Imsolk in 2010, we have witnessed the prevalence 
of email worms and as a consequence, the damage to the Internet. According to the Symantec 
Internet Security Threat Report [59], in the last two years email worms or resembling attacks 
accounted for 1/4 of the total threats in 2009 and nearly 1/5 of the total threats in 2010.  
Although worm propagation through email is an old technique, it is still worthy of further 
study. Firstly, email worms would not have been successful without convincing users that the 
links and attachments they received in an email were from a trusted source. Unfortunately, 
however, most of the email recipients have little security awareness since they always trust 
emails, especially from their friends. Currently, almost everyone using a computer uses an 
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email service, which means the potential damage from email worms is likely to continue in 
the future. Thus, it is of significant importance to investigate email worms and how they 
propagate. Secondly, email worms collect information on the communication of victims. This 
mechanism is similar to certain types of worms like Koobface [27] spreading on social 
networks or Commwarrior [85] propagating through a multimedia messaging service or 
through Bluetooth of mobile devices. The research on the propagation of email worms can 
help us characterize the propagation dynamics of those isomorphic worms. 
In this model, real-world email worms are classified into the following categories based on 
their infection strategies: 
 Non-Reinfection: Non-reinfection means each infected user sends out worm copies 
only once, after which the user will not send any further worm emails, even if he 
opens a worm attachment again. Non-reinfection worms mainly appear in the early 
worm cases, such as Melissa [70] and Love Letter [71]. 
 Reinfection: Reinfection means that an email user will send out worm email copies 
whenever he opens an email worm attachment. Reinfection greatly accelerates the 
spreading speed. 
 Self-start Reinfection: Evolving from reinfection, modern email worms modify the 
registry entries and can be triggered whenever the computer is restarted or certain 
files are opened, such as opening an image file like Mydoom [72] and W32.Imsolk 
[58]. 
In order to understand and possibly address defense strategies against email worms, it is 
important to analyze the propagation of worms. Previous work has adopted the classical 
simple epidemic model [34, 53-55] and the spatial-temporal model [32]. Recently, in order to 
focus on realistic scenarios of email worm propagation, researchers [6] have relied on 
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simulation modeling rather than on mathematical analysis. The difficulty of mathematical 
modeling lies in two aspects. Firstly, each user has their own habits of checking emails. It is 
really hard to characterize the propagation dynamics with different mailbox checking time 
between email users in a large scale network. Secondly, modern email worms belong to 
reinfection or self-start reinfection worms. This means it is difficult to model the repetitious 
email sending process. 
There are only a few email worms that attack client-side vulnerabilities in email agents and 
can infect computers by simply being read by users (with no attachments) [6]. In order to 
understand how worms propagate by email, we focus exclusively on those that propagate 
solely through email attachments. To facilitate an understanding of the following, if not 
otherwise stated, a user reading an email means opening email attachments. The motivation 
and contributions of our research are summarized as follows. 
 We derive an accurate propagation model of email worms by observing the spreading 
procedure from an analytical point of view. We examine the individual spreading 
steps and every state transition on each node in the network so that our analytical 
model can reflect the propagation dynamics with the different mailbox checking 
habits of users (see Section 6.3). 
 Zou et al. have mentioned a noticeable overestimation [6] in the early topological 
epidemic models [34, 53-55] and presented a comprehensive simulation analysis on 
the propagation of email worms, which has been referred to in many papers since 
2007 without its accuracy being questioned. However, as we show in Section 6.5.2, 
their simulation model still poorly estimates the spreading speed of email worms 
due to their assumption regarding repetitive infectious behavior. We propose the 
concept of virtual users to represent the process of sending repetitive emails so that 
our analytical model can accurately reflect the propagation of reinfection worms. 
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 We carry out extensive studies on realistic email worms. Our contributions are made 
as follows: 
− As the authors in [74] stated, neither reinfection nor non-reinfection is very 
realistic. Indeed, according to various security reports like [59], most 
modern email worms that are exposed belong to the more sophisticated self-
start reinfection category and use every opportunity to spread. Different 
from previous works, our model analyzes these types of email worms (see 
Section 6.6). 
− We gain insight into the trust levels among email users. In Section 6.3.1, we 
use a propagation matrix to present the pair-wise information between email 
users. Each email user has different trust levels among their friends, as 
opposed to a constant [6, 34, 53-55]. 
− We prove the exponential increase in the number of received reinfection 
worm emails without considering user awareness (see Section 6.5.2). 
Actually, real-world email recipients may become watchful after receiving a 
number of emails that excessively exceeds the number they would normally 
receive. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 6.2, we introduce related 
work. A basic analytical model is presented in Section 6.3. In section 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6, we 
model the propagation of non-reinfection, reinfection and self-start reinfection email worms 
respectively. We conclude this chapter in Section 6.7 with a brief summary and an outline of 
future work. 
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6.2 Related Work 
Early research on email worm modeling mainly refers to academic thought on epidemic 
propagation [34, 53-55]. Distinguished by whether infected users can become susceptible 
again after recovery, these models can be classified into Susceptible-Infectious-Susceptible 
(SIS) models [18, 53, 74-77] and Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR) models [34, 53-54, 
73]. If no infected users can recover after a worm attack, it is also called the Susceptible-
Infectious (SI) model [6, 20-21]. Satorras and Vespignani [53] presented a differential 
equation for their SIS model by differentiating the infection dynamics of nodes with different 
degrees. Later, Moreno et al. [54-55] and Boguna et al. [34] provided a differential equation 
SIR model to study the dynamics of epidemic spreading on topological networks. As shown 
in Zou et al. work [6], such differential equations significantly overestimate the epidemic 
spreading speed due to their implicit homogeneous mixing assumption. In actual fact, the 
spreading of email worms is directly related to network topology. In our work, we avoid 
traditional overestimation problems (homogenous mixing) by examining the individual 
spreading steps and state transitions on each node in the network (see Section 6.3.2).  
Zou et al. [6] also presented a simulation model on the propagation of email worms. Their 
paper demonstrates a fairly comprehensive analysis on the impact of various parameters, 
different topologies and selective percolation. However, some assumptions are not realistic. 
For example, the authors believe that just one malicious email copy will be sent to recipients 
even if an infected user checks multiple emails containing worms. In fact, only one malicious 
copy is sent whenever the infected user opens a reinfection worm email. We analyze and 
discuss these problems in Section 6.3.2 and Section 6.4.  
In the work of Chen and Ji [32], a spatial-temporal random process was used to describe 
the statistical dependence of malware propagation in arbitrary topologies. However, there are 
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also some weak assumptions made. Firstly, [32] uses a SIS model, even though infected users 
are not likely to be infected again after they clean their computers by patching vulnerabilities 
or updating anti-virus software. Secondly, their model assumes that an infected computer 
cannot be reinfected. As we stated above, recent email worms are apt to reinfect users, which 
are far more aggressive in spreading throughout the network. Thirdly, the authors ignore an 
important human behavior; the email checking time, which has been proven to greatly affect 
the propagation of email worms. In this chapter, we also discuss the spatial and temporal 
processes in the propagation of worms, but we extend this and focus on more realistic 
reinfection email worms. Moreover, we synchronize the worms spreading time between 
nodes because of their different email checking time.  
In recent years, there has also been some research on the propagation of isomorphic 
worms, such as Bluetooth worms, p2p worms [18-19], and worms on social networks [20]. 
Yan and Eidenbenz [21] presented a detailed analytical model that characterizes the 
propagation dynamics of Bluetooth worms. It captures not only the behavior of the Bluetooth 
protocol but also the impact of mobility patterns on the propagation of Bluetooth worms. 
However, all individual Bluetooth devices are homogeneously mixed, which overlooks the 
significant impact of topology. Fan and Xiang [19] used an ideal logic matrix to model the 
peer-to-peer propagation of worms. But in reality, their logic matrix is weak regarding an 
email resembling network because the weight of each link is a probability value ranging from 
zero to one instead of constant zero or one. Fan and Yeung [20] proposed a virus propagation 
model based on the application network of Facebook, which is the most popular among social 
network service providers. The difference between email worms and Facebook worms, as the 
authors highlight, is that people only check if there are any new emails and then log out while 
they spend more time on Facebook. Despite various differences among email worms and 
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other isomorphic worms, the manner in which they are spread is similar. Our work, therefore, 
can help create a better understanding of such models. 
There is another type of worm which propagates through the vulnerabilities in the entire IP 
space [36, 78-79]. However, this propagation is unrelated to topology information and is 
already beyond the scope of this chapter. Our major focus is to understand the complex 
propagation dynamics of email worms, and thus, we focus solely on SI models and do not 
consider the recovery process.  
6.3 Generality of the Propagation Model  
6.3.1 Propagation Parameters 
6.3.1.1 Node Status X(t) 
Each node in the network has two different states: „healthy‟ and „infected‟. „Healthy‟ 
means the node is still susceptible and „infected‟ means the node has been infected by email 
worms. We draw a basic state transition graph of an email user in Fig. 6.1(a). Moreover, an 
infected node sends out malicious emails at the precise moment when a user opens the worm 
email. Later, the node remains infected yet dormant until the process of disseminating 
malicious emails is triggered again. To facilitate the description, we set „infected‟ as having 
two sub-states in terms of „active‟ and „inactive‟ respectively to denote an infected computer 
being at the stage of disseminating infectious emails or staying dormant. Let random variable 
Xi(t) denote the status of a network node i at discrete time tick t, so we have  
 
0 healthy
1.1 active
1 infected
1.2 inactive
iX t


 


             (6.1) 
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Our model consists of the propagation process at each discrete time tick. Each time tick t 
can represent an arbitrary time interval in the real world, such as one minute, ten minutes, or 
even one hour. Thus, the absolute time tick value used in a discrete-time model does not 
matter, such as the mean value E[CTi]=40 used in our model. On the other hand, since all 
events are assumed to happen right at discrete time ticks, a discrete-time model would be 
more accurate if a discrete time tick represents a shorter time interval. The expected number 
of infected nodes at time t, n(t), can be easily computed from P(Xi(t))=1. 
        
1 1 1
1
M M M
i i i
i i i
n t E X t E X t P X t
  
 
       
 
              (6.2) 
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Figure 6.1:  State transition graphs of an email user. 
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6.3.1.2 Email Checking Time (CT) 
The infection time includes network latency from node i sending a malicious email to node 
j, and an email checking time delay which is the time when a user opens a malicious email. 
Compared with time costs of checking an email, network latency can be ignored. In this 
chapter, we assume a worm copy is sent at time t and it will appear directly in the receiver‟s 
mailbox next time tick t+1. In fact, the email checking time of a user is a stochastic variable 
determined by the user's habits. For example, some users check email once every morning. 
Some users use email client programs to fetch and check email at a specified time interval or 
at a random time. We use CTi to denote the average email checking time period of node i. 
Each user i will check and read emails with their own CTi. We use a random variable openi(t) 
to indicate the event of user i to check their mailbox at time t, as in 
 
0 user i does not check mailbox at time t
1 user i checks mailbox at time t
iopen t

 

           (6.3) 
To facilitate the description, we introduce G(i, t) to indicate whether user i checks their 
mailbox at time t or not. This can help synchronize propagation dynamics between the nodes 
in the network, as in 
 
0 otherwise
,
1 t mod CT 0i
G i t

 

               (6.4) 
When G(i, t) is equal to one, user i is checking their mailbox. Therefore, we have the 
expression:  
    1 ,iP open t G i t                    (6.5) 
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6.3.1.3 Self-Start Time (RT) 
Currently, certain email worms, such as Win32/Mydoom and Win32.Imsolk, register 
themselves in start-up services and spread at every opportunity, and do not solely rely on a 
user opening emails. This kind of worm will automatically send out malicious copies once 
the system starts or when specific events are triggered. In this chapter, we employ RTi to 
represent the average self-start period of user i. Similar to the definition of email checking 
time CT, we also use the random variable starti(t) to indicate the „self-start‟ event in user i‟s 
computer at time t, as in 
 
0 system i does not start up at time t
1 system i start up at time t
istart t

 

             (6.6) 
We also introduce Q(i, t) to indicate whether the infected computer will send out malicious 
emails by the self-start process at time t or not, as in 
 
0 otherwise
,
1 t mod RT 0i
Q i t

 

                 (6.7) 
Similarly, we have the expression:  
    1 ,iP start t Q i t                             (6.8)  
6.3.1.4 Propagation Matrix (P) 
Whether or not a computer can be infected by worm emails is determined by human 
factors, such as the user's personal habits of checking emails and their security consciousness. 
In our analytical model, we propose employing an M by M square matrix P with elements pij 
to describe a network consisting of M nodes, wherein pij represents the propagation 
probability of the worm spreading from user i to user j. Specifically, when the value of pij is 
not equal to zero, it means the probability that user j is infected by opening malicious emails 
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received from user i. Otherwise, when pij is equal to zero, it means there is no contact 
between user j and user i. Thus, matrix M also reflects the topology of an email network. We 
call this matrix the propagation matrix P of a network, as in 
11 ... ...
... ... [0,1]
... ...
ij ij
MM M M
p
P p p
p

 
 
  
 
 
                (6.9) 
If user i is susceptible, it can be compromised by any of its infected neighbors once this 
user opens a worm email. As shown in Fig. 6.1(b), for non-reinfection email worms, user i is 
susceptible only when this user is at a healthy stage. We have:  
 ( ) 1.1| ( 1) 1.1, ( 1) 0, ( ) 1j i j j ijP X t X t X t open t p                               (6.10) 
However, as shown in Fig. 6.1(c), for reinfection email worms, user i is susceptible, not 
only at healthy but also at an active and inactive state. In addition to (6.11), we have:  
 ( ) 1.1| ( 1) 1.1, ( 1) 1, ( ) 1j i j j ijP X t X t X t open t p                                       (6.11) 
Moreover, as shown in Fig. 6.1(d), similar to reinfection worms, self-start reinfection email 
worms can drive an infected user to the „active‟ state when the user restarts the computer or a 
specific event is triggered. Thus, in addition to (6.10) and (6.11), the propagation probability 
from user i to user j by worm emails but not the self-start process is as follows: 
 ( ) 1.1| ( 1) 1.1, ( 1) 0, ( ) 1j i j j ijP X t X t start t open t p                           (6.12)  
6.3.2 Basic Analytical Model of the Propagation of Email Worms 
According to (6.2), the expected number of infected users is ascribed to the sum of 
probability of being infected for each node in the network. Therefore, the following 
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discussion will be based on how to compute the probability of being infected for each node. 
The procedure of infection for each node can be expressed by a state-transition graph as 
shown in Fig. 6.1. When a healthy but susceptible user opens a worm email, it is infected 
immediately and the worm begins to search the local email contact book to send malicious 
copies. In this phase, this infected user is at the stage of „active‟. After this infected user 
sends out email copies to their friends, it transfers to the next step definitely, called the 
„inactive‟ state, which means the node will not spread worms even if this infected user opens 
malicious copies again. We then have the following computation for the infected probability 
of each node at time t: 
             
321
0)1(0)1(|1.1)(1)1(1)(
f
i
f
ii
f
ii tXPtXtXPtXPtXP   
      (6.13) 
In (6.13), f1 and f3 can be iterated by difference equations. The problem becomes how to 
compute f2. To facilitate the description, we use v(i,t) to represent f2. It indicates user i is 
healthy at time t-1, but is infected at time t. If user i does not open worm emails at time t, 
v(i,t) is equal to zero. Therefore, we have: 
   
 
impossible event
( , )
( ) 1.1, ( ) 0 | ( 1) 0 ( ) 1.1, ( ) 1| ( 1) 0
( ) 1.1, ( ) 1| ( 1) 0
i i i i i i
i i i
v i t
P X t open t X t P X t open t X t
P X t open t X t
         
    
  (6.14) 
There is no relation between a user i opening a worm email at time t and whether this user 
is infected or not at time t-1. Therefore, the random events Xi(t-1) and openi(t) are 
independent. According to the theorem 1, we can compute v(i,t) as follows: 
 
 
( , )
( ) 1.1| ( 1) 0, ( ) 1 ( ( ) 1)
( ) 1.1| ( 1) 0, ( ) 1 ( , )
i i i i
i i i
v i t
P X t X t open t P open t
P X t X t open t G i t
     
    
   
                              (6.15) 
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Theorem 1: we assume there are three arbitrary random variables: A, B, C. When B and C are 
independent, we have P(AB|C)=P(A|BC)P(B). 
Proof: 
            
     
left
right
P ABC P C P ABC P B P B P C
P ABC P B P BC
 
 
                    
In the real world, users will check and read emails according to their own personal habits. 
Once users read malicious emails, worm copies are then sent out. In this chapter, we assume 
email users check their mailbox periodically. Thus, malicious emails in a user‟s mailbox may 
arrive at different times, though they will be read at the same time when the user visits their 
mailbox. We introduce t’ to indicate an arbitrary time within a time period between when a 
user last checks their email and the current time t (excluding time t). It is significant to 
ascertain the number of unread emails after a user last checks their emails. We then have (as 
shown in Fig. 6.2):  
 
' if G(i,t)=1
 mod ' otherwise
i
i
t CT t t
t t CT t t
  

  
                                                  (6.16) 
In  (6.15), we use s(i,t) to represent P(Xi(t)=1.1|Xi(t-1)=0, openi(t)=1). Different from v(i,t), 
this indicates the probability of user i being healthy at time t-1 but infected at time t under the 
condition that the user opens the mailbox at time t. Let Ni denote all neighbors of node i, Ni = 
{j|pij≠0, ∀j}. The malicious emails in a user‟s mailbox come from neighbors Ni. As a result, 
we have the following computation:  
 
        
        
        
impossible event
,
1.1, ' 1.1 1 0, 1
1.1, ' 1.1 1 0, 1
1.1, ' 1.1 1 0, 1
i i j i i
i i j i i
i i j i i
s i t
P X t j N X t X t open t
P X t j N X t X t open t
P X t j N X t X t open t
        
      
       
                  (6.17) 
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If user i receives worm emails from its neighbors, then the probability for user i to be infected 
is as follows:  
 
        
, 1
1 1.1, ' 1.1 1 0, 1
i
i j i i
j N
s i t
P X t X t X t open t

 
      
 
                  (6.18) 
In (6.18), the events Xj(t’)=1.1 and Xi(t-1)=0 are dependent [32]. According to our 
investigation [80], the dependence of the above events is mainly caused by the cycles in the 
propagation procedure. However, it is really a challenge to estimate the effect of this 
dependence. The conditional probability P(Xj(t’)=1.1|Xi(t-1)=0) is computationally too 
expensive to obtain, especially when the size of a neighborhood is large. In paper [32], the 
authors use two approximations for modeling a worm‟s propagation. Readers can find 
extensive discussion in [32, 80]. In this chapter, we use the simple approximation from [32] 
and consider they are independent. We then have:  
1
( , )
1 1 ( ( ) 1.1 ( ') 1.1, ( 1) 0,
( ) 1) ( ( ') 1.1)
1 [1 ( ( ') 1.1)]
i
i
i j i
j N
i j
ji j
j N
f
s i t
P X t X t X t
open t P X t
p P X t


      
  
   


                              (6.19) 
In this section, we have elaborated a basic propagation modeling mechanism. By using 
difference equations to iterate function s(i,t), we are able to estimate the number of infected 
CTi
range of t’
tt-(t mod CTi)
(b)
CTi
range of t’
tt-CTi
(a)
 
Figure 6.2: Different cases of the parameter t’. 
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nodes in the network at time t. In the following sections, we will derive the computation of f1 
of (6.19) in different cases respectively, because it has different values by different kinds of 
email worms. 
6.4 Modeling of Non-reinfection Email Worms   
6.4.1 How Non-reinfection Worms Work  
Non-reinfection email worms usually appear early on. The state transition graph of an 
email user is shown in Fig. 6.1(b). For each „active‟ user, he sends out one malicious copy 
only once even if worm emails are checked several times. Subsequently, the infected user 
becomes „inactive‟ and stays dormant during propagation.  
A healthy email user will be infected only when its neighbors are in the active stage. In Fig. 
6.3, we set up a simple example of non-reinfection worms spreading in three time ticks. User 
1, 2 and 3 are a victim‟s neighbors. In Fig. 6.3(a), user 1 and user 2 check their mailboxes and 
are infected. 
At the same time, two malicious copies are sent to the victim. This process happens at the 
time t-2. In Fig. 6.3(b-1), user 3 checks their mailbox and reads both emails. As a result, a 
copy of the worm is sent to the victim at time t-1. At this time, there are already two worm 
copies in the victim‟s mailbox. Then, in Fig. 6.3(c-1), the victim receives a total of three 
worm copies from their neighbors at time t. 
By investigating the above scenario, we derive the spreading nature of non-reinfection 
email worms: 1) an infected email user has and only has one chance to spread worm copies in 
an active state; 2) once being infected, an email user will send out just one copy to their 
friends. Non-reinfection email worms spread less efficiently in a network. 
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6.4.2 The Model  
In order to model the propagation of non-reinfection email worms, we extend f1 in (6.19). 
If a user j is in an active stage at time t’, according to Fig. 6.1(b), it should be healthy at time 
t’-1. Then we have:   
( , ) 1 1 ( , ' 1) ( ( ' 1) 0)
i
ji j
j N
s i t p v j t P X t

                          (6.20) 
We disassemble (6.20) and then we have:  
1
, ' 1
2
( , ) 1 [1 ( , 2) ( ( 2) 0)]
1 ( , ' 1) ( ( ' 1) 0)
i
i
ji j
j N
f
ji j
j N t t
f
s i t p v j t P X t
p v j t P X t

  
     
     


                       (6.21) 
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Figure 6.3: Example of email worms spreading between nodes in the network. 
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In (6.2), f1can be iterated by difference equations. f2 is similar to (6.21) except that f2 
excludes the infection process at time t-1. According to the condition that if user i checks 
their mailbox at time t-1, we have time t’ drop in a range from the time user i last checked the 
mailbox to t-1 as shown in Fig. 6.4(a). Therefore, f2 in (6.21) is equivalent to s(i, t-1). f2 in 
this case, records the effect of emails received from the time user i last checked their mailbox 
to t-1. Then we have: 
 ( , ) 1 1 ( , 1) 1 ( , 2) ( ( 2) 0)
i
ji j
j N
s i t s i t p v j t P X t

                            (6.22) 
However, as shown in Fig. 6.4(b), if user i checked their mailbox at time t-1, the mailbox 
at current time t would only contain emails sent from neighbors at time t-1. Thus, f2 is 
meaningless and equal to one. So we have  
( , ) 1 1 ( , 2) ( ( 2) 0)
i
ji j
j N
s i t p v j t P X t

                             (6.23) 
We unify the two cases of a user checking mailbox at time t-1, then we have:  
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Figure 6.4: Two cases in the iteration of s(i,t)  
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In (6.24), f1, f2, f3 and f4 represent variables of user i at time t-1. Therefore, the infected 
number (n(t)) in the network at time t can be iterated step by step through the difference 
equations of (6.2), (6.15) and (6.24).  
6.4.3 Evaluation of the Non-reinfection Email Worms Model  
We represent the topology of the logical email network by a directed graph as the sending 
and receiving of emails is governed by different processes. A widely-studied typical complex 
network [6, 32] has a power-law topology, where the nodal degree distribution is 
characterized as P(k) ~ k
-α
 with P(k) being the probability that a node has a degree of k [47, 
81]. We choose a simple power-law network generator proposed in Chapter 5 (See Section 
5.3.1.1) instead of other generators because it has an adjustable power-law exponent α. Paper 
[34] refers to another concept in email networks: the correlated or uncorrelated email 
network.  For a correlated email network, there is a heightened chance that an email user will 
have some people in their contact list if they have this person in theirs. Besides, the email 
addresses of individuals who have large address books tend to appear in the address books of 
many others. In this chapter, we use reciprocity to indicate the fraction of edges between 
users that point both ways and follow the research findings of [62]: the reciprocity is equal to 
0.23. 
We compare the performance of our proposed analytical model with that of some well-
known models: the simulation model [6] and the spatial-temporal model [32]. These two 
models have been verified by the authors to be more accurate than earlier models, such as the 
epidemic models in [34, 53-55] and the AAWP model [10]. In this chapter, we expect the 
evaluation of our model to be closer to the simulation model than the spatial-temporal model. 
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It should be noted that we compare our model with the independent spatial-temporal model 
according to the independence assumption in this chapter. 
Our implementation is in Visual C++ 2008 SP1 and Matlab 7. The random numbers in our 
experiments are produced by the C++ TR1 library extensions. In the experiments, we set two 
initially infectious nodes. The degree of the topology follows the power-law distribution 
(α=2.58). We assume the total number of nodes in the network is 100,000, and the simulation 
program runs 100 times. 
In this subsection, we carry out two experiments to evaluate the performance of the 
propagation of non-reinfection worms with the same parameters as [6]. Fig. 6.5 shows the 
comparison of the aforementioned models in the uncorrelated and correlated network 
respectively, with infection probability p=0.5 or p=0.3 and CT~N(40, 20
2
). Firstly, we found 
the performance of our model much closer to the simulation model than to the spatial-
temporal model. The main reason is that our analytical model takes into account the user 
checking period, whereas the spatial-temporal model considers that a user opens an email at 
the time of receiving it. Apparently, this is not realistic according to the above statement. 
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Figure 6.5: The propagation of non-reinfection worms with different infection probability p.     
(a) Uncorrelated network with CT~ N(40, 20
2
); (b) Correlated network with CT~ N(40, 20
2
) 
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Thus, the spreading speed of the spatial-temporal model is faster and cannot match the 
simulation model very well. Secondly, the analytical model in Fig. 6.5(a) fits the simulation 
model better than Fig. 6.5(b). This is because the dependence effect on the uncorrelated 
network is weaker than that on the correlated network. We have proven this as follows.  
Proof: For an uncorrelated email network, the effect on the dependence of events (e.g. 
Xj(t)=1.1and Xi(t-1)=0) is weak. We generate the uncorrelated email network as follows. For 
each user, we let a user‟s out-bound edge point to any other randomly selected users, and thus 
the out-degree and in-degree of users is uncorrelated. According to our investigation [80], the 
dependence of the above events is mainly caused by propagation cycles in the spreading 
procedure. A propagation cycle is a spreading route from one user back to itself through 
several intermediate users. For a cycle with one intermediate user, we have:  
 
 
 
 
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2 2
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( ) 1.1| ( 2 ) 1.1
1 1 1
i i i
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D E p E p
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  
           
wherein, D is an average out-degree of each user. N is the network size. E(pij) is the mean of 
the propagation probability of the worm spreading from any user i to user j. Generally, for the 
cycle with k intermediate users, we then have:  
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In this chapter, we generate the email network with D=8, E(pij)=0.5 and N=100,000. It is 
easy to achieve the result where the above formula has a maximum when k is equal to one. 
Then we have:  
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Therefore, we prove that the negative effect on dependence is weak in the uncorrelated 
network. 
Nevertheless, due to the correlated network having a large reciprocity (0.23), many 
propagation cycles exist in the spreading procedure. As discussed in [80], a large number of 
cycles lead to the non-negligible dependence effect on the correlated network. Moreover, it is 
observed that the infection probability p can affect the accuracy of the model. In both Fig. 
6.5(a) and (b), the analytical model with a larger infection probability (p=0.5) fits better with 
the simulation model than the case with a smaller infection probability (p=0.3). In fact, the 
infected scale and speed are largely determined by the early stage of the worm‟s propagation 
[79]. If the infection probability is small, the propagation procedure in the simulation model 
can probably be stopped in the early stages. This results in the small infected scale of the 
network greatly reducing the mean value of n(t). We then have: 
Remark 1: Our analytical model performs better when the email worm is more deceptive 
(means larger infection probability). 
Different from Fig. 6.5, Fig. 6.6 compares models in the uncorrelated and correlated 
network respectively with different email checking time CT~N(40,20
2
) or CT~N(20,10
2
) and 
p=0.5. From both Fig. 6.6(a) and (b), we can conclude that the spreading speed is faster if the 
email checking period is shorter. Similar to Fig. 6.5, when compared with models in an 
uncorrelated network, the models in a correlated network have a larger dependence effect on 
the propagation procedure. In the real world, the correlated network is more realistic [62]. 
Thus, we have: 
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Remark 2: We have to improve the accuracy of our analytical model by eliminating the 
dependence effect. An inspired measurement is to integrate the Markov approximation [32] 
or propagation cycles [80] into our analytical model. 
6.5 Modeling of Reinfection Email Worms  
6.5.1 How Reinfection Worms Work  
Reinfection email worms can greatly accelerate the worm spreading speed as the malicious 
copy will be sent out every time the user opens the worm email. The state transition graph of 
an email user is shown in Fig. 6.1(c). Different from non-reinfection, when an inactive user 
checks a worm email, this user will become active and once again send out malicious copies 
to their neighbors. In order to investigate the propagation process among the email users in 
the network, we have another example of reinfection worms spreading in three time ticks in 
Fig. 6.3. Similar to non-reinfection email worms, in Fig. 6.3(a), infected user 1 and user 2 
send two malicious copies to the victim at time t-2. In Fig. 6.3(b-2), user 3 reads both emails 
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Figure 6.6: The propagation of non-reinfection worms with different email checking time CT.  
(a) Uncorrelated network with p=0.5; (b) Correlated network with p=0.5 
Chapter 6 Modeling Propagation Dynamics of Email Worms 
150 
inside the mailbox and two copies of the worm are sent to the victim at time t-1. As a result, 
in Fig. 6.3(c-2), the victim receives a total of four worm copies from their neighbors at time t.  
Through analysis of the individual steps and the state transition above, we derive the 
spreading nature of reinfection email worms as follows: 1) an infected user will go into an 
active state and send out worm copies after being infected not only from a healthy state but 
also from an infected state; 2) the number of malicious emails sent by an infected user is 
determined by the number of worm emails this user reads when they open their mailbox. 
Compared with non-reinfection worms, reinfection email worms are far more efficient to 
spread in a network. 
6.5.2 Underestimation in the Traditional Simulation Model  
The traditional simulation model [6] ignores the second part of propagating reinfection 
worms. An infected user in the simulation model always sends only one worm copy to their 
neighbors even if the user opens two or more infectious emails. Take Fig. 6.3(c-2) for 
example, one of the two emails from user 3 will be neglected and the victim will receive a 
total of three emails at time t. 
However, the problem is not as simple as we have discussed above. If we revise the 
simulation model to satisfy the second spreading nature, the simulation model becomes a 
time-consuming process. The situation becomes worse when the scale of the email network is 
enlarged. In Fig. 6.7, we observe that the number of emails received by each user increases 
exponentially. Intuitively, this phenomenon is attributed to the snowball effect: we simply 
suppose each email user is connected to m users and will read all emails received. Initially, 
each user has m worm emails. Subsequently, users will receive m
2
 worm emails after one 
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mailbox checking period. Similarly, it is easy to know that each user will be overwhelmed by 
worm emails within a short period of time. 
In the real world, however, email recipients may be aware of the number of emails they 
receive in their mailbox. If the number of emails exceeds the usual number, email users may 
not open all of them. A user‟s vigilance leads to an infected user sending out more than one 
but still a limited number of worm copies to their friends, which is mainly determined by 
social engineering techniques the worm adopts and also the user‟s awareness. For example, 
email worms like Mydoom [72] have many different subject topics. Some email worms, like 
w32.Imsolk [58], are more deceiving because the email titles are labeled with “Here you are”. 
The vigilance effect is hard to estimate and we do not know the true impact of the real worms 
propagation. In order to see how it affects the spreading procedure, we introduce a vigilance 
degree as β. In this chapter, we assume email users mainly communicate with their friends 
and the number of emails sent by users will not exceed β times the length of their contact list. 
We will evaluate the vigilance effect with a series of β (See Section 6.5.5). 
 
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Time Ticks t
a
v
e
ra
g
e
 n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
e
m
a
il
s 
e
a
c
h
 u
se
r 
re
c
e
iv
e
s
Average outdegree is 8
 
 
snowball effect
vigilance effect
users are aware of the
 abnormal number of emails
exponentially increase
 
Figure 6.7: Snowball effect and vigilance effect. 
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According to the above analysis, we revise the simulation model [6] and compare it. As 
shown in Fig. 6.8, it is noticeable that the simulation model significantly underestimates the 
spreading ability of reinfection email worms. Later, we will use the revised simulation model 
to evaluate our analytical model. 
6.5.3 Virtual User  
We use six nodes to illustrate the propagation between email users in the network. As 
shown in Fig. 6.9(a), User U5 may be infected three times by possibly opening one to a 
maximum of three malicious email attachments from U1, U2 and U3. User U6 receives emails 
from U4 and U5 but may be infected again by the possible arrival of another two malicious 
emails from U5. In order to model the infection process of U6, we propose a concept of 
virtual users to explain the possible repetitious infection caused by U5 opening more than one 
worm copies. As is shown in Fig. 6.9(b), U5_1 represents U6 being infected by U5 for the first 
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Figure 6.8: Underestimation in the traditional simulation model. 
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time. If U5 reads two worm emails, we use U5_2 to represent the possible infection of U6 for 
the second time. Similarly, U5_3 represents the third possible infection if U5 reads three emails. 
To facilitate the explanation, we simply set the email checking period as one time tick and the 
current time as t in this example. U1, U2, U3 and U4 initially have only one worm email in 
their mailbox. Then we have:  
3
5_1 5
1
( ( 1) 1.1) 1 1 ( ( 2) 1.1)j j
j
P X t P X t p

                           (6.25) 
We introduce a random variable ki(t) to denote the number of emails user i reads at time t. 
Besides, we use variable Yij(t)=P(Xi(t-1)=1.1)pij to indicate the probability of user j having 
received and read the email from user i and variable ij(t)= 1- P(Xi(t-1)=1.1)pij to indicate the 
negation of Yij(t). We have  
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Figure 6.9: The propagation of reinfection and self-start reinfection worms. 
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Actually, if the number of users in the network is large enough, it is exceptionally hard to 
examine P(ki(t-1)=K) on each K by each user. K is the number of emails that a user has 
opened. Suppose the network has m users, the complexity of the algorithm to obtain the 
infection probability of each virtual user is O(m
3
). In this chapter, we adopt an approximate 
calculation. Generally, the Bernoulli experiment is widely used to model the number of 
successes in a sample drawn from a large population. Thus, we use the approximation as 
follows:  
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5_ 2 5_1 3 5| 5|( 1) 1.1 ( 1) 1.1 ( ) 1 ( )ave aveP X t P X t C p t p t                     (6.28) 
whereas C3
1
 is the Bernoulli coefficient. Pi|ave(t) denotes the average probability of user j 
having received and read the email from user i, as in  
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We also have,  
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Therefore, the probability of user U6 being infected and sending out worm copies is as 
follows:  
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6.5.4 The Model 
In this section, we follow the above discussion and example to build the propagation model 
of reinfection email worms. As shown in Fig. 6.1(c), not only a healthy but also an infected 
user can become active and send out worm emails to their neighbors. We define vR(i,t) as the 
probability of user i having been infected at time t-1 and being active at time t. Then we have: 
   , ( ) 1.1 ( 1) 1R i iv i t P X t X t                                (6.32) 
In order to model the propagation of reinfection email worms, we extend f1 in (6.19) of the 
basic model. Similar to the non-reinfection model, we assume the events Xj(t‟)=1.1 and Xi(t-
1)=1 are independent in this chapter. Then according to theorem 2, we have:  
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Theorem 2: when the events Xj(t‟)=1.1 and Xi(t-1)=1 are independent, there is vR(i,t)=v(i,t). 
Proof: similar to (6.15), (6.17) and (6.18), we have the following derivation:  
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If the events Xj(t‟)=1.1 and Xi(t-1)=1 are independent, similar to (6.19), we then prove the 
proposition as in: 
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We continue to disassemble (33) for iteration, as in 
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According to the condition, if user i checks their mailbox at time t-1, s(i,t) may have 
different results. Similar to the analysis in Section 6.4.2, we have a unified conclusion as in 
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Different from non-reinfection email worms, the neighbors Ni of user i should be 
composed of two parts: real users and virtual users. We use Ni|R to represent real neighbors 
and Ni|V to represent virtual neighbors. Note that Ni|R is constant for each user i in our 
topology, but Ni|V(t) is determined by the propagation procedure of worms. Ni|V(t) varies at 
different time t. Thus, we have  
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Visual users are created when corresponding real users are infected. We assume that visual 
users send worm copies to their neighbors at the time they are created. That is, visual users 
are healthy before, but infected when they are created. Thus, for a visual user which is 
created at time t, we have: 
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Because visual users are supposed to be initially healthy, we have f1 is equal to one and f2 
is equal to zero in (6.37). According to the analysis of the virtual users and the vigilance 
effect in Section 6.5.2 and 6.5.3, we have:  
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wherein ||Ni|V(t)|| is the number of visual users at time t, which can be iterated in the 
propagation procedure. In this chapter, we assume the number of emails sent by a user i will 
not exceed β times the length of user i‟s contact list (Di), so we use min(||Ni|V(t)||, Di) to obtain 
the minimum value. K ranges from 1 to min(||Ni|V(t-2)||, βDi). P(Xj_K(t)=1.1) is the probability 
for the k-th virtual user of real user j to be at an active state. We calculate P(Xj_K(t)=1.1) as in:  
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Pi|ave can be calculated as in 
   |
1
|| ||
i
i ave ji
j Ni
p t Y t
N 
                                    (6.40) 
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In (6.38), all the components can be determined by the variables of user i at time t-1 or t-2. 
Therefore, the number of infected users in the network (n(t)) can be estimated by difference 
equations of (6.2), (6.15) and (6.38). 
6.5.5 Evaluation of the Reinfection Email Worms Model  
In this subsection, we carry out three experiments to evaluate the performance of 
propagation for reinfection worms with the same parameters as [6]. To the best of our 
knowledge, there are no analytical models that describe the propagation of reinfection and 
self-start reinfection worms. [32] discussed the propagation of worms in the network on the 
basis of a non-reinfection spreading mechanism. In this subsection, we compare our 
analytical model with the simulation model and expect its performance to be closer to the 
simulation model.  
Fig. 6.10 shows the comparison of models in the uncorrelated and correlated network 
respectively with infection probability p=0.5 or p=0.3 and CT~N(40, 20
2
). Similar to the non-
reinfection case, the results in the uncorrelated network are a lot better in relation to 
performance than in the correlated network. Meanwhile, it is observed that our analytical 
model is fairly accurate to the simulation model if users have a higher probability of opening 
malicious emails. Fig. 6.11 depicts the comparison of models in the uncorrelated and 
correlated network respectively with different email checking time CT~N(40,20
2
) or 
CT~N(20,10
2
) and p=0.5.  We then have: 
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Remark 3:  Our analytical model can accurately reflect the propagation of reinfection worms. 
The simulation model [6] did not consider the effect of repetitious spreading and assumed 
only one copy was sent by an infected user, which results in underestimating the scale of 
infection throughout the network. However, the repetitious spreading can lead to an 
overwhelming number of emails without considering user awareness. In order to be more 
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Figure 6.10: The propagation of reinfection worms with different infection probability p. 
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Figure 6.11: The propagation of reinfection worms with different infection probability p.  
(a) Uncorrelated network with CT~ N(40, 20
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); (b) Correlated network with CT~ N(40, 20
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realistic, we introduce virtual users sending malicious copies in the propagation procedure. 
To overcome the snowball effect, we adopt the vigilance degree β to reflect a user‟s 
awareness when they receive an abnormal number of emails. As shown in Fig. 6.12, when the 
value of β increases, the spreading speed becomes faster. A high value of β represents more 
malicious copies checked by users so that users can be easier to infect. In our analytical 
model, this means more virtual users are involved in the propagation procedure. Thus, we 
have:   
Remark 4: A large β can lead to a more accurate model when the worm is fairly deceptive 
However, it is observed that the increase of spreading speed decreases with the increasing 
β. This is because the infected probability of virtual users decreases in (6.28) and (6.38). 
Meanwhile, a large β may consume a great deal of computation. Thus, we need to choose a 
large but suitable β for modeling.   
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Figure 6.12: Reinfection worms‟ propagation with β. 
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6.6 Modeling of Self-start Reinfection Worms  
6.6.1 How Self-start Reinfection Worms Work  
Evolving from reinfection, self-start reinfection worms register themselves in start-up 
services and automatically send out malicious copies once the system starts or specific events 
are triggered. For example, in Fig. 6.3 (b-3), user 2 sends out a worm email to the victim at 
time t-1 as self-start reinfection. The victim receives five worm emails from their neighbors 
at time t. The state transition graph of an email user is shown as in Fig. 6.1(d). We use vS(i,t) 
to indicate the probability of user i having been infected at time t-1 and being active at time t 
under the scenario of self-start reinfection.  
6.6.2 The Model  
The self-start reinfection propagation procedure is determined by a user‟s personal habits 
and, thus, it is independent of the event of Xi(t-1)=1. Different from reinfection, we derive 
vS(i,t) as in:  
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According to theorem 3, we have 
 ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) 1 ( , )sv i t Q i t v i t Q i t                                (6.42) 
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Theorem 3: when the events Xj(t‟)=1.1 and Xi(t-1)=1 are independent, there is 
P(Xi(t)=1.1|starti(t)=1, Xi(t-1)=1) is equal to v(i,t). 
Proof: similar to (6.15), (6.17) and (6.18), we have the following derivation:  
In this work, we assume the events Xj(t‟)=1.1 and Xi(t-1)=1 are independent. Similar to (6.19), 
we then prove the proposition as in 
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Therefore, f1 in (6.41) is equal to v(i,t). 
In order to model the propagation of self-start reinfection email worms, we extend f1 in 
(6.19) of the basic model. Then we have  
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Similar to (6.34) and (6.35), we can derive (6.44) as in:  
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As is shown in Fig. 6.9(c), the self-start process can be considered as a virtual user (Ni|S) 
who sends worm emails to user i periodically. We disassemble the neighbors of user i into 
three parts: Ni|R, Ni|V and Ni|S. For Ni|R and Ni|V, we have f2=0 because there is no self-start 
Chapter 6 Modeling Propagation Dynamics of Email Worms 
163 
effect on them. For Ni|S, we also have f1=0 because this kind of virtual user results from the 
self-start process rather than from worm spreading. Therefore, we are able to factorize (6.44) 
as in  
 
 
    
   
 
|
| |
|
, '
, ' , '
_
( 2)
1
,
1 (1 ( , 1) ( , 1)) 1 ( , 2)
1 ( , 2) ( , 2) ( 2) 1
1 1 2 1.1
( , 2) ( 2) 1
i R
iV i S
iV
i
ji
j N t
ji j
j N t j N t
ji j K
j N t
j
j N
f
s i t
G i t s i t p v j t
p v j t Q j t P X t
p P X t
Q j t P X t




 
 

      
    
    
 
   
  
 

 

, 'S t

                    (6.45) 
f1 in (6.44) can be calculated by iteration. Therefore, the number of infected users in the 
network (n(t)) for self-start reinfection worms can be estimated by difference equations (6.2), 
(6.15) and (6.45).  
6.6.3 Evaluation of the Self-start Reinfection Worms Model  
The difference between the propagation of reinfection and self-start reinfection worms is 
that the latter can be trigged by specific events and the system restart process. The 
propagation dynamics of self-start reinfection is similar to the one of reinfection. In this 
subsection, we mainly analyze the impact of the self-start period RT on the propagation 
procedure. The dependency effect may affect the investigation of the self-start process, and 
thus, we only examine the propagation of self-start reinfection worms in the uncorrelated 
network.  
In Fig. 6.13, it is observed that the spreading speed is faster if the self-start period is short. 
If a spreading process can be trigged by more events such as opening a picture or movie files, 
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it means the worm is more aggressive and has a faster propagation speed.  However, in the 
real world, it is harder for aggressive worms to conceal themselves. Our analytical model can 
reflect the self-start reinfection propagation process. 
6.6.4 Comparison of the Spreading Speed of Different Email Worms  
We constructed our basic model of worm propagation in Section 6.3.2. The mechanism of 
spreading varies for different type of worms. As shown in Fig. 6.3, the victim receives three 
worm emails for non-reinfection, four for reinfection and five for self-start reinfection. In this 
subsection, we will investigate and compare the spreading speed of each type of worm. We 
also discuss the reason for their derivation. 
Remark 5: The spreading speed of reinfection worms is much faster than non-reinfection 
worms. 
We use the number of infected users at time t(n(t)) as the benchmark to estimate the 
spreading speed. The key propagation procedure is described by (6.23) for non-reinfection 
worms and by (6.37) for reinfection worms. In (6.23), f2 belongs to [0, 1] so that s(i,t) of 
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Figure 6.13: The propagation of self-start reinfection worms in an uncorrelated network with RT. 
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(6.23) is less than (1-λ) in (6.37). Moreover, (6.37) contains the component which reflects the 
effect of virtual users in the propagation of worms, and the value of this component is less 
than one. Thus, it is easy to prove the spreading speed of reinfection worms is much faster 
than non-reinfection worms. 
Remark 6: The spreading speed of self-start reinfection worms is much faster than reinfection 
worms. 
The key propagation procedure of self-start reinfection worms is described by (6.43). 
Compared with reinfection, (6.43) has an extra component f1, which reflects the effect of the 
propagation procedure when the system starts or specific events are triggered. The value of f1 
is less than one. As a result, the value of (6.37) is less than (6.43). Therefore, the spreading 
speed of self-start reinfection worms is much faster than reinfection worms. 
We compare the spreading speeds and show the difference between different kinds of 
email worms in Fig. 6.14. We find reinfection and self-start reinfection email worms 
propagate much faster than non-reinfection email worms. 
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Figure 6.14: The propagation of non-reinfection, reinfection and self-start reinfection worms in an 
uncorrelated network. 
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6.7 Summary 
This chapter presented a new method for modeling the propagation process of email 
worms. We discussed three categories of email worms: non-reinfection, reinfection and self-
start reinfection. We also analyzed previous research and compared our approach with these 
works. The evaluation we performed demonstrates the accuracy of our approach. Researchers 
can employ our analytical model to analyze the propagation of worms in order to provide 
defense strategies. We believe this is the most significant characteristic and the most 
important contribution of this thesis. 
There is still much work to be done in relation to the propagation of email worms. Firstly, 
in this chapter, we focused on the modeling propagation procedure for various email worms. 
As part of our ongoing work, we plan to estimate the parameters of worms‟ propagation and 
use our proposed model to study the countermeasures [82] for controlling the spread of email 
worms. Secondly, by making use of our model, we have studied the impact of the underlying 
topology on the propagation of worms. However, an email network is essentially a complex 
network, and many factors of complex networks can affect the propagation and defense of 
worms but these have not been explored in this work [83-84]. Thirdly, in a correlated email 
network, the effect on dependence cannot be neglected. In order to analyze the model more 
accurately, future work will pay attention to eliminating the impact on dependence 
completely. Readers can find more details in [32] and [80]. Finally, in the real world, infected 
users may clean the email worms and recover. More comprehensive analysis on the 
propagation of worms should involve the recovery procedure. In this thesis, we mainly 
focused on the propagation procedure and thus, our model is based on the SI model.
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Chapter 7  
Conclusions and Future Work 
This chapter summarizes the main contributions of this thesis on modeling and defenses 
against worm propagation in networks. It also provides suggestions for improving our 
research in the future. 
7.1 Conclusions 
In this thesis, we have conducted research on the characterization of worm spreading 
behavior, analyzed their propagation mechanisms, modeled their propagation procedures and 
developed defense strategies. The research contributions of this thesis have been made in the 
following areas. 
7.1.1 A Microcosmic Model of Worm Propagation  
Each year, large amounts of money and labor are spent by the industry on patching 
vulnerabilities in operating systems and popular software. In order to prevent worms from 
spreading effectively, many models have been proposed by research and application 
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communities. Most worm propagation models, however, are based on a macroscopic 
viewpoint. They focus on the overall tendency of the worm to spread and do not describe the 
worm propagation from node to node or the infection procedure when disrupted by patching 
or immunizing nodes. Consequently, the macroscopic model makes it hard to deal with the 
problems of where, when and how many nodes we need to patch. The question then arises as 
to how we can develop a model that can accurately reflect the distribution of nodes in the 
network, which is beneficial for describing the propagation procedure, and thus, can answer 
the three proposed problems.  
In Chapter 3, a microcosmic worm propagation model was proposed. We introduced a 
complex matrix to represent the probabilities and the time delay between each pair of nodes. 
These two factors lead to an accurate exploration of the propagation procedure and estimation 
of both infection scale and the effectiveness of defense. We also developed three vectors for 
investigating the different scenarios of infectious states, vulnerable states and quarantine 
states. Compared with a macrocosmic propagation model, a microcosmic model prefers to 
study the dynamic propagation between nodes and is able to understand how the current 
infected states impact on the worm‟s propagation in the next step. In addition, we introduced 
an error calibration vector for analyzing the errors caused by reinfection in macroscopic 
models. Modeling a microcosmic propagation procedure can provide defenders with useful 
information to deal with the problems of where, when and how many nodes we need to patch.   
7.1.2 Defense Study against Scanning Worms 
Scanning is one of the most common strategies employed by worms for spreading. Scan-
based worms (scanning worms) probe the entire network and infect targets without regard to 
topological constraints. It is closely related to the logical features of the network rather than 
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the physical structure. The objective of studying scanning worms is to address the three 
practical aspects of preventing worm propagation: where, when and how many nodes we need 
to patch.  
In Chapter 4, we used Code Red II as an example to evaluate the vulnerability distribution 
and patch strategy vector from the microcosmic worm propagation model in Chapter 3 and 
presented a series of recommendations and advice for immunization defense. Firstly, the IP 
ranges with a high density of vulnerable nodes are essential areas for patching. Secondly, for 
high risk vulnerabilities, it is critical that networks reduce the number of vulnerable nodes to 
below a certain threshold, e.g., 80% in this analysis. Thirdly, increased disclosure of specific 
vulnerabilities could possibly be delayed until the patching rate reaches a certain threshold, 
e.g., at least 20% in this analysis. Moreover, we observed the effect of different impact factors 
step by step, which reflected the mutual impact between the propagation probability and time 
delay. Experimental results indicated that an increase in time delay results in a small 
propagation probability of the worm‟s propagation. In addition, the overestimation in 
macroscopic models caused by propagation cycles was also discussed. 
7.1.3 Defense Study against Topology-based Worms 
Topology information is a fundamental element that enables topology-based worms, such 
as email worms and social network worms. In order to control the impact of their outbreak, 
large amounts of money and labor are spent on devising effective strategies for defense. 
Questions then arise as to how to model the propagation mechanism of topology-based worms 
so that we can provide effective schemes to deal with the problems of where and how many 
nodes we need to patch to prevent them from propagating.   
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In Chapter 5, a novel probability matrix was proposed to model the spreading of topology-
based worms. We introduced a propagation source vector and a patch strategy vector to 
evaluate their effects in different spreading scenarios and investigate a more effective 
immunization defense for preventing worms from propagating. We take a typical topology-
based worm, such as an email worm, as an example investigating how a worm spreads from 
one node to another node through a group of intermediate nodes. Through model analysis, we 
derive a better understanding of dynamic infection procedures in each step to answer the 
proposed questions. The results from experiments showed that, for a power law network, a 
more effective patch strategy against email worm propagation is to immunize the most-
connected nodes. Besides this, the effect of random patching is not obvious as email worm 
spreading relies on the underlying connectivity between each pair of nodes. In addition, we 
analyzed the formation of propagation errors and examined the impact of eliminating errors 
on the propagation procedure of topology-based worms. We have shown through simulations 
that errors increase as more propagation cycles are formed and quantified the errors under 
different propagation scenarios. This work is helpful for the accurate analysis of worm 
spreading. 
7.1.4 Modeling the Propagation Dynamics of Email Worms 
Spreading malicious code through email is still effective and is widely used by current 
attackers. However, previous work has preferred to rely on simulation modeling rather than 
on mathematical analysis because of the following two aspects. Firstly, each user has their 
own habits for checking emails. It is really hard to characterize the propagation dynamics with 
different mailbox checking time between email users in a large scale network. Secondly, 
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modern email worms belong to reinfection or self-start reinfection worms. This means it is 
difficult to model the repetitious email sending process.  
In Chapter 7, an analytical model was proposed to characterize the propagation dynamics 
of email worms. Our model extensively investigates different classes of real-world worms 
based on their infection strategies, including non-reinfection, reinfection, and modern self-
start reinfection categories. We examined the individual steps and state transitions in the 
propagation procedure. Compared to the simulation model [6] and the spatial-temporal model 
[32], our model can provide an accurate representation of the propagation of worms with 
different checking time of mailboxes from users. We also analyzed the propagation 
mechanisms of reinfection and self-start reinfection worms respectively. In particular, the 
concept of virtual users was introduced to represent the process of sending repetitive emails. 
Therefore, our model can accurately reflect the propagation of reinfection and self-start 
reinfection worms. The results from our experiments indicate that our analytical model is 
accurate and helpful in providing a better and more realistic understanding of the propagation 
of email worms. 
7.2 Future Work 
There are a number of areas where future work can be pursued. 
 Characterizing the propagation of social network worms: The spreading of 
social network worms rely on the topology of social networks, which may result in 
a problem of spatial dependence in the propagation procedure. This means that 
compromised users will infect their neighbors but the probabilities for those 
compromised users being infected may be due to their neighbors having been 
infected before and then spreading the worm to these compromised users. This 
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results in redundant computation of infection probabilities. In order to simplify this 
problem, some research has assumed the status of all nodes at each time tick to be 
spatially independent. However, it is a weak approximation to the spreading 
dynamics. Therefore, we will attempt to discover what the spatial dependence is 
and how we can approximate it so that we can eliminate the redundancy and 
describe the real spreading probability.  
 Locating defense positions: The centrality of a node in a social network is a 
measure of its structural importance and prominence in the group. It can be 
calculated in a number of ways depending on whether one measures it in terms of 
the degree, the closeness or the betweenness. In this thesis, we have proved that 
patching the highly-connected (high degree) nodes is an effective immunization 
defense for preventing topology-based worms from spreading. Under certain 
conditions, however, such as when some popular users (highly-connected nodes in 
the network) have more vigilance of malicious codes, this may not always be the 
truth. Therefore, how to locate more suitable positions through a measure of 
betweenness and closeness for slowing down the worm propagation should be 
considered in future research. 
 Overhead analysis:  The proposed model in the thesis investigates the propagation 
probability between each pair of nodes through matrix computation. If the 
simulated network has a larger scale, the simulation overhead can be prohibitively 
high in some cases. In the real world, however, some nodes have no direct 
connection in the Internet. If those nodes can be removed from the proposed model, 
the simulation overhead can be saved to a certain extent. Therefore, how to 
represent the nodes without direct connection in the Internet in the proposed model 
should be considered in future work. 
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 Attack source analysis:  In the real world, the distribution and number of attack 
sources has considerable impact on the spreading speed of worms.  Understanding 
the topology of the entire network has been a great help for defenders in analyzing 
the attack sources and then deploying the immunization defense. However, except 
for ISPs and administrators of social networks, it is hard to obtain the structure of 
the entire network. The problem then arises as to how we can minimize the number 
of possible attack sources with only partial network knowledge and effectively 
prevent worm propagation. 
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